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 Voorwoord 
Elke week maakt de klimaatverandering het nieuws. Ondanks deze steeds groeiende 
aandacht is een algehele economisch en politiek haalbare oplossing nog niet in zicht. 
Hoewel de grote transformatie uitblijft, bevinden we ons in een transitiefase. Stap 
voor stap komen deeloplossingen naar boven die fungeren als een minuscuul stukje 
uit een immense puzzel.  
Ook in de elektriciteitssector heeft de klimaatverandering zijn weerslag. Slechts 
enkele decennia geleden zou een mens raar opkijken wanneer hij of zij in een huis 
terechtkwam met een Tesla voor de deur, zonnepanelen op het dak, een slimme 
meter in de kelder, een batterijpakket in de tuin, een robotstofzuiger en slimme 
witgoedtoestellen die reageren op de elektriciteitsprijs in de keuken en in-home 
displays en tablets met bijhorende informatie over elektriciteitsverbruik in de 
woonkamer. Vandaag beseffen we dat dit realiteit kan zijn. Ik ben benieuwd wat we 
binnen 10 jaar mogelijk achten. Ondanks dat het woord “dynamiek” traditioneel niet 
gelinkt wordt aan de elektriciteitssector, kunnen we deze stelling vandaag 
ontkrachten. De transitie komt op toerental, dynamiek is het codewoord. En ik heb 
het geluk om hiervan deel uit te mogen maken. 
Met volgende quote van Bill Gates in het achterhoofd, wil ik mijn steentje bijdragen: 
“We always overestimate the change that will occur in the next two years and 
underestimate the change that will occur in the next ten. Don't let yourself be lulled 
into inaction.” Laat ik met deze wijze woorden de thesis op gang trekken, en mijn 
uiterst minieme bijdrage leveren aan een ongekende nieuwe wereld. 
Alvorens volledig van start te gaan, wil ik het niet nalaten om enkele personen te 
bedanken die rechtstreeks en onrechtstreeks een bijdrage leverden aan mijn werk.  
Vooreerst wil ik mijn promotor, Professor Belmans bedanken om mij vertrouwen te 
geven en mij de kans te geven om een doctoraat te vervolledigen. Door zijn 
academische en industriële ervaring en zijn visie, creëert hij werk en mogelijkheden 
binnen en buiten ELECTA. Ik ben blij dat ik van deze optie gebruik gemaakt heb. 
Bovendien stond hij me toe om in alle vrijheid mijn weg te zoeken binnen de 
academische wereld en op de kritieke momenten bood hij de nodige stimulans om er 
nog eens tegenaan te gaan. 
Ook wil ik Professor Driesen bedanken. Dankzij hem ben ik meegestapt in de KIC 
PhD school. Hij was mijn directe aanspreekpunt. Door de buitenlandse avonturen die 
volgden, ben ik gegroeid als academicus en persoon.  
In this perspective, I also want to thank Professor Ramos for being my host at the 
Institute for Research and Technology at Comillas Pontifical University. During my 
stay, I was welcomed with open arms. This time proved to be very fruitful in the 
academic way. Special thanks also to Dr. Luis Olmos and Kristin Dietrich for the 
interesting talks about dynamic tariff design and the ROM-model. I also want to 
thank all colleagues and friends from the institute for the necessary distractions apart 
from work. 
I also thank Ms. Kiliccote for being my host at the demand response research center 
at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Through her close connections with 
industry, I was able to get in contact with several demand response companies and 
get familiar with the North-American demand response market. Our weekly 
discussions proved to be a good exercise to check my academic results with reality. 
Mijn economische achtergrond wou ik niet verloochenen. Daarom is een deeltje van 
dit doctoraat gebaseerd op economische en econometrische modellen. Hierbij wil ik 
Professor Pepermans bedanken. Door onze vele discussies, ben ik dieper in de 
materie gedoken en heb ik antwoorden gevonden op voordien niet gestelde vragen. 
Mede dankzij hem, is mijn werk beter in lijn met de economische theorie. 
Professor D’haeseleer bedank ik voor zijn nuttige feedback op deze tekst. Bovendien 
heb ik gebruik kunnen maken van de rijke ervaring die bij TME rond unit-
commitment modellen is opgebouwd. De feedback van Kenneth Bruninx en Dr. Erik 
Delarue werd ten zeerste geapprecieerd. 
Mijn dank gaat ook uit naar Professor Adhemar Bultheel om de preliminaire en 
publieke verdediging voor te zitten. 
Voorts wil ik heel ELECTA bedanken. In deze dynamische omgeving, heb ik de 
opportuniteit gehad om ervaring uit te bouwen op verschillende terreinen: 
academisch onderzoek, begeleiden van thesissen, projectwerk, nauwe 
samenwerkingen met industrie, werkpakketleiderschap, labo’s geven, assistent van 
een vak, enz. Bovendien ben ik als newbie gestart op een topic genaamd “demand 
response” en heb ik ELECTA zien uitgroeien tot een gevestigde waarde in deze 
materie. De stappen die we de laatste jaren op dit en vele andere vlakken gezet 
hebben zijn onnavolgbaar. De elektriciteitssector is in volle dynamiek en we kunnen 
stellen dat ELECTA de boot niet gemist heeft. Het allerbelangrijkste is bovendien dat 
ik in tussentijd omringd was door de meest fantastische collega’s. Aan de 
collegialiteit en amusementswaarde zullen weinige onderzoeksgroepen kunnen 
tippen. Ik zou elke collega 1 voor 1 kunnen bedanken. Al is het niet voor het pintje 
bier, de gezamenlijke (sport)activiteiten, dan wel om de gezellige babbel tussendoor. 
Omdat ik mijn voorwoord korter wil houden dan mijn tekst zelf, ga ik dit 
achterwegen laten. Daarom richt ik me specifiek aan de personen die een directe 
bijdrage aan dit werk hebben geleverd. Eerst en vooral wil ik Cedric bedanken voor 
 de verhelderende discussies. Deze stonden me toe om alles eens op een rijtje te 
zetten en af te wijken van mijn eigen denkpatroon. Bedankt voor uw enthousiasme 
doorheen mijn hele doctoraat en voor het nalezen van de tekst. Ook Jeroen T. wil ik 
bedanken. Zijn wiskundig inzicht en Matlab skills hebben menig onderzoeker binnen 
ELECTA vooruit geholpen. Ik was daar één van. Vooral bij het optimaliseren van 
witgoed heeft onze samenwerking geloond. Ook Frederik R. bedank ik. Het gebruik 
van flexgrafieken kent geen geheimen voor hem. Zijn hulp bleek dan ook heel nuttig 
bij het schedulen van elektrische wagens op basis van de elektriciteitsprijs. Ook de 
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ondersteuning binnen ELECTA, met name het secretariaat en het IT- en 
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 Abstract 
The need for flexibility within power system operation is growing as more 
intermittent renewables with limited controllability are integrated. While traditionally 
this need is met by supply side resources, the demand side also has intrinsic 
flexibility available which could be tapped, often referred to as demand response. 
Although policy makers and industry recognize the value of demand response, its use 
and understanding remains limited. This is especially the case on the residential 
level. 
This thesis aims at enhancing the understanding of demand response by addressing 
three knowledge gaps, ranging from designing dynamic tariff schemes to incentivize 
demand response, over quantifying the residential load modifications these cause, 
until determining the final benefits this brings for households and society as a whole. 
First of all, the demand response incentive following from the current residential 
tariff designs is limited especially in view of more renewable energy resources. 
Moreover, these tariffs do not reflect the time-dependency of the underlying cost of 
electricity. In order to allow demand response and to reflect actual costs to the 
users, this thesis argues a balance has to be found between tariff principles related 
to costs and social acceptability on the one hand and its resulting demand response 
incentive on the other. This balance can be accomplished by proper tariff design. It is 
shown that the choice of the tariff design not only affects the demand response 
incentive, but also the resulting benefits. 
Second, the magnitude to which residential users react to those tariff schemes 
remains largely unknown. This thesis shows that flexibility obtained from both wet 
appliances and battery electric vehicles is considerable. Moreover, automation adds 
to the level and predictability of demand response. Hereby, predictability can be 
reached by means of price elasticities. 
Finally, the benefits residential demand response brings to power system operation 
are not properly identified. This thesis shows that demand response leads to 
operational benefits as costs of plant operation decrease, while enhancing system 
reliability. Moreover, demand response proves to be an efficient means to integrate 
intermittent renewable energy resources. On the investment side, demand response 
leads to a postponement and reduction of the need for additional generation 
capacity. 
 
 Samenvatting 
De nood aan flexibiliteit voor de werking van het elektriciteitssysteem groeit 
naarmate meer intermitterende hernieuwbare energiebronnen met beperkte 
controleerbaarheid geïntegreerd worden. Hoewel deze nood traditiegetrouw door 
elektriciteitscentrales aan de aanbodzijde wordt opgevangen, beschikt de vraagzijde 
ook over intrinsieke flexibiliteit die kan ingezet worden. Hierbij wordt vaak verwezen 
naar vraagrespons. Hoewel beleidsmakers en industrie het nut van vraagrespons 
herkennen, blijft het gebruik en de kennis beperkt.  
Deze thesis verrijkt de kennis omtrent residentiële vraagrespons door zich op drie 
hiaten te richten. Deze hiaten omvatten het ontwerp van elektriciteitstarieven die 
vraagrespons aanmoedigen, het inschatten van de huishoudelijke 
verbruiksaanpassingen, en het bepalen van de voordelen die dit oplevert voor 
huishoudens en voor de maatschappij als geheel. 
Ten eerste moedigen de huidige elektriciteitstarieven vraagrespons nauwelijks aan, 
zeker met het oog op toenemende hernieuwbare elektriciteitsbronnen. Bovendien 
vatten deze tarieven de onderliggende tijdsafhankelijke kost van elektriciteit 
onvoldoende. Om vraagrespons toe te laten en de eigenlijke elektriciteitskost naar de 
eindgebruiker te reflecteren, toont deze thesis aan dat er een balans nodig is tussen 
tariefprincipes gerelateerd aan kosten en sociale aanvaardbaarheid enerzijds en de 
resulterende stimulus voor vraagrespons anderzijds. Deze balans wordt bereikt door 
een gepast tariefontwerp. De keuze van het ontwerp beïnvloedt niet alleen de 
stimulans voor vraagrespons, maar ook de voordelen die hieruit voortvloeien. 
Ten tweede blijft de grootteorde waarmee residentiële gebruikers reageren op deze 
tarieven niet gekend. Deze thesis toont dat flexibiliteit afkomstig van zowel 
wasmachines, droogkasten, afwasmachines als van batterij-aangedreven elektrische 
voertuigen substantieel is. Zij geeft ook aan dat automatisatie bijdraagt tot de 
grootteorde en de voorspelbaarheid van vraagrespons. Deze voorspelbaarheid kan 
deels gevat worden door prijselasticiteiten.  
Tot slot zijn de huishoudelijke en maatschappelijke voordelen van residentiële 
vraagrespons niet geïdentificeerd. Deze thesis toont aan dat vraagrespons resulteert 
in operationele voordelen aangezien de operationele productiekost van 
elektriciteitscentrales daalt en de betrouwbaarheid van het elektriciteitssysteem 
toeneemt. Bovendien leidt vraagrespons tot een efficiëntere integratie van 
hernieuwbare energiebronnen. Tenslotte resulteert vraagrespons in uitstel en 
vermindering van de nood aan additionele productiecapaciteit. 
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 0. Introduction  
0.1 Context and motivation 
Power system operation is on the verge of a major transition. Due to new challenges 
such as the integration of more intermittent renewable energy sources (RES), 
supply-side resources could be insufficient to keep the balance at all times. To reach 
this higher need for flexibility and to increase efficient power system operation, a 
paradigm shift is occurring as more and more flexibility is provided by demand side 
resources. While initially the intrinsic flexibility of the demand side was neglected, 
nowadays, demand is starting to take a more active role within power system 
operation. This is also referred to as demand response (DR). 
Demand response can be triggered by providing more dynamic electricity tariffs 
reflecting the dynamic nature of the underlying cost of electricity. These tariffs are 
also referred to as dynamic pricing (DP). This way, the demand side is incentivized to 
modify its demand pattern in order to bring more efficient power system operation in 
which the operation of RES is integrated.  
Although the inclusion of demand response and dynamic electricity tariffs is already 
described in the literature since the 80s, the use and understanding is still limited. 
Especially residential demand response is still neglected and no clear indication of the 
impact on both household and supply side level is available. 
These gaps become apparent on three levels. First of all, current electricity tariff 
designs fall short on incentivizing DR, especially on the residential level. Second, no 
clear indication or quantification is available on how residential users react to more 
dynamic tariff schemes, leading to slower implementation. And finally, benefits 
resulting from DR are largely unknown, again leading to slower implementation. 
To address these gaps in the literature and practice, this thesis aims to enhance the 
knowledge of residential DR and DP. In addition, it also desires to enable more 
informed decision making by policy makers, industry and residential users. In this 
perspective, this thesis intends to answer following questions: 
- Q1: What are demand response and dynamic electricity pricing? 
- Q2: How should dynamic electricity prices be designed? 
- Q3: To which extent do residential users modify their power pattern as a 
reaction to DP? 
- Q4: How can this modification be quantified and predicted? 
- Q5: What benefits do such load modifications bring for the residential users 
and for power system operation and investments? 
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0.2 Outline 
This thesis is divided into four parts. Each part contributes to the understanding of 
demand response based on dynamic pricing by answering the questions formulated 
in Section 0.1. An overview of the first three parts and the underlying chapters is 
visualized in Fig. 0.1. The final part covers the conclusions and recommendations 
following from this thesis. Each of these parts is discussed in what follows. 
 
Fig. 0.1.  Thesis overview. 
0.2.1 Part I: Fundamentals of demand response and dynamic 
pricing 
Chapter 1 presents the theory and practice of demand response. It creates the 
background of this thesis as it discusses different demand response types and 
programs, and various benefits they can bring forward. Moreover, it provides an 
overview of worldwide deployment of demand response. 
This chapter is partly based on the following paper: 
 B. Dupont, C. De Jonghe, K. Kessels and R. Belmans, “Short-term 
Consumer Benefits of Dynamic Pricing,” in IEEE, International 
Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM), Zagreb, 
Croatia, May 2011. 
Chapter 2 focuses on one of the demand response programs, being dynamic pricing. 
More specifically, the focus is on locational dynamic pricing (LDP) schemes in which 
prices depend on both time and location. It provides a theoretical framework for LDP 
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schemes accounting for general principles of tariff design related to costs and social 
acceptability. Also the impact of RES on this theoretical framework is assessed. 
Moreover, it describes how tariff design can trigger demand response. Backed by this 
framework, existing tariff schemes are assessed. 
This chapter is based on the following paper: 
 B. Dupont, C. De Jonghe, L. Olmos and R. Belmans, "Demand 
response with locational dynamic pricing to support the integration 
of renewables," Energy Policy, vol. 67, pp. 344-354, April 2014. 
0.2.2 Part II: Residential demand response based on dynamic 
pricing 
The second part simulates and quantifies residential demand response resulting from 
different dynamic pricing schemes. For each tariff scheme, demand modifications are 
analyzed and the resulting residential benefits are pointed out. It consists of 3 
chapters covering from the development of DP up to the quantification of the 
resulting demand response. 
Chapter 3 describes the development of different dynamic pricing schemes taking 
into account the principles discussed in Chapter 2. This results in various dynamic 
pricing schemes which reflect the dynamics in the underlying costs and the 
availability of RES to a different extent. 
Chapter 3 is partly based on the following paper: 
 B. Dupont, C. De Jonghe, K. Kessels and R. Belmans, „Short-term 
Consumer Benefits of Dynamic Pricing,” in IEEE, International 
Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM), Zagreb, 
Croatia, May 2011. 
Chapter 4 describes residential demand response following the different dynamic 
pricing schemes from Chapter 3. Distinction is made between simulation and 
practical evidence. While demand response simulation allows setting benchmarks, 
practical evidence retrieved from a pilot project allows obtaining practical demand 
response results. 
This chapter is partly based on the following papers and project deliverable within 
LINEAR: 
 B. Dupont, J. Tant, and R. Belmans, “Automated Residential 
Demand Response Based on Dynamic Pricing,” in IEEE PES 
International Conference and Exhibition of Innovative Smart Grid 
Technologies (ISGT Europe), Berlin, Germany, October 14-17, 
2012. 
 B. Dupont, P. Vingerhoets, P. Tant, K. Vanthournout, W. 
Cardinaels, T. De Rybel, E. Peeters, and R. Belmans, “LINEAR 
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Breakthrough Project: Large-Scale Implementation of Smart Grid 
Technologies in Distribution Grids,” in Third IEEE PES Innovative 
Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT), Europe edition, Berlin, Germany, 
October 14-17, 2012. 
 B. Dupont, “LINEAR Deliverable 2.1: Portfolio management based 
on dynamic pricing,” LINEAR, Belgium, November 2014. 
Chapter 5 provides a quantification of residential demand based on results from the 
previous chapter. The quantification is obtained by means of price elasticities 
allowing to estimate demand response when sending a dynamic pricing scheme to 
residential users. 
0.2.3 Part III: Power system benefits of residential demand 
response 
While part II focuses on demand response at household level, part III describes the 
benefits on power system level following from residential demand response. Hereby, 
distinction is made between the impact of demand response on power system 
operation and generation investment decisions.  
 
Chapter 6 provides an operational model that quantifies power system operation 
benefits of residential demand response and tests this model within a Belgian case 
study pointing out the impact of RES. 
The chapter is based on the following paper:  
 B. Dupont, K. Dietrich, C. De Jonghe, A. Ramos, and R. Belmans, 
"Impact of residential demand response on power system 
operation: A Belgian case study," Applied Energy, vol. 122, pp. 1-
10, June 2014. 
Chapter 7 provides an investment model quantifying generation investment benefits 
of residential demand response and tests this model within a Belgian case study. 
Again, the impact of RES is pointed out in this chapter. 
This chapter is based on the following paper:  
 B. Dupont, M. Maenhoudt, C. De Jonghe, K. Dietrich, A. Ramos, G. 
Deconinck, and R. Belmans, "Impact of short-term demand 
response with battery electric vehicles on generation investment 
decisions: A Belgian case study," submitted for Energy Policy. 
0.2.4 Part IV: Conclusions and recommendations 
Chapter 8 reviews the conclusions drawn throughout this thesis. Additionally, 
recommendations for further research are suggested. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
Fundamentals of demand 
response and dynamic pricing 
 
 
 1. Demand response: theory and practice 
1.1 Introduction 
The European electricity system is facing three tremendous evolutions. First, the 
European Union aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% below 
1990 levels towards 2050 [1]. Therefore, they consider integration of renewable 
energy sources (RES) as a key instrument. Second, the European transmission and 
distribution grid is ageing and needs replacement as most of the infrastructure was 
invested during the seventies [2]. Finally, electricity demand will rise due to the 
electrification of energy services such as transport or heating and cooling of buildings 
and dwellings. Examples of this electrification are the integration of heat pumps and 
electric vehicles. These three evolutions trigger the need for more flexibility in order 
to ensure reliable power system operation in which electricity supply equals 
electricity demand at all times.  
Traditional solutions to ensure the balance between demand and supply are found at 
the supply side. New generation, transmission, and distribution investments are 
made to cover the electrification of demand and ageing infrastructure. Moreover, 
variability of demand and generation from RES is covered by the remaining power 
generation capacity. Although these means of flexibility benefit reliability, only 
focusing on traditional solutions could be insufficient, expensive, and harmful for the 
environment. 
Rather than only focusing on the supply side, the demand side itself can also bring 
flexibility into the system. This is also referred to as demand response (DR). By more 
active involvement of end-users which can change electric usage in response to 
power system conditions, operation of and investment in generation, transmission, 
and distribution can profit, also facilitating the integration of RES.  
 
European interest, recognition and promotion of DR are rising within the last decade. 
This is reflected at the level of policy, regulation, standardization, and the electrical 
energy industry as such.  
European policy recognizes that a further introduction of DR will benefit end-users, 
industries, and society as a whole [3]. In the Energy Efficiency Directive [4], the 
conditions are created for national policy makers, regulators, network operators, and 
the energy industry to integrate DR in the market in the near term. This is expressed 
by the following statements: “Member states shall ensure that national regulatory 
authorities encourage demand side resources, such as demand response, to 
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participate alongside supply in wholesale and retail markets”, and “Member states 
shall promote access to and participation of demand response in balancing, reserves, 
and other system services markets, inter alia by requiring national regulatory 
authorities […] in close cooperation with demand service providers and consumers, 
to define technical modalities for participation in these markets on the basis of the 
technical requirements of these markets and the capabilities of demand response.” 
The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) also expresses its 
support to DR in its Framework Guidelines on Electricity Balancing: “These terms and 
conditions, including the underlying requirements, shall, in particular, be set in order 
to facilitate the participation of demand response, renewable and intermittent energy 
sources in the balancing markets [5].” 
By the end of 2014 European standardization organizations are expected to develop 
a standard facilitating demand response and complementing the current smart grid 
standard under Mandate 490 [6]. 
The European industry also paves the way for DR. Among others, this can be seen in 
the European Electricity Grid Initiative issued by European transmission and 
distribution system operators [7]. Moreover, new energy businesses are created to 
enable more flexibility at the demand side and national and worldwide smart grid 
initiatives such as Smart Grid Flanders [8] and the Global Smart Grid Federation [9] 
foster DR knowledge. 
 
Apart from increased interest from European stakeholders, other developments are 
also building momentum for DR. The integration of smart metering systems 
enhances accurate metering of demand and therefore stimulates active involvement 
of end-users. This integration is boosted by the European Commission (EC) in the 
Third Energy Package stating that by 2020 consumers are required to be equipped 
with intelligent metering systems subject to a cost-benefit analysis [10]. Advanced 
ICT and automation widen the possibility of stimulating DR without any loss of 
comfort or production efficiency for end-users. The importance is stipulated by a 
growing interest from industry not directly related to energy, e.g. data management 
companies, appliance manufacturers, telecom, technology providers. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides deeper insight in DR and 
confusion with other terminology is clarified. Section 1.3 discusses the broad range 
of programs, user classes and load types involved in DR. Different benefits of DR are 
highlighted in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 discusses the deployment of DR and finally 
Section 1.6 concludes. 
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1.2 Definition of demand response 
Various organizations around the globe provide a definition of demand response. 
The first definition was given by the Department of Energy (DOE) in the U.S. [11] 
and was later on adopted by the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [12] and 
some academics [13]: 
 “Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal 
consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over 
time, or to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at 
times of high wholesale market prices or when system reliability is 
jeopardized”. 
Within Europe the following definitions are formed: 
 European Commission: “Demand response is to be understood as voluntary 
changes by end-consumers of their usual electricity use patterns - in response 
to market signals (such as time-variable electricity prices or incentive 
payments) or following the acceptance of consumers’ bids (on their own or 
through aggregation) to sell in organized energy electricity markets their will 
to change their demand for electricity [3].”  
 European University Institute: “Changes in electric usage implemented 
directly or indirectly by end-use customers/prosumers from their 
current/normal consumption/injection patterns in response to certain signals 
[14].” Hereby, only consumers acting voluntarily are concerned, excluding 
demand response that is mandatory or without any compensation. Moreover, 
stand-alone generators on distribution level are not considered.  
The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines demand response in the following 
way:  
 “Demand response programs are programs and activities designed to 
encourage consumers to change their electricity usage patterns, including 
timing and level of electricity demand, covering all load shape and customer 
objectives. Demand response includes time-of-use and dynamic rates or 
pricing, reliability programs such as direct load control of devices and 
instantaneous interruptible load, and other market options for demand 
changes, such as demand side bidding [15].”  
In all definitions, DR entails a change in the electric usage pattern of end-users in 
response to signals such as dynamic electricity prices or incentive payments. 
Additionally, in Europe emphasis is put on the voluntary nature of DR programs and 
the definition is widened by also including changes in injection patterns. Also note 
that DR involves changes in power consumption, yet not necessarily in total energy 
usage.  
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Although the consistency in defining demand response, confusion with other 
terminology such as demand side management (DSM) exists. Within DSM programs 
a market party actively uses different options to modify electricity demand to 
increase customer satisfaction and coincidentally produce desired changes in the 
electric utility’s load shape [16]. These programs were already created in the early 
1980s in the U.S. in reaction to concerns on the dependency on fossil fuels and on 
the environmental impact of generation [17]. In this context, often is referred to 
integrated resource planning (IRP) [18], [19]. These planning models contrast to 
traditional electricity expansion planning as IRP includes both supply and demand 
side options in the planning process. The demand side options, also referred to as 
DSM, cover different load shape objectives distinguishing between energy [MWh] 
adjustments and power adjustments [MW] [20]. The most well-known objective is 
energy efficiency which focuses on permanent energy consumption [MWh] 
reductions. In contrast, objectives related to DR typically entail power adjustments. 
Examples are load shifing and valley filling. In other words, DSM is a wider concept 
than DR as it also captures energy adjustments such as energy efficiency. 
1.3 Categorization of demand response 
Different categories of demand response exist depending on the way it is 
encouraged and the purpose it is used for, the user classes it serves, and the load 
types targeted. 
 
Demand response programs  
Two groups of DR programs are distinguished: incentive- and price-based [11], [13]. 
This classification is made according to the techniques used for encouraging changes 
in the instantaneous electric power usage. While in price-based programs, end-users 
react to dynamic prices, incentive-based programs provide incentive payments 
independent from the electricity rate. Within each program, several subcategories 
exist (Fig. 1.1). 
 
Fig. 1.1.  Demand response programs distinguishing between incentive-based programs and 
price-based programs. 
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On the left hand of Fig. 1.1, incentive-based programs are depicted. In those 
programs, participating users receive payments for reducing their demand at critical 
times. Incentive-based programs include six subcategories: direct load control, 
curtailable load, demand bidding, emergency demand response, capacity and 
ancillary services markets programs. In direct load control programs, a third party is 
in control of some appliances at the end-user’s premises (e.g. air conditioners, heat 
pumps). In the event of system stress, the third party can control those appliances 
directly in compensation for a previously known participation fee. Often these 
programs are also referred to as dispatchable. In curtailable load programs [21] end-
users are in control of their own appliances. By enrolling into the program, the end-
user makes the commitment to modify load when a request is received. The gain for 
the participants can take different forms as bill credits and participation fees. A 
penalty is given in case the user does not respond to the load signal. In demand 
bidding programs end-users make the commitment to modify load by bidding in the 
wholesale electricity market. If the bid is cleared, the end-user is obliged to reduce 
his load by the according amount. Emergency demand response programs are called 
upon times when system security is in danger. End-users get incentive payments for 
helping to resolve system stability. Capacity market programs use load reduction 
commitments [21], partly replacing traditional generation commitments on capacity 
reserve markets. Participating end-users receive an up-front reservation payment for 
offering the load capacity and an activation payment for calling the capacity in case 
of an event. In ancillary services market programs end-users bid load reduction 
commitments in ancillary markets as operating reserves [22]. When the bid is 
accepted, end-users receive an up-front payment reflecting the spot market price for 
being on stand-by. Once the load reduction is called for, end-users receive the 
additional spot market electricity price. 
Price-based demand response programs are depicted on the right hand side of Fig. 
1.1. In those programs, time-varying tariffs also referred to as dynamic tariffs, 
approximate the actual cost of energy. Those tariffs are offered to make end-users 
shift consumption from high to low price periods. Although many variants of price-
based demand response programs exist, most can be classified in three 
subcategories according to their tariff design: time-of-use, critical peak and real-time 
pricing [23]. While all three are dynamic in nature and therefore more closely 
reflecting the underlying cost of energy, the frequency of updating predetermined 
prices differs. Time-of-use tariffs divide the day into different time blocks in which 
different electricity prices apply. These prices are fixed for a specific period (e.g. a 
month). Even though they reflect the average cost of energy during the time blocks, 
they fail to account for short-term variability in wholesale prices. This is partly 
resolved by critical peak pricing, which adds a component to time-of-use or flat 
tariffs. This component is only applied during critical peak hours for a limited number 
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of hours a year. Typically the end-user receives the critical peak tariffs on short 
notice. As a refund, a price discount during non-critical peak hours applies. The 
variability of the electricity tariff is even greater with real-time prices, which typically 
reflect hourly wholesale and imbalance prices. Between a day-ahead and an hour-
ahead, the end-user receives new hourly electricity prices. This pricing program 
allows a deeper reflection of the underlying cost of energy. A more extensive 
description of these tariff designs is provided in Chapter 2. 
The main difference between incentive-based and price-based demand response 
programs is the level of end-user involvement in load modification. Incentive-based 
programs trigger load modification in the occasion of critical events based on 
contractual arrangements. In return the end-user receives an incentive payment. 
Although participation is voluntary, falling short on a specific demand response 
request brings penalties. In price-based programs, the end-user enrolls in a dynamic 
pricing scheme. Voluntary load modifications are based on the user’s own economic 
and rational preferences. In such programs no penalties are incurred, although the 
user can be imposed to high electricity prices. 
 
DR user classes and load types 
Demand response programs target all user classes: residential, commercial, and 
industrial. For each user class, the load type and its accompanying end-use service 
differ. While the end-use service for residential and commercial users is closely 
related to comfort, industrial users are more concerned about the efficiency of 
production processes. Moreover, each user class is characterized by different types of 
loads which can be used for demand response purposes. A distinction can be made 
between storable, shiftable, and curtailable loads [14]. With storable loads, thermal 
inertia or batteries can be used to separate the moment of power consumption and 
the end-use service in time; examples are electric vehicles for residential users or air 
conditioning in commercial buildings. With shiftable loads power consumption can be 
shifted in time without loss of the end-use service. Usually this shifting involves 
planning which might affect comfort or production efficiency; examples of such loads 
are washing machines and dishwashers for residential users or production processes 
in industry which can be moved in time. With curtailable loads power consumption is 
forgone along with the end-use service. Therefore, this curtailment also involves a 
loss of comfort or production output; examples are household lighting or curtailment 
of industrial processes. 
1.4 Benefits of demand response 
Demand response brings about several benefits for participants and society as a 
whole [11], [13] (Fig. 1.2). 
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Fig. 1.2. Demand response benefits. 
Benefits can be split up in four categories: participant financial benefits, market wide 
financial benefits, reliability benefits and market performance benefits. Participant 
financial benefits consist of short-term direct bill savings resulting from incentive 
payments or a decreased electricity bill. Market wide financial benefits are divided 
into short-term operational benefits and long-term investment benefits. Demand 
response can lead to operational benefits in the short run due to a reduced start-up 
cost of expensive peaking units. Moreover, demand can be aligned with the 
availability of generation from RES. This causes lower wholesale prices during peak 
periods or when generation from RES is abundant. In the long run, utilities avoid 
capacity, transmission and distribution investment costs [24], because the system 
can be tuned to a lower peak demand due to sustained demand response. Both short 
and long term benefits result in a lower electricity price for both participating and 
non-participating end-users due to more efficient power system operation. Demand 
response can also lead to reliability benefits [25], as additional system flexibility 
reduces the probability of a demand-supply imbalance [26]. Demand response can 
furthermore lead to market performance benefits [27]. End-user’s ability to decrease 
electricity consumption during high price moments reduces generator’s incentive to 
bid above marginal generation costs. 
1.5 Deployment of demand response 
Within Europe, the Nordic region and the United Kingdom are on the forefront when 
dealing with demand response [28]. Hereby, demand response resources contribute 
up to 30% of the total ancillary services market. Although the main part of these 
resources is attributable to large industrial users, an increasing amount is coming 
from medium and small users. 
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While demand response is gaining importance in Europe, the United States are 
running ahead with up to 50% of peak resources provided by DR in some markets 
[28]. This 50% derives from the different user classes covering different DR 
programs (Fig. 1.3). The main part of demand response resources is retrieved from 
the commercial and industrial users and the wholesale market. This last one refers to 
demand response reported by wholesale providers which cannot be attributed to 
specific retail companies or user classes [12]. Another observation is that residential 
demand response is lagging and the main source of residential demand response 
comes from direct load control.  
 
Fig. 1.3. Reported potential peak reduction for commercial and industrial, residential, wholesale 
and other users within incentive-based or time-based programs in 2010 in the US based on a 
FERC Survey [29]. 
Although worldwide implementation is still limited, the potential of residential 
demand response is considerable. Empirical evidence suggests that the potential 
economic benefits are substantial and residential users respond to dynamic pricing 
schemes [28]. Moreover, some residential loads such as water and space heaters are 
by nature controllable and can offer cost-effective opportunities. As the deployment 
of smart metering and enabling technologies is gaining speed, this residential 
potential starts to getting tapped. 
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1.6 Summary & Conclusions 
The concept of demand response has been defined. A deeper description of different 
programs, user classes, and load types has been provided. Moreover, the rising 
interest of policy makers, regulators, standardization bodies, and industry has been 
pointed out. It has been shown that although benefits of demand response are 
known, DR within one user class is still lagging behind, being residential.  
Over the past years, residential demand response seems to be on the verge of a 
breakthrough due to the deployment of smart metering, ICT, enabling technologies 
and smart appliances. How and when the majority of the demand response potential 
will be tapped is still unknown. 
 
 2. Locational dynamic pricing: theory and 
practice 
2.1 Introduction 
Departing from the general demand response (DR) description, this chapter further 
elaborates on one of the DR programs, being price-based programs. The focus is on 
residential users with a locational dynamic pricing (LDP) scheme. Within this scheme, 
the price depends on time and location. As LDP allows capturing the locational and 
time dependency of underlying costs [30], residential consumption and generation 
can be valued against their contribution to the whole electricity system. In turn, LDP 
can influence the location and time of consumption and generation [31]. Hereby, the 
amount of residential flexibility triggered depends on the tariff design of LDP.  
In order to evaluate the potential of constructing an LDP scheme in view of 
incentivizing demand response, first the underlying costs of consuming and 
generating electricity need to be assessed. Therefore, a theoretical framework is built 
(Fig. 2.1). The framework starts from costs incurred at the generation, transmission 
and distribution (T&D), and retail level. These costs are translated into a tariff 
scheme according to some general principles. Depending on the potential for 
locational and time dependency of tariffs, traditional and locational dynamic pricing 
can be applied to charge for residential demand and generation. While typically 
traditional pricing leads to inflexible demand and generation, residential flexibility can 
be triggered by LDP.  
In the literature, demand response is often neglected when constructing tariff 
schemes. The design is mainly based on principles related to cost and practicality 
[32], [33]. Other papers, primarily based on experimental projects, mainly focus on 
incentivizing demand while harming some of the cost related principles [34], [35]. In 
contrast, this chapter discusses the impact and relationship between costs and 
practicality on the one hand, and demand response on the other. This approach aims 
to provide a background for policy makers, industry and academics to assess existing 
tariff schemes and construct new ones.  
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Fig. 2.1. Theoretical framework of locational dynamic pricing, translating costs into tariffs 
triggering flexibility. 
 
In Section 2.2, general principles of tariff design are discussed and applied to 
traditional and LDP tariff schemes. Section 2.3 gives a more detailed perspective on 
LDP for consuming electricity by evaluating the potential of making each tariff 
component locational and time dependent. Hereby, the influence of renewable 
energy sources (RES) is pointed out. Section 2.4 elaborates on the potential of LDP 
for residential generation of electricity. Section 2.5 highlights some practical 
considerations to be taken into account. Section 2.6 assesses how tariff design of 
LDP can affect the incentive for demand response and how this relates to general 
principles of tariff design. To clarify the theoretical concepts discussed, Section 2.7 
discusses some existing tariff designs and assesses four illustrative tariff schemes. 
Section 8 concludes. 
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2.2 Locational dynamic pricing based on general 
principles of tariff design 
 
Principles of tariff design 
In a liberalized electricity system, distinction is made between the regulated and 
competitive part of the system. Typically, the T&D networks are considered as 
regulated and operated by a transmission system operator (TSO) and a distribution 
system operator (DSO), respectively. Competition is introduced in generation and 
retail activities. Both regulated and competitive parties incur costs and convert them 
into tariffs taking into account general principles of tariff design. 
In the literature, a wide variety of general principles of tariff design is provided. In 
Bonbright [36] general principles for public utility tariffs are discussed. In Berg and 
Tschirhart [37] the focus is on optimal pricing and tariff design for natural 
monopolies, while Pérez-Arriaga and Smeers [32] provide guidelines for grid tariff 
design. While most of these principles date from the era of vertically integrated 
utilities, they also apply in a context of an unbundled electricity system. In what 
follows, five general principles of tariff design are selected and discussed. A 
distinction is made between principles resulting from practical considerations and 
social acceptability, on the one hand, and cost related principles, on the other.  
 
Three principles result from practical consideration and social acceptability. 
 Transparency: a tariff design should be clear and understandable 
for the user; 
 Simplicity: a tariff should be simple, aligning with the 
transparency principle; 
 Minimum volatility: tariff fluctuations in the short and long term 
should be limited to protect the user. 
While historically the lack of ICT, metering and automation did not allow for complex 
tariffs with high short-term volatility, technological breakthroughs have altered this. 
These breakthroughs make it feasible to send LDP schemes regularly, register 
consumption and generation on a shorter time frame, and automate consumption 
and generation at the residential level. Therefore, it becomes easier to meet the 
principles related to practicality in case of more complex or volatile tariffs.  
 
Two principles are cost related:  
 Cost recovery; all actors should be able to recover their costs. 
Although this principle arises from the regulated part of the 
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electricity system, it is assumed that competitive actors also should 
recover their costs in order to remain profitable in the long run. 
 Cost causality; consumers or generators should pay the costs 
they cause. In other words, costs should be assigned to whoever 
they belong to. This creates non-discrimination as consumers face 
the same price for electricity which causes the same costs. It also 
implies that cross-subsidization is avoided as costs are allocated to 
the beneficiary of the electricity, instead of being socialized. In 
other words, cost causality avoids the cross-subsidies between 
different customer groups as stated in Borenstein [38]. 
 
Traditional pricing in view of RES 
Considering the large-scale introduction of RES and its accompanying operational 
and economic challenges, traditional tariff designs meet with the principles out of 
practical consideration and social acceptability, while conflicting with the cost related 
tariff principles.  
Traditional pricing schemes align with simplicity, transparency and minimum volatility 
principles due to the intrinsic nature of flat or day-night tariff designs. Cost recovery 
is under stress as RES can bring additional costs for T&D which were initially not 
anticipated. Cost causality is harmed as well, as traditional tariffs do not reflect 
varying generation costs due to the intermittent nature of generation from RES. This 
leads to cross-subsidization in time as defined in Borenstein [38]. As the underlying 
cost of energy is variable, consumers who consume less when more generation from 
RES with zero marginal costs is available, subsidize the other consumers under 
traditional tariffs. Although variability of costs already existed before, it increased due 
to the integration of RES. Moreover, cross-subsidization in location occurs as every 
consumer pays the same price independent of the local availability of generation 
from RES and the local operational challenges it brings. As the cost causality principle 
is seriously harmed, especially in view of the introduction of RES, a new tariff design 
such as LDP is required. 
 
Locational dynamic pricing  
In contrast to traditional tariffs, dynamic pricing schemes allow for more variability in 
the price level and pattern over the course of the day. This adds to the cost related 
principles of tariff design as this tariff facilitates to pass on the costs to their 
beneficiaries and to avoid cross-subsidization over time. Next to the dynamics of this 
tariff scheme in time, a dynamic price can be made locational resulting in a locational 
dynamic price [30]. This allows allocating the costs to the beneficiary and avoids 
cross-subsidization over locations.  
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Besides the contribution to cost causality, LDP also allows attracting flexibility at the 
residential level [11]. This offers the demand side the potential to be part of the 
solution to the challenges RES brings. Historically, the focus at the demand side was 
on the flexibility consumption can bring. This was referred to as demand response. 
In the event of more dispatchable decentralized generation, flexibility of consumption 
should be complemented with flexibility of generation as discussed in Chapter 1. 
Therefore, residential demand response can refer to flexibility of both consumption 
and generation.  
2.3 Residential consumption tariff 
In this section, LDP for residential electricity consumption is assessed. It consists of a 
tariff for the withdrawal of electricity from the grid and for the investment in the 
electricity system associated with it. This tariff incorporates the costs of consumption 
without taking into account local generation facilities. In the next section, the 
injection tariff discusses the value a residential user gets for local injection of 
electricity.  
Before the potential for demand response can be estimated, the potential for making 
a tariff dynamic and locational according to the cost causality principle needs to be 
assessed. It should be based on the underlying costs of the electricity. A distinction 
needs to be made between cost components, categories and drivers (Fig. 2.2). 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Potential for locational dynamic pricing based on cost components, cost categories, 
and cost drivers. 
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Three cost components are distinguished: generation, T&D, and retail. All three 
should separately meet the five principles of tariff design as much as possible.  
Cost categories reflect the different types of costs associated with the nature of the 
business underneath each cost component. The following cost categories are 
associated with generation, system operation, and retail business.  
 Operational costs are variable costs that typically depend on 
operational decisions of the different actors in the system. 
Generation, T&D, and retail costs share some similar operational 
costs such as wages and office rents. However, most costs depend 
on the nature of the business (generation, T&D, retail). 
 In contrast to operational costs, investment costs are made with a 
longer term perspective. Therefore, these costs also largely 
contribute to future electricity usage.  
 
For all costs within a cost category, a distinction in cost drivers is made [33]. 
 Costs driven by energy usage expressed in kWh, such as the fuel 
costs. 
 Costs driven by system’s peak expressed in kW due to the balance 
between demand and generation. It refers to the net peak as both 
demand and generation are considered in the system. It can refer 
both to the local and global level, depending on the underlying 
cost component. An example is a distribution feeder investment 
partly driven by the net peak at the local level. 
 Costs independent of energy usage or system’s peak. In the 
literature, this cost is considered to be driven by the number of 
users [39]. An example is the metering cost partly driven by the 
number of users connected. 
 
In the following, the time and locational dependency of costs are affected by the 
time and locational dependency of its cost drivers. As both energy usage and 
system’s peak are variable over the course of the day, time dependency of tariffs is 
possible. Similarly, locational dependency of tariffs rests on the locational 
dependency of its cost drivers. If the cost driver is situated at the local or global 
geographical area, costs should be borne by the beneficiaries in that specific area. 
The time and locational dependency of the underlying costs of each component are 
assessed based on the cost drivers of its underlying cost categories. The different 
cost categories of each component are evaluated against its time dependency. 
Locational dependency is discussed. This leads to insights in the potential for 
locational and time dependency of tariffs in view of demand response. The focus is 
on costs depending on the nature of the business. As operational costs such as 
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wages and office rent are incurred by generation, T&D, and retail, these costs are 
omitted for simplicity. Costs are assigned to each of the different components based 
on who makes the initial costs, not on the market actor which bears the 
responsibility of the costs. The assignment of costs due to grid losses illustrates this. 
Even though the TSO is responsible for these costs and charges them to the 
consumers, costs are assigned to generators as they bear the operational costs of 
generating more. 
Also note that several rate designs exist to recover costs: energy charging [c€/ kWh], 
demand charging [c€/ kWh] and fixed charging [c€] [39]. This is in line with the cost 
drivers as defined in Fig. 2.2. In what follows, the focus is on energy charging 
implying that all costs are translated in a price per kWh. According to Weston [39], 
energy charging is the preferred rate design for residential consumers as these 
promote energy efficiency. Moreover, energy based charging is widely adopted in 
Europe. Nevertheless, combining energy charging with demand or fixed charging and 
its impact on DR is subject to further research.  
2.3.1 Generation component 
Operational costs for generation are split up in generation costs, surplus generation 
costs, generation costs as a service to the TSO, and maintenance and repair costs 
(Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1. Underlying costs of generation cost component. 
Cost categories Costs 
Operational costs  Generation costs  
 Surplus generation costs 
 Generation costs as service to the TSO 
 Maintenance and repair costs  
Investment costs  Generation investment costs 
 
Generation costs consist of fuel and environmental costs. The driver of these costs is 
typically energy usage expressed in kWh as energy usage typically affects the 
commitment of contributing generation plants. As the energy usage is affected by 
the variability and unpredictability of RES, the commitment of plants and their 
underlying operational costs are affected as well [31]. This adds to the dynamics of 
the underlying costs. The next costs are surplus generation costs driven by energy 
usage as they result from grid losses. Costs as a service to the TSO include ancillary 
services. Although compensation mechanisms exist to recover them from the TSO, 
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initial costs are partly incurred by the generator. As stated in Parsons et al. [40], 
variability and unpredictability of RES add to the underlying costs of ancillary 
services. Finally, maintenance and repair costs complete the operational costs.  
Investment costs mainly consist of investments in generation plants, including the 
RES. These investment decisions mainly depend on the expected future energy 
usage pattern on the one hand, and the expected unpredictability and 
uncontrollability of demand and generation on the other. It corresponds to the 
expected hours of generation plant commitment and availability. The latter is mainly 
applicable for flexibility purposes as this gains importance in view of a massive 
introduction of variable RES [41]. 
On the whole, most generation costs are attributable to present and future energy 
usage at system level. As electric power use is time dependent, the underlying cost is 
also time dependent making dynamic pricing (DP) a logical rate design. This 
contributes to cost causality and no excessive cross-subsidization. By allowing DP, 
consumers pay the generation cost they cause. Especially in view of more integration 
of RES, characterized by intermittency and limited predictability, importance grows. 
Locational dependency of generation costs is applicable as well, as surplus 
generation costs or losses due to consuming electricity depend on the location of the 
consumption. If lines are congested, locational pricing is even more appropriate to 
reflect cost causality. In view of RES, locational dependency gains importance. An 
example is the electricity transport from areas with an excess of RES and limited 
demand to areas with excess demand [42]. It contributes to losses and increases the 
importance of locational pricing. The same applies at the distribution level if 
residential consumers are able to consume locally generated electricity, reducing 
losses. Next to losses and congestion costs, the remaining costs of the generation 
component are not dependent on the location of consumption. 
2.3.2 Transmission and distribution component  
Next to general operational costs like wages or office rent, the operational cost of 
T&D operation constitute mainly of grid maintenance and repair (Table 2.2). As the 
cost driver of these costs is typically locationally dependent, location can be reflected 
in the tariff. 
Table 2.2. Underlying costs of T&D component. 
Cost categories Costs 
Operational costs Grid maintenance & repair 
Investment costs Expansion existing T&D grid 
 New T&D assets 
 Connection costs of demand and generation 
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A considerable amount of costs results from investments in T&D assets. A distinction 
can be made between expansion of the existing grid, investments in new assets, and 
connection costs of demand and generation. In general, three different kinds of 
investments are done: reliability, economic, and connection investments [43]. In 
what follows, each of them is evaluated against its costs driver after which its time 
and locational dependency are assessed.  
 
Reliability investments arise when security and safety standards are exceeded, or 
when quality and continuity of supply are jeopardized. These problems typically lead 
to expansion of the existing grid or to investments in new assets. Most problems are 
driven by a system’s peak expressed in kW leading to investments scaled to system 
peak. In this case, the system refers to the area where the reliability problem occurs 
making it locationally dependent. Other investments are caused by the energy usage 
pattern expressed in kWh. E.g., next to the system’s peak, the usage pattern also 
affects the aging of transformers [44]. Both costs driven by energy usage and 
system peak are affected by the integration of RES, as RES can both hamper and 
benefit reliability [45], [46]. 
Economic investments are made to maximize the global surplus of network users 
within a specific geographical area. The cost driver is mainly the usage and peak of 
the relevant system. Again, costs need to be allocated to beneficiaries. Examples are 
investments to increase competition, to defer congestion or to decrease losses [47]. 
Again, RES impact the cost drivers and the accompanying economic investments, 
either magnifying or reducing investment costs [48], [49]. 
Connection costs, both of demand or generation, represent the cost of connecting 
to the grid. They are driven by energy usage and system peak. Connection costs 
directly attributable to a specific consumer or generator can be directly charged to 
this consumer or generator [50]. This part falls outside the LDP scheme as costs can 
be recovered directly. If the investment costs also bring benefits to other consumers 
or generators, they should contribute to recover the investment costs. It can be part 
of the LDP scheme. 
 
Most T&D operation and investment costs are driven by both energy usage and 
system’s peak. As the introduction of centralized and decentralized RES affects both 
elements, investments are also affected. Depending on the usage and peak pattern 
at the relevant system level, RES can both increase or decrease investment costs. 
To follow the cost causality principle, consumers and generators causing this usage 
or peak, should pay for the corresponding costs. Therefore, a different tariff can be 
charged to consumers depending on their contribution to usage and peak. As 
discussed in Olmos and Pérez-Arriaga [51], in case T&D investment costs are already 
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incurred, they should be recovered by a fixed charge over time. If not, the cost 
recovery can conflict with the system operation and lead to inefficiencies. This 
implies that investment costs already incurred should not be transformed in time 
dependent tariffs. By charging a fixed charge depending on the residential usage and 
peak pattern, cost causality is still met. 
The driver of T&D costs can be assigned to consumers or generators within the 
specific geographical area where the reliability, economic or connection problems 
occur. As a result, T&D charges should be location dependent in order to reflect cost 
causality and defer cross-subsidization over location. Examples on how to transfer 
transmission costs in prices can be found in Green [52] and Shirmohammadi et al. 
[53]. In Brandstätt et al. [54], the transfer of distribution costs is discussed. 
2.3.3 Retail component 
The retail business mainly operates as an intermediary between generation and 
system operation business on the one hand, and users on the other. Basic retail 
activities consist of procurement, sales, and billing [55]. Several retail businesses are 
involved in marketing and user service activities. Underlying costs are typically driven 
by the number of users. These are independent of energy usage and peak pattern, 
leading to limited potential for transferring costs in locational dynamic pricing. 
2.4 Residential injection tariff 
Next to the role of consumers, residential users can take the role of generators when 
they install local generation facilities at their premises and inject electricity in the 
distribution grid. Following the cost recovery principle, installation costs made by the 
residential generator need to be recovered as well. A distinction is made between the 
direct costs at the household level itself and the indirect costs at the grid level.  
Direct costs are for installing and operating its local generation facilities. Based on 
the costs they make, they should be compensated according to the cost causality 
principle. Although cost recovery is not guaranteed, local generators try to recover 
the two cost categories of Fig. 2.2. In other words, these costs should be regained 
through the generation component paid by the consumers. As this puts local 
generators on an equal footing with centralized generators, local electricity 
generation affects the overall costs of generation. Therefore, together with the costs 
of centralized generation, the direct costs of local generation can be translated in a 
locational dynamic tariff charged to consumers. 
Next to the recovery of direct costs resulting from the installation and operation of 
local facilities, generation can also indirectly affect costs at the grid level. In 
contrast with direct costs made by the local generators themselves, indirect costs are 
initially borne by the TSO and DSO. As they are caused by local generators, they 
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should be assigned to them following the cost causality principle. Again, these 
indirect costs are split according to Fig. 2.2. Consistent with Section 2.3.2, distinction 
is made between operational costs and investment costs. 
Similar to withdrawal, injection of electricity at the residential level can lead to grid 
reliability problems triggering additional investments. These problems mainly occur at 
the distribution level as this network was only designed for consumption purposes. 
Following the cost causality principle, additional cost should be paid for by the local 
generators. In contrast, local generation can also avoid network problems, which 
reduces investment needs [31]. In this case local generation should be compensated. 
The second indirect investment cost is the economic investment costs due to global 
surplus maximization. Again, costs need to be allocated to the beneficiaries. The final 
indirect cost is the connection costs associated with the installation of the generation 
facility at the residential level. Similar to generation at a centralized level, costs 
should be borne by the user who causes them. 
Following the same principles and reasoning as with consumption of electricity, these 
indirect costs made at grid level can be translated in a locational dynamic tariff 
charged to local electricity injection. 
2.5 Practicability of locational dynamic pricing 
Operational and investment costs, driven by energy usage or system’s peak, can be 
transformed to LDP. This adds to the cost causality principle and defers cross-
subsidization. Although this approach is viable from a theoretical point of view, some 
practicalities have to be taken into account. 
Operational and investment costs should be exactly determined together with their 
beneficiaries in order to attain full cost causality. In practice, both calculation of costs 
and allocation to the beneficiaries are difficult to determine, as every node in the grid 
needs to be modelled in detail [51]. Moreover, T&D investments are based on 
predictions of energy usage and peak flows, which complicates exact cost 
determination and allocation. Indivisibilities of investments and strong increasing 
returns to scale are further complicating this exercise [32].  
Social acceptability and practicality are at stake if full cost causality is applied. As cost 
causality implies largely varying electricity charges depending on time and location of 
consumption, electricity charges can differ from one time period and household to 
another. The integration of RES only strengthens this variation. This conflicts with 
the principles of tariff design of transparency, simplicity and minimum volatility. 
To overcome these challenges, a balance has to be found between cost causality and 
its feasibility of cost and beneficiary determination on the one hand, and social 
acceptability and practicality on the other. 
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2.6 Tariff design incentivizing demand response 
Apart from meeting the cost causality principle, LDP can influence decisions on the 
timing of electricity usage of residential consumers and generators. This way, the 
demand side becomes a flexible part of the electricity system reacting to changing 
system conditions. As both operational and investment costs are partly driven by 
residential users, it becomes relevant to defer these costs by influencing their 
behavior. Apart from consumption, LDP can also influence the decisions on the 
timing of dispatchable electricity generation at the residential level. In what follows 
the focus is on consumption, although the same reasoning can be applied for 
generation. Although in theory LDP can also influence the choice of residential users 
on the location of their consumption or generation in the network, only the influence 
of costs on the operation at their current location is discussed. 
An LDP scheme can be sent to residential consumers in different forms, depending 
on the advance notice of sending the pricing scheme to consumers, the length of the 
price blocks, and the length of the price patterns (Fig. 2.3). More practical examples 
of tariff designs can be found in the literature. In Ortega et al. [56] and Bartusch et 
al. [57] a tariff design for distribution network costs is proposed, while in Dupont et 
al. [58], [59], the focus is mainly on tariff design for generation costs. Each of the 
theoretical concepts is assessed according to the principles of tariff design and the 
demand response incentive for consumers. Cost related tariff principles are balanced 
against principles related to practicality. The balance between both leads to a certain 
demand response incentive (Fig. 2.4). 
 
Fig. 2.3. Tariff design based on advance notice, and the length of price blocks and price 
patterns. 
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Fig. 2.4. Demand response incentive following from the design concepts of locational dynamic 
pricing:  advance notice, price blocks, and price patterns. 
2.6.1 Advance notice 
Advance notice refers to the time period between the moment when the price is sent 
to the consumer and when it is applied [60]. In Fig. 2.3, the price for hour 8 is sent 
to the consumer at hour 0, resulting in an advance notice of 8 hours. Advance notice 
of DP tariffs gives residential consumers the possibility to react. The longer 
consumers know their tariffs in advance, the better they are able to adjust demand 
as this adds to the transparency and simplicity principles of tariff design.  
This contrasts with the cost causality principle as advance notice assumes a 
prediction of costs. If prices are sent a year in advance, it’s difficult to get the costs 
right, but easier for consumers to adapt consumption. The closer to real-time, more 
information becomes available making cost predictions more accurate. This 
contributes to the cost causality principle, although consumers experience more 
difficulties to adapt consumption at the last moment. Full cost causality can be 
achieved if prices are communicated at or after real-time. This decreases demand 
response benefits as demand is not able to react to the price signal anymore. 
The contrast between the demand response incentive and the cost causality principle 
can be reduced in two ways.  
A first way is by sending the predicted price pattern in advance to consumers. This 
serves as a trigger for demand response. When costs are known, the final price 
reflecting full costs causality can be sent and billed. The practical implementation 
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depends on the accuracy of predicting costs and the willingness of consumers to take 
on the risk of an inaccurate prediction. 
A second way is by using automation of residential appliances. In this case, 
appliances cycle whenever the price is lowest, without further consumer interaction. 
Only consumer preferences need to be set. Examples are the shifting potential for a 
washing cycle or the temperature set point for a heat pump. As consumer interaction 
is minimal, automation can protect consumers against complexity and volatility, 
overcoming the demand response demotivation of consumers. 
In what follows, a more detailed view on advance notice is provided for each of the 
different components of Fig. 2.2: 
 
Generation 
A considerable part of generation costs is not affected by the daily consumption 
pattern of residential users. Examples are operational costs such as wages and office 
rent. As these costs are known in advance, the time of communicating them can 
occur beforehand as long as the cost recovery principle is satisfied. 
Most generation plants are scheduled based on day-ahead predictions of electricity 
generation from RES, reserve requirements, and on day-ahead predictions of 
demand and demand response. This commitment of plants results in an expected 
cost of covering demand, leading to a price pattern which can be communicated to 
the users. 
As the commitment of plants is based on predicted demand and demand response 
from consumers and generation from RES, prediction errors induce an intraday 
rescheduling of the generation plants. Following cost causality, this results in a new 
price pattern which can be communicated to the consumers. This process of 
rescheduling generation and communicating prices can continue until real-time. At 
the moment of consumption itself, the actual cost of generation is known (Fig. 2.5). 
In view of an optimal incentive for demand response, a balance should be found 
between following the cost related principles and the principles related to practicality 
and social acceptability. 
 
Fig. 2.5. Cost uncertainty over time. 
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Transmission and distribution 
A considerable part of the T&D costs is not affected by the daily consumption pattern 
of residential consumers. Examples are investment costs such as meter installation 
and operational costs such as wages and office rent. As these costs are known in 
advance, the time of communicating these costs can occur beforehand as long as the 
cost recovery principle is satisfied. 
Time dependency of T&D prices is less straightforward, because of possible conflicts 
with system operation. As this reasoning only applies when investment costs are 
already incurred, elaboration is needed when investments are not done yet. In this 
case, it is important to notice that reliability investments, economic investments and 
new connections are driven by the operation of consumers and generators. This 
implies that the operation of residential users can defer investments by using 
demand response [61]. Therefore, in some situations it can be more efficient to send 
locational dynamic prices and defer investments, instead of making the investments 
directly [54], [62]. To align with cost causality, a link should be found between 
forward looking network investment costs and prices sent to households [31]. Similar 
to the energy component, costs can be derived if demand and generation patterns of 
both centralized and decentralized RES are predicted. As this prediction is again 
covered by uncertainty, cost prediction gets more accurate closer to real-time.  
2.6.2 Length of price blocks and price patterns 
The length of price blocks refers to the time period in which the same price is 
applicable. As an example, the length of price blocks is one hour in Fig. 2.3. Dynamic 
pricing schemes charge a different price during different price blocks as costs 
fluctuate. Full cost causality would charge a different price every time costs change. 
The volatility of these costs depends on the underlying cost of power system 
operation. Similar to advance notice, a balance should be found between reaching 
the cost related tariff principles and the principles related to practicality, in order to 
optimally incentivize demand response [63]. 
Three examples of dynamic pricing schemes with a different length of price blocks 
are visualized in Fig. 2.6. The smaller the length of different price blocks, the better 
the principle of cost causality can be met. As a result of small price blocks, volatility 
is higher and the tariff could be more complicated or loose transparency. Moreover, 
consumption cycles such as washing machine cycles can last longer than the length 
of the price blocks, making the DR decision for the consumer more complex.  
Full cost causality could discourage demand response as adjusting consumption to 
short price blocks is more difficult. If price blocks get longer, demand response for a 
residential consumer could become more convenient as tariffs become more 
transparent and simpler to react to. If the length of the price blocks becomes longer 
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than the shifting potential of demand, the DR incentive decreases again. Moreover, it 
is more difficult for wider price blocks to reflect price spikes. If the price block lasts 
longer, the peak price level is flattened by averaging with shoulder periods. This 
leads to a lower opportunity for bill saving, resulting in a lower incentive for DR. 
 
Fig. 2.6. Dynamic pricing scheme with quarterly (left), hourly (middle), and six-hourly (right) 
pricing blocks and consumption of washing machine cycle. 
The price pattern consists of one or multiple price blocks. The length of the price 
pattern refers to the total time period covered by the pricing signal sent to the users 
constituting of the different price blocks, e.g. 4 hours in Fig. 2.3. Next to the length 
of individual price blocks, the length of the communicated price pattern also affects 
the cost related principles and the principles related with social acceptability, thereby 
affecting the demand response incentive.  
The longer the communicated price pattern lasts, the more costs are based on 
predictions. This makes it more difficult to attain full cost causality, but adds to the 
principles of social acceptability as for example demand shifting can be planned in 
time. Therefore, adjusting demand based on this longer price pattern is easier. 
2.7 Tariff designs in practice 
2.7.1 Existing tariff designs 
Around the world, different tariff designs are implemented. In line with Chapter 1, 
four main tariff designs are distinguished: flat, Time-of-Use (ToU), critical peak 
pricing (CPP), and real-time pricing (RTP) [12]. Each of these tariff designs aligns 
with a different extent with the cost related principles and the principles related to 
social acceptability and practicality. The specifics of each of these four tariff designs 
are given in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3. Tariff designs. 
Tariff design Advance notice Price pattern Price block 
Flat days Year/season Year/season 
Time-of-use days Year/season >1 block/day (e.g. day-night) 
Critical peak pricing < 1 day Hours Hours 
Real-time pricing < 1 day 1 hour 1 hour 
 
Each tariff design differs in its period of advance notice, price blocks, and price 
pattern. Flat tariffs are the traditional design and apply a constant price over a longer 
time period such as a year or season. Therefore, the length of the price pattern and 
price block is equal. The price level is set based on long term cost predictions. ToU 
pricing also typically sends a pricing scheme which applies over a longer time period, 
although the length of the price blocks are shorter. ToU pricing distinguishes 
between different price blocks a day. A widespread example is day-night pricing in 
which a lower price applies during the night. During the 80s, this price design was 
introduced within Belgium following investments in nuclear capacity. This design 
aimed at avoiding nightly shut downs of nuclear plants. In the CPP scheme, a peak 
price is added on top of another pricing scheme during a limited number of hours per 
year. In general, the length of advance notice is less than a day, while the length of 
the price block covers several hours. This tariff design is mainly used in the US. 
Finally, in RTP the length of advance notice, price blocks, and price patterns 
decreases to close to real-time. Although deployment of these pricing schemes for 
residential users is limited, some examples can be given. In Illinois, US, an hourly 
RTP scheme is used which charges consumers based on hourly wholesale prices 
[64]. To overcome the principles of social acceptability, pricing schemes can be 
coupled with information and automation services. Moreover, predicted prices are 
sent to the users day-ahead, although afterwards they are charged based on actual 
prices. In Sweden, a day-ahead hourly RTP scheme is used [65]. This implies that 
residential users are noticed the previous day of a tariff pattern covering 24 hours 
divided in hourly price blocks and are billed on the same tariff pattern afterwards. 
This design reflects availability of generation from RES more closely and aims to 
compensate inflexibility resulting from RES integration with flexibility at the demand 
side. A residential tariff design with smaller price blocks attaining higher cost 
causality than the latter has not been found in the literature. 
2.7.2 Assessment of illustrative tariff schemes 
Based on the different tariff designs from the previous section and in accordance 
with the theoretical framework discussed, four examples of tariff schemes are 
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constructed and assessed. This allows testing and clarifying the different theoretical 
concepts.  
To construct these schemes, the underlying costs and their time and locational 
dependency need to be assessed first. A realistic quantification of the underlying 
costs is outside the scope. Nevertheless, in what follows simplified tariff schemes are 
built serving as an illustration. Three cost components are considered: generation, 
T&D, and retail. Components are assumed to be driven by energy usage and are 
accordingly translated in tariffs expressed in €/MWh. Only the generation component 
is assumed to be time dependent and only the T&D component is assumed to be 
locational dependent. 
 Based on the underlying costs characteristics, four different tariff schemes are 
obtained: Flat1, Flat2, ToU, and RTP (Table 2.4). Compared to the previous section, 
the CPP tariff design is left out for the purpose of simplicity, while two flat tariffs are 
presented to illustrate the effect of the way generation is remunerated. The first 
three tariff designs are implemented in Belgium [66], while the last aligns with the 
design from Illinois [64]. The price levels of the schemes are given. Locational 
dependency of costs is transferred in the Flat2, ToU, and RTP design. Time 
dependency of generation cost is only fully reflected in RTP. In other designs, 
generation costs are averaged over longer time periods. Flat1 differs from the other 
tariffs in the way generation is remunerated. While Flat1 remunerates generation 
based on the consumption tariff as a whole covering generation, T&D and retail, 
other tariff schemes only remunerate injection based on the generation component.  
These tariff schemes are tested on two types of residential users with similar 
consumption pattern (Fig. 2.7). The first user (U1) is located in a city and does not 
possess any type of generation. The second user (U2) is situated in a rural area and 
has solar panels installed. Daily electricity generation in terms of energy of U2 equals 
his daily consumption. To integrate locational dependency in the example, it is 
assumed that distribution costs are higher for U2 compared to U1. Applying the tariff 
designs on the two users leads to seven tariff schemes (Fig. 2.8). 
 
Table 2.4. Characteristics of theoretical tariff schemes.  
Tariff 
Cost component Cost dependency 
Remuneration 
generation 
Gen. T&D Retail Locational  Time   
Flat1 Flat Flat Flat No No Total tariff 
Flat2 Flat Flat Flat Yes No Generation component 
ToU Day-night Flat Flat Yes Yes Generation component 
RTP Hourly Flat Flat Yes Yes Generation component 
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Fig. 2.7. Fictional consumption and generation patterns of the residential users. 
 
 
Fig. 2.8. Fictional tariff schemes for the residential users. 
The cost related principles of tariff design are assessed by comparing daily electricity 
bills following from the different tariff schemes. The bills for the two users are 
depicted in Table 2.5. Distinction is made between the generation, T&D, and retail 
components. The RTP bill is assumed to be a perfect approximation of actual costs 
and serves as a reference to assess cost causality. Although the different bills result 
from a theoretical example, the comparison with the reference bill illustrates the 
concepts of cost related principles. 
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Table 2.5. Daily electricity bills for residential users following from different tariff schemes. 
 
 Flat1
U1 
Flat1
U2 
Flat2
U1 
Flat2
U2 
ToU 
U1 
ToU 
U2 
RTP 
U1 
RTP 
U2 
Generation [€] 1.13 0.00 1.13 0.00 1.30 -0.08 1.43 0.13 
T&D [€] 0.60 0.00 0.38 1.29 0.38 1.29 0.38 1.29 
Retail [€] 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.23 0.15 0.23 0.15 0.23 
Total [€] 1.88 0.00 1.66 1.52 1.83 1.44 1.96 1.65 
 
In the Flat1 tariff, a discrepancy occurs between the total bill and the actual costs 
represented by the RTP bill. This illustrates that the Flat 1 tariff is not able to fully 
meet cost causality. This discrepancy is also present in the underlying components. 
For U1, only the retail component captures the actual costs. The discrepancy in the 
generation component leads to cross-subsidization in time, implying that users who 
consume during inexpensive periods subsidize the other users. The discrepancy in 
the T&D component leads to cross-subsidization in location, implying that users who 
live in an area with low T&D costs subsidize the other users. For U2, the total bill is 
zero. This follows from an equal daily consumption and generation, and from a 
generation remuneration based on the total tariff scheme. As U2 does not bear the 
costs he causes, this leads to cross-subsidization and to cost recovery problems. This 
illustrates that the impact of residential RES should be properly valuated. In the Flat2 
tariff, the locational dependency is reflected and injection is only remunerated based 
on the generation component. This leads to an accurate T&D component for both 
users. As retail costs are not locational and time dependent, this component is 
accurately valuated as well. The time-dependency of generation costs is not 
reflected, as observed in the difference in generation costs between the Flat2 and 
RTP design. In the ToU tariff, time-dependency is included. Depending on the 
consumption and generation pattern of the users, the bill approximates the actual 
costs better or worse. This illustrates that an imperfect reflection of costs in time-
depending tariffs designs can worsen the alignment with the cost causality principle 
for some users. 
Although a quantification of demand response is not within the scope of this chapter, 
it can be noticed that the four tariff schemes affect the demand response incentive 
differently. Only Flat1 does not incentivize demand response. Flat2 incentivizes 
demand response in case generation capacity is installed, as shifting consumption 
can defer the T&D cost of injecting and withdrawing electricity. Time-varying tariff 
schemes such as ToU and RTP also incentivize demand response. As RTP is able to 
more accurately reflect the impact of RES, demand response based on this scheme 
contributes to RES integration. 
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2.8 Summary & Conclusions 
Traditional tariff schemes are not able to reflect the challenges renewables 
integration brings. In contrast, locational dynamic pricing can capture these 
challenges by allowing price dependency on location and time.  
To assess the potential of locational dynamic pricing and the residential flexibility it 
can trigger, this chapter provides a theoretical framework. First, it evaluates the 
underlying costs of electricity. This is essential as demand response is mainly 
triggered if a substantial part of the underlying costs is locational and time 
dependent. Costs of electricity are split in cost components and cost categories. In 
general, cost components constitute of generation, T&D, and retail. Cost categories 
consist of operational and investment costs. The locational and time dependency of 
these costs is assessed according to its cost drivers: energy usage, system’s peak, 
and cost independent of usage or peak. It is shown that the different cost categories 
are highly affected by the integration of RES as this affects the cost drivers. As usage 
and peak typically depend on the time of the day, most costs driven by these drivers 
can be made time dependent. Moreover, locational dependency of costs relates to 
the locational dependency of its cost drivers. If costs are driven by usage or system’s 
peak at local level, costs should be assigned to this local level. If costs are induced 
by usage or peak at the global level, costs should be shared among its beneficiaries 
at the global level. 
When designing an LDP scheme, the principle of cost causality should be strived for, 
although some constraints need to be taken into account. Full cost causality is not 
always possible as cost determination and allocation is not straightforward. 
Meanwhile, general principles resulting from social acceptability and practical 
consideration should be considered. While cost causality allows for a non-
discriminatory way of billing residential users as they pay for the cost they cause, the 
demand side is still considered as an inflexible part of the system. Therefore, 
additional principles of tariff design are needed to incentivize demand response in an 
efficient way. This leads to an LDP scheme which not only takes into account RES, 
but also helps RES integration as this scheme allows for more flexibility.  
The demand response incentive is affected by three concepts related to tariff design: 
advance notice, length of price blocks and length of price pattern. These concepts in 
their turn affect the general tariff principles related to costs and social acceptability, 
often in a contrary way. Therefore, a balance has to be found between tariff 
principles related to costs and social acceptability on the one hand and its resulting 
demand response incentive on the other.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
Residential demand response 
based on dynamic pricing 
 
 
 3. Development of dynamic pricing schemes 
3.1 Introduction 
Based on the theoretical framework previously discussed, different dynamic pricing 
schemes are constructed. The variety in resulting dynamic tariff schemes leads to a 
deeper understanding of the potential for incentivizing demand response. Moreover, 
this chapter forms the basis on which the following chapters build. Although the 
same methodology can be used for other countries, pricing schemes are based on 
Belgian cost structures. Locational pricing is not considered. Also note that in what 
follows the focus is on an energy based rate designs expressed in c€/kWh. Other 
types of rate designs are out of scope and subject to further research. 
Section 3.2 starts by describing the price level of the different tariff components 
within Belgium. Based on the underlying costs and time-dependency, Section 3.3 
describes a methodology to develop dynamic tariff schemes. The tariff schemes 
following from this analysis are discussed and compared in Section 3.4 and 3.5 
respectively. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Tariff components 
A Belgian residential electricity tariff consists of several tariff components. Compared 
to the theoretical tariff components discussed in the previous chapter, in reality the 
structure and the content of the electricity tariff differs. Taxes and levies are added 
to the generation, transmission, distribution, and retail components. Belgian 
examples of levies are the financing of the connection of offshore wind farms, 
surcharges for green certificates, surcharges for public lighting, financing of 
promotion of rational energy use, etc. Other taxes and levies are mentioned 
separately on the residential bill. Rather than distinguishing between generation and 
retail, Belgian residential bills only account for an energy component summing both 
components. 
The breakdown of a residential electricity tariff in Belgium is visualized in Fig. 3.1 
based on an analysis of the Belgian federal regulator [67]. The tariff components are 
derived for a typical residential user connected to the low voltage grid with a yearly 
daytime and nighttime consumption of 1600 and 1900 kWh respectively [67]. The 
figure shows that the total tariff amounts to 20 c€/kWh of which 75% consists of the 
energy and distribution components. The remaining part is attributable to 
transmission and taxes and levies. Only those taxes and levies not included in the 
energy, transmission, and distribution components are visualized.  
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Fig. 3.1. Breakdown of the electricity tariff for a typical Belgian residential user. 
3.3 Dynamic tariff scheme development 
This section describes a methodology for developing dynamic pricing schemes based 
on the different tariff components and applied to the Belgian case. Based on 
available cost information, the time dependency of underlying costs of each 
component is assessed. Afterwards, these costs are translated in a dynamic tariff 
component. This approach is followed for each tariff component, being a 
simplification aiming at providing insights, rather than reflecting full cost causality. 
 
Energy tariff component 
As generation and retail are competitive in Belgium, no further insights in the 
underlying cost structure of the energy component are publicly available. 
Nevertheless, the main part of the energy tariff component is related to electricity 
generation costs which can be approximated by the price on the Belgian day-ahead 
wholesale market, later on referred to as the Belpex-price [68]. Within this market, 
hourly variation of power generation costs is reflected. 
As the Belpex-price accounts for only part of the total energy component, rescaling is 
needed for generators and retailers to recover their costs. In addition, revenue for 
the generators and retailers should be the same under flat pricing than under 
dynamic pricing if the residential users do not change their consumption pattern. 
This is also referred to as revenue neutrality [69]. 
A valid rescaling factor rfe is derived from: 
∑ [[SLPp ∙ WPp ] ∙ rfe]
8760
𝑝=1
= FlatEnergy 
(3.1) 
with: 
SLPp: Synthetic load profile during hour p [% of yearly 
consumption], 
WPp: Wholesale price during hour p [c€/kWh], 
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rfe: Rescaling factor for energy component, 
FlatEnergy:  Average energy tariff component over year [c€/kWh]. 
The wholesale price is based on hourly day-ahead Belpex-prices of 2011 [68]. Hourly 
electricity use of residential users is derived from synthetic load profiles of 2011 [70], 
while the average energy tariff is based on [67] as discussed in Section 3.2.  
Based on the rescaling factor and the Belpex-prices, the hourly dynamic energy tariff 
component 𝑅𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦,𝑖 is: 
𝑅𝑇𝑃𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦,𝑝 = 𝑟𝑓𝑒 ∙ WPp. (3.2) 
The resulting dynamic energy tariff component for a random day in October is 
depicted in Fig. 3.2. The tariff varies considerably during the day between 6.26 
c€/kWh and 18.35 c€/kWh. Two measures define the variability. First, the peak to 
off-peak (PtOP) ratio describes the ratio between the maximum and minimum price 
level during the day. Often this measure is used to describe the incentive for users to 
react to the pricing signal. For October 20th, the PtOP ratio is 2.93. Second, also the 
hourly variance within a day captures the DR incentive. This is the average of 
squared differences from the mean. The higher the variance, the further hourly 
prices deviate from the daily mean, in this case 7.51. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2. Dynamic energy tariff component for Thursday October 20th. 
 
Transmission and distribution tariff component 
Belgian transmission and distribution is regulated as future costs need to be 
approved by regulators in advance. To attain perfect cost causality in time as 
discussed in the previous chapter, a quantification of the underlying costs and the 
time dependency of the cost drivers is required. As this is outside the scope of this 
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thesis, a simplified approach is taken in view of demonstrating tariff development 
and its implications. Therefore, transmission costs and its resulting tariff are assumed 
flat over the year, while distribution costs are assumed to vary with the level of 
electricity usage of residential users. In this perspective and after discussions within 
a residential pilot project named LINEAR [71], the dynamic distribution tariff 
component 𝑅𝑇𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝑝 becomes: 
𝑅𝑇𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝑝 =
SLPp
∑ SLPp
28760
p=1
 ∙  FlatDistr 
(3.3) 
with: 
𝑅𝑇𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝑝: Dynamic distribution tariff component [c€/kWh], 
FlatDistr:  Average distribution tariff component over the year 
[c€/kWh]. 
Hereby, 𝑅𝑇𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝑝 is determined based on the ratio between the hourly usage and its 
weighted average over the year. This results in a higher distribution tariff when the 
hourly electricity usage of residential users is above the weighted average. Moreover, 
the formula ensures revenue neutrality and cost recovery. 
The resulting dynamic distribution and flat transmission tariff components for 
October 20th are depicted in Fig. 3.3. The distribution tariff varies widely during the 
day between 3.86 c€/kWh and 9.00 c€/kWh. Therefore, the PtOP-ratio amounts to 
2.33 and the variance is 2.30. 
 
Fig. 3.3. Dynamic distribution tariff component and flat transmission component for Thursday 
October 20th. 
Taxes & levies tariff component 
Finally, although taxes and levies are partly variable in time, they are also assumed 
flat during the day (Fig. 3.4). 
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Fig. 3.4. Flat taxes & levies tariff component for Thursday October 20th. 
 
Total dynamic tariff 
Once all dynamic components are known, first the dynamic tariff design needs to be 
decided upon by determining advance notice, the length of the price blocks, and the 
length of the price pattern. Then, the price level of each type of price block is set by 
calculating the weighted average of all hourly prices of the same type. Finally, by 
summing the resulting dynamic tariff components, the final dynamic pricing scheme 
is obtained. 
3.4 Tariff schemes 
Based on the tariff development methodology and on different tariff design 
characteristics, four different dynamic tariff schemes are constructed. They are 
summarized in Table 3.1, along with the flat pricing scheme. In what follows, each 
tariff scheme is briefly discussed. 
 
Table 3.1. Design characteristics of considered tariff schemes. 
 Advance notice Price pattern Price Blocks 
Flat pricing Year-ahead 1 year 1 year 
Time-of-use pricing Year-ahead 1 year Peak, off-peak 
Critical peak pricing Basis: Year-ahead 
CPP: Day-ahead 
Basis: 1 year 
CPP: 1 hour  
Basis: Peak, off-peak 
CPP: 10 peaks of 1 hour 
Real-time pricing Day-ahead 24 hours 1 hour 
Renewable pricing Day-ahead 24 hours 0h-7h, 7h-10h, 10h-13h, 
13h-17h, 17h-20h, 20h-24h 
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3.4.1 Flat pricing 
The flat pricing scheme is widespread in Belgium [72]. Although the price with flat 
pricing schemes in Belgium can be adapted over the different seasons, it is assumed 
that it remains flat over the entire year. Assuming that the contract with the 
residential user spans a year, the period of advance notice covers up to a year-
ahead. 
An example of the flat tariff scheme for a day in October is provided in Fig. 3.5, 
distinguishing between the different tariff components. 
 
Fig. 3.5. Flat tariff scheme for Thursday October 20th. 
3.4.2 Time-of-use pricing 
Together with flat pricing, time-of-use pricing is the main tariff scheme in Belgium. 
As shown in Table 3.1, two price blocks are distinguished within this tariff scheme. 
Depending on the geographic area within Belgium, the peak tariff covers the daytime 
block from 7h to 22h during weekdays, while the off-peak period covers all hours 
during weekends and the nighttime block from 22h to 7h during weekdays. Similar to 
flat pricing the price patterns spans a full year.  
An example of the ToU tariff scheme for Thursday October 20th is provided in Fig. 
3.6, distinguishing between the different tariff components. The peak tariff amounts 
to 21.58 c€/kWh, while the off-peak tariff sums to 18.60 c€/kWh. This leads to a 
price difference of 2.98 c€/kWh and a peak to off-peak (PtOP) ratio of 1.16. The 
variance sums up to 2.17 for this day. 
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Fig. 3.6. ToU tariff scheme for Thursday October 20th. 
3.4.3 Critical peak pricing 
A dynamic tariff scheme, which is currently not available in Belgium for residential 
users, is Critical Peak Pricing (CPP). This tariff scheme covers the ToU scheme which 
is overruled when an hourly price spike is sent on a day-ahead basis. The occurrence 
of this event is limited to 10 times a year. The purpose of this tariff scheme is to 
reduce consumption during these critical events. 
To attain the level of the price spikes, the energy component of the ToU price is 
lowered by 0.5 c€/kWh for all periods and the resulting revenue loss is recovered by 
charging a higher price level during the critical peak hours. These critical hours were 
chosen to be the ones with the highest Belpex-price. This leads to a price of 162.55 
c€/kWh on top of ToU price.  
Note that contrary to prices within other dynamic tariff schemes, the critical peak 
price is not based on the principle of cost causality and therefore does not reflect the 
underlying costs. Instead, the critical peak price is sent to assure demand response 
to be triggered and therefore to avoid the critical event. 
An example of the CPP tariff scheme for Thursday October 20th is provided in Fig. 
3.7. During this day a critical peak price is called. The peak tariff amounts to 183.83 
c€/kWh, while the off-peak tariff sums to 18.30 c€/kWh. This leads to a price 
difference of 165.53 c€/kWh and a PtOP-ratio of 10.04. The variance adds up to 
1118.89. 
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Fig. 3.7. CPP tariff scheme for Thursday October 20th. 
3.4.4 Real-time pricing 
A second dynamic tariff scheme, currently not available in Belgium for residential 
users, is real-time pricing (RTP). In this thesis, day-ahead RTP is assumed covering 
24 price blocks a day. This allows a closer reflection of the underlying costs 
compared to the flat, ToU, and CPP tariff scheme. 
An example of the RTP tariff scheme for Thursday October 20th is provided in Fig. 
3.8, distinguishing between the different components. The peak tariff amounts to 
32.34 c€/kWh, the off-peak to 15.21 c€/kWh. This leads to a price difference of 
17.13 c€/kWh and a PtOP-ratio of 2.13. Variance adds up to 15.81. 
 
Fig. 3.8. RTP tariff scheme for Thursday October 20th. 
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As the energy and distribution tariff patterns vary over the day, it could happen that 
these two patterns of the underlying tariff components incentivize opposing demand 
response directions. From the point of view of DSOs and retailers, these opposing 
signals have to be avoided. The direction of the DR incentive of each component is 
determined by the deviation of the hourly price from its daily average. For example, 
an hourly price of the energy component above its daily average incentivizes a 
demand reduction, while an hourly distribution price during the same hour below its 
daily average incentivizes a demand increase. This implies an opposing demand 
response incentive triggered by the energy and distribution component. This 
decreases the impact of the demand response incentive resulting from each 
individual component. In what follows, this effect is referred to as opposing dynamic 
components. Within the RTP scheme, this effect is present in 2724 hours or 31.10% 
of the hours within a year. In the remaining 68.10% of the time, the demand 
response incentive is enlarged due to coincident variability of the energy and 
distribution pattern. Hereby, any size of opposing effects is considered however 
small. When neglecting smaller effects, this picture changes. When a deviation of the 
hourly price from the daily average of less than 0.25 c€/kWh is not considered, the 
opposing effect only takes place in 13.82% of the time. When deviations of less than 
0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2 c€/kWh are neglected, this further reduces to 8.79, 1.84, 0.29 and 
0.01% of the time respectively. Therefore, it can be concluded that during the main 
part of the hours in which the price deviation is high, the demand response incentive 
is enlarged due to coincident dynamic components. 
3.4.5 Renewable pricing 
A final dynamic pricing scheme is referred to as renewable pricing (REN). The 
purpose of this tariff scheme is to align consumption with power generation from 
renewable energy sources. It is used within a Flemish pilot project, named LINEAR 
[58]. As shown in Table 3.1, this pricing scheme sends the price pattern day-ahead 
similarly to RTP. Nevertheless, renewable pricing differs from RTP in two ways.  
The price pattern is divided in 6 price blocks instead of 24. The width of each time 
block is chosen based on similarity between the price levels in adjacent hours [58]. 
The purpose of the wider blocks is to allow residential users to react more easily.  
The impact of power generation from wind farms and solar panels on the wholesale 
price and energy component is enlarged, as the share of RES increases [73]. 
Therefore, wholesale prices are adjusted according to the RES capacity [74]. 
Wholesale price adjustment is based on market resiliency analysis. This analysis 
states the wholesale price sensitivity due to an increase in offer or demand on the 
market. Based on [68], an hour with 100 MW renewable energy generation above 
average leads to a 0.332 €/MWh decrease of the hourly wholesale price. This 
resiliency factor is applied to annual hourly generation profiles of solar and wind 
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plants, derived from public data [75], [76]. Hereby, the resiliency factor is applied to 
the hourly power deviation from the average power. Moreover, this impact is 
increased with a factor 5 in order to stimulate consumption during moments of 
power generation from RES. The hourly price adjustments over the whole year are 
shown in Fig. 3.9 and Fig. 3.10 for power generation from solar and wind plants 
respectively. Only short-term effects are considered, while the long-term effect due 
to the impact on generation investments is not. The adjusted wholesale prices are 
depicted in Fig. 3.11 and compared to the initial wholesale price within a price 
duration curve. This curve ranks the hourly price levels within a year from high to 
low. The price adjustment leads to a higher spread of prices even extending to 
negative prices. The final residential energy price component is obtained by 
multiplying the wholesale price with a rescaling factor similarly to rescaling in Section 
3.3. As the price blocks cover multiple hours and after adding distribution, 
transmission, and other components, the total REN-tariff becomes positive during all 
hours of the year.  
 
Fig. 3.9. Wholesale price adjustment due to power generation from solar panels. 
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Fig. 3.10. Wholesale price adjustment due to power generation from wind mills. 
 
Fig. 3.11. Initial and adjusted wholesale price. 
An example of the REN tariff scheme for Thursday October 20th is provided in Fig. 
3.12, distinguishing between the different components. The peak tariff amounts to 
23.48 c€/kWh, while the off-peak tariff sums to 16.20 c€/kWh. This leads to a price 
difference of 7.28 c€/kWh and a PtOP-ratio of 1.44. Variance adds up to 5.76. 
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Fig. 3.12. Renewable tariff scheme for Thursday October 20th. 
3.5 Tariff comparison 
To gain insights in the similarities and differences between schemes, tariffs are 
compared based on the price patterns within a single day and on price curves and 
statistics for a full year. 
The different tariff schemes within a single day are depicted in Fig. 3.13. They result 
from the methodology as previously described and all meet the cost recovery and 
revenue neutrality principle. The CPP tariff scheme is omitted for clarity reasons. The 
flat price positions between the peak and off-peak price of the ToU tariff. This 
follows from the calculation method of both pricing schemes and from the cost 
recovery and neutrality principle. By comparing the flat and ToU tariff scheme, it can 
be seen that averaging over multiple periods reduces the peak tariff and enlarges the 
off-peak period. Therefore, the PtOP-ratio and the demand response incentive get 
smaller. The same principle applies for the RTP and REN tariff schemes. The RTP is 
higher than the flat or ToU price during the main part of the day, when consumption 
is higher. This implies that apart from daily variations, flat pricing is not able to 
account for seasonal variation. As in general Belgian wholesale prices are higher 
during winter compared to summer, flat and ToU pricing are undervalued during 
winter while overvalued during summer. Finally, the REN tariff scheme is lower than 
the RTP scheme. This implies that power generation from RES during this day was 
higher than average, lowering prices. 
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Fig. 3.13. Comparison of tariff schemes for Thursday October 20st. 
 
Next to the insights following from an individual day, some general observations for a 
full year can be derived by analyzing the price duration curve (Fig. 3.14) and the 
statistics of each tariff scheme. The price duration curve ranks the hourly price levels 
within a year from high to low. The CPP tariff scheme is left out for clarity reasons. 
Comparison between the remaining schemes shows that similarly to the previous 
figure, flat pricing lays between the peak and off-peak price of ToU. Peak prices 
within ToU only occur in less than 50% of the times as no peak prices are present in 
weekends. The RTP and REN tariff schemes illustrate that these tariff schemes 
increase the variability around the flat tariff. Comparing the RTP and REN tariff 
schemes shows that for the main part of the year, the REN further deviates from the 
flat tariff. This follows from the inclusion of a higher price impact of power 
generation from RES, increasing price variability. Although Fig. 3.14 illustrates the 
hourly price spread for the entire year, it does not allow capturing the demand 
response incentive as short-term demand response results from the proportion 
between the different price blocks within the short-term, such as a day.  
In order to capture the demand response incentive, different statistics for each tariff 
scheme are provided in Table 3.2. A distinction is made between the daily PtOP-ratio 
and the daily variance. For each day within each tariff scheme, these characteristic 
are calculated after which the yearly minimum, median, and maximum of these daily 
values are derived (Table 3.2). As no price variability is present within the flat pricing 
scheme, the PtOP-ratio is 1.00 while the variance amounts 0.00. For the ToU tariff 
scheme the minimum PtOP-ratio and variance remain the same as ToU prices are flat 
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during weekends. During weekdays values go up arriving at a variance of 2.17. The 
minimum and median values are similar for the CPP tariff schemes as both tariff 
schemes are parallel during the main part of the year. During the days including the 
critical peak prices, both PtOP and variance boom reaching values of 10.04 and 
1118.89 respectively. For the RTP scheme, the minimum PtOP and variance values 
are 1.40 and 2.42, exceeding the maximum values of the ToU scheme and the 
median value of the CPP. It implies higher price variability within the day of the RTP 
scheme during the main part of the year. The same applies for the REN scheme, 
although the latter has lower minimum and median PtOP ratios and variances. This 
results from longer price blocks, which average peak or off-peak periods with 
shoulder periods decreasing the price spike and price drop. The maximum 
characteristics are higher in the case of the REN tariff scheme due to the impact of 
power generation from RES leading to more price extremes. 
 
Fig. 3.14. Yearly price duration curves for the different tariff schemes. 
 
Table 3.2. Statistics of different pricing schemes. 
 Peak to off-peak ratio Variance 
 Min. Median Max. Min. Median Max. 
Flat 1.00 1.00 1.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 
ToU 1.00 1.16 1.16 0,00 2.17 2.17 
CPP 1.00 1.16 10.04 0,00 2.17 1118.89 
RTP 1.40 1.88 2.51 2.42 9.71 25.60 
REN 1.12 1.44 3.03 0.44 6.93 39.03 
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3.6 Summary & Conclusions 
This chapter discusses the development of different dynamic tariff schemes and the 
implication the choice of a particular tariff scheme has on tariff characteristics and 
demand response incentives. Based on a distinction in the length of advance notice, 
the length of the price blocks, and the length of the price pattern, five tariff schemes 
are discussed: flat, ToU, CPP, RTP, and REN.  
Three types of tariff schemes can be distinguished based on their objectives: 
meeting cost causality, decreasing demand during critical events, and aligning 
consumption with power generation from RES. The first tariff type covers the flat, 
ToU, and RTP tariff schemes. While the flat scheme allows meeting cost causality 
over the year, it does not meet cost causality over a shorter time horizon. The ToU 
tariff scheme goes one step further by allowing cost causality over the peak and off-
peak periods within the year. Moreover, it stimulates short-term demand response 
due to the difference between peak and off-peak prices. The RTP tariff scheme 
meets cost causality on an hourly basis reflecting the hourly underlying costs and 
therefore incentivizing demand response. In the second type of tariff schemes, cost 
causality is not the main objective, but the focus is on reducing demand during 
critical events. The example used is CPP. This tariff scheme is typically used within a 
capacity constrained power system that is not able to meet demand during every 
hour of the year. Therefore, a previously agreed price spike is sent during these 
critical events aiming to reduce demand. As such events occur rarely, this tariff 
scheme is not suited to cover the intermittency in a power generation portfolio based 
on RES. Moreover, this tariff scheme only aims at securing a power generation 
shortage while a power generation excess is not covered. The third type of tariff 
schemes aims at a more efficient integration of intermittent RES by aligning demand 
with the available power generation from RES. An example is the REN tariff scheme 
which increases the impact of power generation from RES on the electricity price.  
To assess the quantity of short-term demand response following from a tariff 
scheme, two characteristics often used are the daily PtOP-ratio and the daily 
variance. Apart from critical peak days within the CPP scheme, the RTP scheme 
shows the highest daily PtOP and variance during the main part of the year. 
Although yearly variability is higher, daily PtOP and variance are lower for the REN 
tariff as peak and off-peak periods are averaged with shoulder periods due to wider 
price blocks. Another effect that can limit the daily PtOP and variance values, is the 
opposing dynamic components effect. Although existing, it should be noted that this 
effect only occurs in 0.29% of the time when only price deviations larger than 1.5 
c€/kWh are accounted for. Nevertheless, in reality further optimization and 
prioritization of these opposing signals seems interesting. 
 
 
  
4. Demand response simulation and practical 
evidence 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses residential demand response (DR) as a reaction to dynamic 
pricing. To achieve a comprehensive insight in demand response under it various 
forms, distinction is made between demand response following from the different 
dynamic pricing schemes developed in the previous chapter, DR simulation and 
practical evidence, and DR with different underlying residential load types. 
In Section 4.2, DR with different residential load types is simulated based on the 
various dynamic tariff schemes developed in Chapter 3. After this theoretical demand 
response description, practical evidence of residential demand response is 
highlighted in Section 4.3 based on results from a residential pilot project. Finally, 
Section 4.4 summarizes and concludes.  
4.2 Demand response simulation under various tariff 
schemes 
A theoretical approach is taken by simulating demand response following from 
dynamic tariff schemes. Hereby, it is assumed that power consumption of different 
load types is shifted towards the lowest price period while accounting for user 
preferences. This simulation serves as a benchmark against which results from real-
world pilots can be compared allowing to consider different load types and tariff 
schemes. It can also be seen as the case in which loads automatically shift towards 
the lowest price period with a minimum level of interaction with residential users, 
also referred to as automated demand response. The assumption is that prices are 
binding once communicated. Therefore, demand shifts do not affect prices 
communicated to the households. Note however that this is an approximation, 
especially if the amount of DR becomes substantial. In the ideal case, the dynamic 
pricing scheme sent to the residential users already accounts for the resulting 
demand shifts. Nevertheless, this is subject to further research.  
To attain deeper insights in this simulation, first the optimization model for the 
different load types is discussed. The focus is on wet appliances (WAs) and on 
battery electric vehicles (BEVs). Afterwards results of DR are discussed in a 
descriptive analysis, comparing DR with different load types under different dynamic 
tariff schemes. Finally, household benefits of demand response are described.  
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4.2.1 Wet appliance scheduler 
Starting from the dynamic pricing schemes, a WA scheduler shifts consumption 
cycles of appliances towards the lowest price period. Several load control algorithms 
are discussed in the literature [77], [78], [79], and [80]. Most studies optimize the 
appliance schedule for one day, given a theoretical time window in which the 
predefined power consumption profile can be shifted [78], [79], and [80]. Adding to 
these studies, this section applies a WA scheduler to measured consumption data of 
residential consumers. These realistic consumption profiles call for a different 
approach as the power profile and timing of each appliance cycle differ day by day. 
Moreover, the scheduler requires the integration of user preferences to ensure a 
more realistic outcome. Therefore, a WA scheduler based on Integer Linear 
Programming (ILP) is developed. 
 
Data & Assumptions 
Within the context of the LINEAR project [71], consumption profiles of over 200 
Belgian households are measured since 2012. Out of these 200 profiles, 30 profiles 
were selected based on quality and completeness of data. For each of the 
households a three-month period is considered covering January till March 2013. 
Hereby, distinction is made between total and flexible consumption. Total 
consumption covers all consumption within the household, while flexible consumption 
only covers consumption due to the use of WAs. These WAs cover washing 
machines, dishwashers, and dryers. Each WA is submetered separately.  
The average consumption profile for WAs within a household is visualized in Fig. 4.1 
and Fig. 4.2 for an average week and weekend day respectively. Generally daytime 
consumption during weekends is higher than during weeks. The difference in 
consumption profiles during weeks and weekends has two main reasons. In 
weekends more consumers are at home during daytime. Some of the households are 
registered for a day-night tariff scheme, implying a lower price during weekends and 
during the nighttime of weeks. Therefore, some of the WA cycles are already shifted 
towards the evening of weekdays and towards weekends. Also the profile of WAs 
differs. During weeks, consumption of dishwashers typically peaks at the end of the 
day. Consumption of washing machines typically peaks between 9h00 and 12h00, 
while the dryer peaks between 12h00 and 13h00. This illustrates the link between 
washing machine and dryer. The dryer runs behind on the washing machine. This 
can also be seen by the delayed rise in the consumption profile of the dryer in the 
morning. During weekends, peaks in consumption profiles of washing machines and 
dryers fall later during the day. Nevertheless the link between both appliances 
remains. 
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Fig. 4.1.  Average household power profiles of WAs during an average weekday. 
 
Fig. 4.2.  Average household power profiles of WAs during an average weekend day. 
As WAs are considered to be flexible, they can be shifted in time. Therefore, two WA 
consumption profiles are distinguished: the unscheduled measured and the 
scheduled profile with DR. The unscheduled flexibility profile equals the historical 
profile and results in the averaged measured profiles of Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2. The 
scheduled profile with DR is obtained after running the WA scheduler. Hereby, it is 
assumed that consumers do not change the loading behavior of their appliances 
under dynamic pricing schemes. This implies that residential users load and initialize 
their WAs at the same time as in the unscheduled case. Afterwards they set the 
shifting potential (TSP) with a timer, stating by when the cycle needs to be finished. 
Within this period, the appliance cycle is optimally scheduled based upon the 
dynamic pricing scheme. Only a shift of the full cycle is considered, as the wet 
appliances are assumed uninterruptible. 
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Before the model for scheduling WAs is discussed, an overview of the spread of total 
and flexible consumption of households for the three-month period is visualized by 
means of a boxplot (Fig. 4.3). Hereby, the upper and lower box each covers a spread 
of 40% or 12 out of 30 households. The border between both represents the 
household with median consumption level, while the wickers represent households 
with minimum and maximum consumption levels. This illustrates that the amount of 
flexibility originating from WAs is limited compared to the total consumption. 
Moreover, the relative spread of both total and flexible consumption is high. 
Therefore, total and flexible consumption depends on the household itself, as the 
frequency of use and number of appliances vary. While flexible consumption 
accounts for less than 80 kWh per 3 months in some households, other households 
have over 270 kWh available for flexibility purposes during the three-month period. 
Although not visualized, also appliance ownership differs amongst households. While 
23 households possess all three wet appliances, 7 households only possess two. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3.  Spread of total and flexible consumption of 30 households for a three-month period 
with the upper and lower box each representing 40% of the observations and the wickers 
representing the minimum and maximum consumption levels. 
 
Integer Linear Program (ILP) 
Objective Function  
The objective of the scheduler is to minimize electricity costs by shifting WAs to the 
lowest price periods. The objective function is: 
∑ C𝑎𝑗𝑛 ∗ 𝑋𝑎𝑗𝑛𝑎𝑗𝑛 , (4.1) 
where C𝑎𝑗𝑛 reflects the cost for cycle j of appliance a (1 = washing machine, 2 = 
dryer, 3 = dishwasher) shifted with n - 1 hours, where n ∈ {1, … , shifting potential}. 
X𝑎𝑗𝑛 represents a binary auxiliary decision variable. If 𝑋𝑎𝑗𝑛= 1, cycle j of appliance a 
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is shifted for n - 1 hours. Values of C𝑎𝑗𝑛 are calculated before solving the ILP. This 
allows easily adding constraints integrating user preferences into the model. 
Constraints 
Cycle j of appliance a needs to be executed once within the shifting interval: 
∑ 𝑋𝑎𝑗𝑛 = 1n  ∀ 𝑎, 𝑗.  (4.2) 
An appliance cycle needs to be finished within its total shifting potential (TSP): 
𝑜𝑐𝑓𝑎,𝑗  ≤  ISa,j + TSP ∀ 𝑎, 𝑗, (4.3) 
where 𝑜𝑐𝑓𝑎,𝑗 is the optimal cycle finish and ISa,j is the initial cycle start of cycle j of 
appliance a.  
An appliance cycle needs to be finished before the initial start of the next cycle of the 
same appliance:  
𝑜𝑐𝑓𝑎,𝑗 ≤ ISa,j+1 ∀ 𝑎, 𝑗. (4.4) 
The last cycle of the time horizon needs to be finished before the horizon ends: 
𝑜𝑐𝑓𝑎,𝑗 ≤  TMax ∀  𝑎, 𝑗, (4.5) 
where TMax represents the last time interval of the simulation period. 
In most cases, a direct link exists between the cycle of the washing machine and 
dryer as washed load is put in the dryer after finishing. Therefore, the washing 
machine needs to finish before the dryer cycle is initialized: 
𝑜𝑐𝑓1𝑗 ≤ IS2l ∀ 𝑗, (4.6) 
where 𝑜𝑐𝑓1𝑗 represents the optimal cycle finish of cycle j of the washing machine and 
IS2l stands for the initial cycle start of the linked dryer cycle l. 
 
Scheduler Example 
Fig. 4.4 illustrates the change in consumption pattern after solving the ILP. Hereby, 
the total shifting potential (TSP) is set to 8 hours in line with results from the LINEAR 
project [71]. The example depicts the flexible consumption pattern of one household 
under RTP for two random weekdays in February. Hourly prices are represented at 
the top. Underneath, the unscheduled and scheduled consumption patterns of the 
washing machine and dryer are depicted. For reasons of clarity, non-flexible 
consumption and consumption from dishwasher cycles are omitted. Clearly, washing 
machine and dryer cycles are shifted towards the lowest cost periods given an 8 hour 
shifting potential. Moreover, the figure illustrates that the washing machine cycle 
needs to be finished before the start of the associated dryer cycle.  
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   Fig. 4.4. Hourly price pattern, and unscheduled & scheduled consumption patterns of washing 
machine (WM) and dryer (DR) during two random weekdays of February for one household. 
4.2.2 BEV scheduler 
Starting from the dynamic pricing schemes, a BEV scheduler shifts battery charging 
of BEVs to the lowest price period in order to minimize total electricity costs. To 
ensure a realistic outcome, the scheduler requires the integration of driving behavior 
and technical characteristics of vehicles. Therefore, a BEV scheduler based on Linear 
Programming (LP) is developed and discussed. 
 
Data & Assumptions 
To determine the optimal charging profile, data are needed on both the driving 
patterns of BEVs and on vehicle characteristics.  
The driving patterns are derived from results of the 3rd Flemish Mobility Study 
(OVG3) [81]. In this study transportation behavior of 8800 drivers was analyzed from 
September 2007 till 2008. Over this period, the status of the vehicles is listed, 
distinguishing between driving and standing still. Moreover, standing still is split in ‘at 
home’ and ‘other’. In Van Roy et al. [82], the energy consumption of each driving 
cycle is determined based on these driving patterns and the vehicle sizes.  
From the analysis of OVG3 [81] and Van Roy et al. [82], 100 representative BEVs 
with a full year of data on minute basis were selected and driving patterns and 
energy consumption were obtained. The average status of all vehicles during a week 
and weekend day is visualized in Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6, distinguishing between 
driving, at home, and at another location. Both during weeks and weekends the main 
share of vehicles is standing still at home or another location. On average weekend 
days, the share of vehicles driving never exceeds 10% while the share during 
weekdays is a bit higher. 
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Fig. 4.5.  Average number of vehicles driving, at home and at another location during weeks.   
 
Fig. 4.6.  Average number of vehicles driving, at home and at another location during 
weekends.   
Table 4.1. Technical characteristics of BEVs. 
 Subcompact 
BEV 
Midsize 
BEV 
Large BEV Reference 
Specific consumption [kWh/km] 0.16 0.19 0.25 [81] 
Battery capacity [kWh] 20.8 31.2 41.6 [81] 
Grid-to-battery efficiency [%] 90 90 90 [81] 
Battery-to-wheel efficiency [%] 90 90 90 [81] 
Maximum state of charge [% of battery capacity] 95 95 95 [82] 
Maximum charging power [kW] 4 4 4 [83] 
 
Three types of vehicles are considered: subcompact, midsize, and large, accounting 
for 26%, 67%, and 7% of the total fleet respectively. Each type has its own technical 
battery characteristics (Table 4.1). Effects such as aging of the battery and 
depreciation are not considered. 
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Two charging scenarios are considered. Within the unscheduled scenario, BEV 
batteries start charging as soon as they are plugged in. BEVs are only assumed to be 
plugged in at home. This scenario serves as reference. Within the scheduled 
scenario, timing and quantity of charging is optimized over the period when the BEV 
is at home. Hereby, it is assumed that residential users do not change their driving 
behavior under dynamic pricing schemes: they arrive and depart at the same time as 
in the unscheduled case. In both charging scenarios batteries charge until they reach 
the maximum state of charge or until the BEV departs. 
The spread in consumption due to BEV charging, also referred to as flexible 
consumption, is visualized in Fig. 4.7 by means of a boxplot. Apart from flexible 
consumption, inflexible household consumption without BEVs is also visualized based 
on data retrieved in the scope of the LINEAR-project [71]. The upper and lower box 
in both boxplots each covers the spread of 40% or 40 out of 100 households. The 
border between both represents the median consumption level, while the wickers 
represent minimum and maximum consumption levels. This illustrates that the 
amount of flexibility from BEVs is substantial compared to inflexible consumption. 
Moreover, the spread of both inflexible and flexible consumption is high. 
Consequently, inflexible and flexible consumption depends on the household or BEV 
itself, as the use of appliances and BEVs varies. While consumption due to BEV 
charging accounts for less than 2000 kWh in some households, others have over 
4500 kWh available for flexibility purposes over the year. For inflexible consumption, 
spread is even higher covering consumption from over 300 kWh up to almost 13000 
kWh. Nevertheless, these high inflexible consumption values typically result from 
electric heating. Although considered as inflexible within this dissertation, this is not 
necessarily the case in practice. 
 
Fig. 4.7.  Spread of inflexible consumption and flexible consumption from BEVS of 100 
households for a year with the upper and lower boxes each representing 40% of the 
observations and the wickers representing the minimum and maximum consumption levels. 
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Linear Program (LP) 
Before the BEV scheduler is used, available data is preprocessed. Therefore, a 
minimum and maximum boundary between which cumulative energy should lay is 
determined. An example of the minimum and maximum energy boundaries of one 
BEV on October 20th is given in Fig. 4.8. The minimum boundary (EMin) is obtained 
by a strategy that postpones charging as much as possible. The maximum boundary 
(EMax) results from charging as soon as the BEV arrives home until the battery is 
fully charged or the vehicle departs again, aligning with the unscheduled charging 
scenario. If the BEV is not fully charged during standstill, the minimum and 
maximum boundaries overlap and no charging flexibility is available. As the area 
between minimum and maximum boundary grows, more charging flexibility becomes 
available which can be used for demand response purposes. Once the boundaries are 
found, the optimal charging path can be determined between these boundaries 
resulting from a Linear Programming (LP) approach. 
 
Fig. 4.8. Minimum (dashed, black) and maximum energy boundaries (dotted, black), and 
minimum (dashed, gray) and maximum power patterns (dotted, gray) for October 20th for a 
random BEV. 
Objective Function  
The objective of the BEV scheduler is to minimize the yearly electricity cost by 
charging the BEVs during the lowest price periods, reflected by the objective 
function: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛. ∑ DPq ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑞q ,   (4.7) 
where DPq reflects the dynamic pricing scheme in quarter q, while 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑞 represents 
the charging power in quarter q. Time steps cover 15 minutes, contrary to the hourly 
time steps in the WA case.  
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Constraints 
The charging power is limited by the maximum power charging capacity PowerMax: 
𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟q ≤ PowerMax  ∀ q. (4.8) 
Discharging of BEVs is not considered: 
𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑞 ≥ 0 ∀ q. (4.9) 
The cumulative energy content needs to be within the minimum and maximum 
energy boundaries: 
∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑞
𝑞
𝑗=1 ≤  EMax𝑞  ∀ q, (4.10) 
∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑞
𝑞
𝑗=1 ≥  EMin𝑞   ∀ q. (4.11) 
The charging pattern of each BEV is separately optimized for each week of the year. 
 
Scheduler Example 
Fig. 4.9 illustrates the change in the charging pattern after solving the LP. The 
example depicts the charging pattern of a random BEV for October 20th. Hourly 
prices or the RTP tariff design are shown together with unscheduled and scheduled 
charging patterns. Clearly, the scheduled charging pattern of the BEV is shifted 
towards the lowest price periods given minimum and maximum energy boundaries of 
Fig. 4.8. The last unscheduled charging cycle is shifted towards the next day and is 
not shown in the figure. 
 
 
Fig. 4.9.  Electricity tariff and unscheduled charging patterns (dotted) and scheduled charging 
patterns (dashed) of a random BEV during October 20th. 
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4.2.3 Descriptive analysis 
In this section, the effect of simulated demand response is outlined in a descriptive 
analysis. First, the change in consumption pattern of WAs and BEVs due to demand 
response based on RTP is discussed. Distinction is made between flexible 
consumption only and total household consumption. Afterwards, a similar analysis is 
performed for other dynamic tariff schemes. 
 
Effect on residential consumption pattern 
To get an overall view on the flexible consumption pattern change due to WA 
consumption or charging of BEVs, Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11 show the average 
unscheduled and scheduled consumption patterns for one particular day under RTP. 
These patterns result from the WA and BEV scheduler respectively and are the 
average pattern over all households considered.  
For WAs, results show that flexible consumption is shifted towards the early morning 
and the afternoon. Thereby new peaks of flexible consumption arise, while noon and 
evening peaks disappear. Considering total consumption, no new peaks arise due to 
WA scheduling. Instead, valleys are filled in the night and afternoon. Nevertheless, 
total peak impact is limited due to limited use of WAs in the unscheduled case.   
For BEV charging, results show that charging power increases towards the evening 
and night without DR, resulting from the arrival of vehicles at home during the 
evening time (Fig. 4.5). In case of total unscheduled consumption this leads to a 
peak in consumption just before midnight. Scheduling of vehicles evokes a renewed 
average charging pattern, peaking during nighttime while being low during daytime. 
The evening peak of flexible consumption reduces, while the average night peak 
nearly triples and is shifted towards 5h00.  
New peaks created by BEV charging based on dynamic electricity pricing often are 
said to be harmful for the normal functioning of distribution grids [84], [85], [86], 
and [87]. Although technical implications of BEV charging are out of scope of this 
dissertation, some remarks in this perspective are made. The impact of BEV charging 
based on DP is often assessed within weak distribution grids. In such a grid, the 
problem is not the charging based on DP itself, but rather the addition of load: also 
unscheduled charging brings about technical issues. Nevertheless, scheduled 
charging can increase these. Simulations often assume all BEVs are scheduled based 
on the same DP. This is not necessarily the case when households have different 
contracts with different retailers. Hereby, lowest price periods can differ. Moreover, 
not necessarily all households participate in DP. Simulations often assume that all 
households in distribution grids possess a BEV. Although this might be true in the 
long run, in the short run this is unlikely. If all households possess BEVs, dynamic 
pricing patterns change shape as considerable load is added. This again can 
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influence the number of participants in DP schemes. Several methods exist to avoid 
load peaks. An example is to spread load over the lowest price block, instead of all 
starting to charge in the beginning of the price block. Nevertheless, this method is 
only applicable if price blocks are long enough. Another example is the use of local 
voltage droop control [85]. In this case, scheduling based on prices can be 
performed within the technical boundaries of the distribution grid.   
 
 
Fig. 4.10. Total unscheduled (dashed, black) and scheduled power patterns (dotted, black), and 
unscheduled (dashed, gray) and scheduled (dotted, gray) power patterns of WAs under RTP for 
a random weekday in February. 
 
Fig. 4.11. Total unscheduled (dashed, black) and scheduled power patterns (dotted, black), and 
unscheduled (dashed, gray) and scheduled (dotted, gray) power patterns of BEVs under RTP 
during October 20th. 
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Demand response under different tariff schemes 
Apart from the change in consumption pattern due to DR with RTP within a specific 
day, this subsection discusses the average flexible consumption pattern during week 
and weekend days due to various dynamic pricing schemes, allowing to assess the 
impact of various DP schemes. 
The average demand modifications due to WA scheduling under different dynamic 
pricing schemes are shown in Fig. 4.12 and Fig. 4.13 for week and weekend days 
respectively. Shifting under all dynamic pricing schemes is visualized except for CPP 
which is omitted for clarity reasons. The average power pattern under CPP closely 
follows the pattern under ToU. During week days, scheduling of WAs under ToU 
shifts flexible consumption away towards the late evening and early morning. 
Consequently only evening peaks are reduced while noon peaks remain unaffected 
through ToU implementation. During weekends power profiles almost align for Flat 
and ToU pricing schemes. Only in the early morning, the patterns differ resulting 
from a shift of Friday evening to Saturday morning. Within the REN and RTP case, 
consumption is shifted. Both for REN and RTP, consumption is shifted away from 
noon and evening periods. It contrasts with the ToU tariff case in which consumption 
was only shifted away from evening periods. Nevertheless, REN and RTP tariff 
schemes cause different power patterns to evolve. Typically, new peaks occur later 
when RTP is applied as consumption is postponed longer for some WAs. As REN 
averages longer periods, typically the cheapest time blocks start earlier in case of 
REN. Therefore, new peaks are created in shoulder periods. This illustrates that the 
effect of a shift in consumption depends on the underlying tariff scheme and that 
due to averaging of prices over longer periods, new flexible peaks do not necessarily 
end up in the preferred hour.  
 
Fig. 4.12. Average power patterns of WAs during weekdays under different pricing schemes: 
flat (long dashed line), ToU (short dashed line), REN (solid line) and RTP (dotted line). 
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Fig. 4.13. Average power patterns of WAs during weekend days under different pricing 
schemes: flat (long dashed line), ToU (short dashed line), REN (solid line) and RTP (dotted 
line). 
Average demand shifts due to BEV scheduling under different dynamic pricing 
schemes are visualized in Fig. 4.14 and Fig. 4.15 for weeks and weekends 
respectively. In line with WAs, scheduling under CPP is not visualized for clarity 
reasons. In ToU pricing, a clear difference between week and weekend days can be 
noticed. During weekdays a new peak arises in the evening, while the pattern under 
Flat and ToU pricing almost aligns during weekends. Also for REN and RTP pricing 
the evening peak diminishes. Hereby, consumption is shifted deeper into the night. 
For REN pricing, a new peak arises at 00h00 at the start of the new price block. 
Small peaks during the day also arise at the start of other price blocks. Nevertheless, 
these peaks could be spread over the whole price blocks flattening peaks. For RTP, 
charging is postponed longer until the lowest price block is obtained. Although on 
average these new peaks are smaller than in the REN case, this is not necessarily 
true for individual days. 
 
Fig. 4.14. Average power patterns of BEVs during weekdays under different pricing schemes: 
flat (long dashed line), ToU (short dashed line), REN (solid line) and RTP (dotted line). 
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Fig. 4.15. Average power patterns of BEVs during weekends under different pricing schemes: 
flat (long dashed line), ToU (short dashed line), REN (solid line) and RTP (dotted line). 
 
4.2.4 Household savings 
Monetary savings obtained from residential DR are outlined. First, average annual 
household savings under the different tariff schemes are discussed, distinguishing 
between DR with WAs and BEVs. Apart from the averages, distribution of savings 
over all households is discussed afterwards.  
Table 4.2 gives average costs for consumption from WAs and BEVs under different 
tariff schemes. Consequently, only costs due to flexible consumption are included. 
Distinction is made between average costs within the unscheduled and scheduled 
scenario. Difference between both is the average saving also expressed as a 
percentage of unscheduled costs. While savings for BEVs are based on yearly 
simulations, savings for WAs are extrapolated towards a year. 
The annual average unscheduled costs vary among different tariff schemes. 
Typically, unscheduled costs are higher for more dynamic tariff schemes in case of 
WAs as unscheduled consumption from WAs partly falls in shoulder and peak 
periods. For BEVs the opposite is true as BEV charging largely falls during nighttime. 
This implies that even without DR, savings can be obtained from switching to 
another tariff design. Although not treated in this thesis, this effect also occurs for 
non-flexible consumption as described by Borenstein [88]. 
The table shows that the use of DR has the biggest monetary effect under RTP. In 
general, higher variability of the tariff scheme leads to higher savings. On average, 
savings under RTP are 6 to 7 times higher than under ToU, both for WAs and BEVs, 
although lowest costs for WAs are reached under REN.  
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93A
v
e
ra
g
e
 c
h
a
rg
in
g
 p
o
w
e
r 
[k
W
] 
Time of day [quarter] 
Flat ToU REN RTP
76 Chapter 4  
Finally, both average annual costs and absolute savings are higher with BEVs. For 
BEVs average yearly savings of €144 are obtained under RTP while for WAs this is 
limited to €18. This follows from higher consumption with BEVs. Also in relative 
terms, savings for BEVs are higher. This follows from a longer shifting potential into 
the night and from uninterruptability of WA cycles.  
 
Table 4.2. Impact of demand response on average annual electricity costs due to wet appliance 
consumption and charging of battery electric vehicles under different tariff schemes. 
 Wet appliances Battery electric vehicles 
 Unscheduled 
cost [€] 
Scheduled 
cost [€] 
Savings  
[€] 
Unscheduled 
 cost [€] 
Scheduled 
cost [€] 
Savings  
[€] 
Flat 132 x x 683 x x 
ToU 132 129 3    (2%) 663 643 20   (3%) 
CPP 131 127 4    (3%) 659 634 25   (4%) 
RTP 146 128 18  (12%) 652 508 144 (22%) 
REN 137 123 14  (10%) 662 566 96   (15%) 
 
Apart from average savings, individual household savings provide deeper insight into 
the usefulness of DR as practical implementation of DR not necessarily focuses on all 
households. Rather implementation could focus on one household type. Therefore, 
Fig. 4.16 and Fig. 4.17 depict boxplots with the spread of cost savings resulting from 
DR with WAs and BEVs respectively, each box representing 40% of households.  
These figures illustrate large spread of cost savings for each tariff scheme. This is 
especially true for more dynamic schemes. Moreover, the figure also shows that 
savings due to BEV scheduling is a multitude of savings due to WA scheduling. 
For WA scheduling, cost savings under ToU and CPP remain below €10 for over 90% 
of households. For RTP and REN, this picture changes as cost savings can top 30 and 
even €40 for some households. For BEV scheduling, cost savings under ToU and CPP 
are lowest. Nevertheless, most households save more than €20 annually, even 
extending to around €50. In more dynamic tariff schemes such as RTP and REN, all 
households save over €50. For RTP more than 90% of households save over €100. 
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Fig. 4.16. Spread of cost savings due to DR with WAs under different tariff schemes: ToU, CPP, 
RTP and REN. The upper and lower boxes represent 40% of the observations and the wickers 
represent the minimum and maximum yearly savings. 
 
Fig. 4.17. Spread of cost savings due to DR with BEVs under different tariff schemes: ToU, CPP, 
RTP and REN. The upper and lower boxes represent 40% of the observations and the wickers 
represent the minimum and maximum yearly savings. 
 
4.3 Practical evidence of demand response: the 
LINEAR field test 
In contrast to the previous section, this section discusses more practical results of 
residential demand response following from dynamic pricing. In this perspective, 
results from a Flemish residential demand response project called LINEAR are 
highlighted. 
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The general set-up of this project is discussed and specific measurements used are 
highlighted. A descriptive analysis points out the main impact from dynamic pricing 
on household consumption patterns within the field test. Finally, household savings 
obtained within LINEAR are described. 
 
4.3.1 Set-up LINEAR 
 
General project scope 
LINEAR is a large-scale research and demonstration project focused on the 
introduction of smart grids, and more specifically on demand response strategies, at 
residential premises in the Flanders region in Belgium. The LINEAR project aims at a 
technological as well as an implementation breakthrough of DR. Its focus is twofold. 
On the one hand, the project deals with research and development efforts required 
to deploy DR technologies. On the other hand, it aims at implementing these 
technologies in a field test, by setting up a pilot in which 245 households participate. 
The project started in May 2009 and receives partial funding from the Flemish 
government for the academia and research institutes (KU Leuven, VITO and IMEC, 
embedded in EnergyVille, and iMinds). Furthermore, several industrial partners, 
including Belgacom, Eandis, EDF-Luminus, Fifthplay, Infrax, Laborelec, Miele, 
Siemens, Telenet and Viessman, invest and actively participate in the project. Finally, 
the Flemish regulator for the electricity and gas market (VREG), as well as industry 
and government interest groups (Agoria, EWI, VOKA) take part in the project. 
As demand response can serve many purposes, the following four cases are selected 
and addressed within the field test of LINEAR: portfolio management, wind 
balancing, transformer ageing, and line voltage management. The portfolio 
management case investigates how residential DR helps optimizing the generation 
portfolio by reacting to day-ahead market prices. The wind balancing case assesses 
the impact of DR on the imbalance of a balancing responsible party due to errors in 
wind predictions. The transformer ageing case investigates whether DR can avoid 
accelerated ageing of distribution transformers. Line voltage management assesses 
the usefulness of DR for avoiding voltage deviations in distribution grids. In what 
follows the focus is only on the first case as this is the topic of this dissertation. 
To gain insight in consumer behavior and acceptance towards DR, two different 
consumer interaction models are tested, referred to as manual and automated 
demand response. In the manual DR interaction model, 60 households participate. 
They receive dynamic electricity tariff schemes day-ahead and are supported with 
home energy management systems and displays showing current and historic tariff 
schemes and consumption profiles. Consequently, households can manually shift 
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consumption in order to align consumption with cheaper price periods. Within the 
automated demand response interaction model, 185 households participate. They do 
not receive price signals, yet appliances are steered automatically towards dynamic 
prices through the LINEAR project while satisfying comfort requirements. 
Two different appliance types are considered for automation purposes: shiftable and 
storable. Over 440 shiftable appliances such as washing machines, dryers, 
dishwashers, are deployed within LINEAR. When they are configured, household 
consumers are requested to set a deadline for the end of the appliance cycle, also 
referred to as the shifting potential. Within the time window between configuration 
time and deadline, the appliance is started by LINEAR. Regarding storable 
appliances, 15 hot water buffers are deployed. For these appliances, no user 
interaction is required as LINEAR operates them within the household’s comfort 
zone.  
Substantial difference exists in the way DR is remunerated. For manual demand 
response, it is based on the underlying dynamic electricity price. Hereby LINEAR 
opted for renewable pricing, as described in Section 3.4.5. This tariff scheme is day-
ahead based on day-ahead wholesale prices and predicted generation from 
renewables, distinguishing between 6 time blocks a day. For portfolio management 
with automated DR, again consumption is optimized based on this renewable tariff 
scheme. Nevertheless, remuneration is based on the shifting potential configured for 
the shiftable appliances. Hereby, each hour of shifting potential is remunerated 
against an incentive payment of €0.025 per hour per appliance, implying a 
remuneration of €1 for every 40 hours of shifting potential configured with an 
appliance. 
 
Measurement data  
In order to assess the impact of DR based on dynamic electricity pricing, 
measurement data from LINEAR are analyzed. In this perspective, a distinction is 
made between a reference period during which no DR incentive is sent to the 
households and a field test period during which a DR incentive is provided, for both 
manual and automated DR. In both cases, comparison between reference and field 
test periods allows assessing the impact of DR. The same months for both reference 
and field test periods are selected. 
For manual DR, measurement data considered in this dissertation cover 16 
households for a four-month period for both reference and field test period. This 
period runs from March 1st till June 30th in 2013 and 2014 respectively. During the 
reference period around 81% of households were enrolled in a day-night tariff 
scheme in which prices are lower during nighttime and weekends.  
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For automated DR, measurement data considered in this dissertation cover 48 
households for a two-month period for both reference and field test period. This 
period runs from September 16th till November 17th for 2012 and 2013 respectively. 
Around 70% of households were enrolled in a day-night tariff scheme during the 
reference period. Also important to note is that within these 48 households, 123 
appliances were automated covering 43 washing machines, 43 dryers, 34 
dishwashers and 3 hot water boilers. 
4.3.2 Descriptive analysis 
 
Manual DR results 
A first difference between consumption during reference and field test period 
consists of the total consumption during both periods. While consumption during the 
reference period was 39515 kWh for the 16 households over the four-month period, 
consumption during the field test over the similar period the following year only was 
35937 kWh, aligning with a consumption drop of 9%. To investigate whether this 
drop does not originate from a couple of households only, the spread of the 
difference between the reference and field test consumption over the various 
households is visualized by means of a boxplot, each box representing 40% of 
housholds (Fig. 4.18). Positive values indicate a higher reference than field test 
consumption. Negative values indicate higher field test consumption. Overall, 
consumption during the reference period is higher than during the field test. The 
median difference between consumption during reference and field test periods 
amounts to 149 kWh over the four-month period.  
 
Fig. 4.18. Spread of the difference in household consumption between the four months of the 
reference and field test period. The upper and lower boxes represent 40% of the observations 
and the wickers represent the minimum and maximum consumption difference. 
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Energy conservation can originate from several factors. Within LINEAR consumers 
are stimulated to take an active role in adapting consumption in order to perform 
better compared to the reference period. Hereby, a comparison between 
consumption in reference and field test periods is sent to the consumers. 
Submetering of appliances helps to detect energy intensive appliances and act 
accordingly. Moreover, households receive a different renewable electricity price on a 
daily basis. This also keeps them actively involved to modify their consumption. 
These results align with the literature which states that feedback results in energy 
conservation [89]. Nevertheless, a second factor which could explain conservation is 
formed by climatologic circumstances as 2013 was colder than 2014. To check this, 
consumption of a control group over the same period was analyzed, consisting of 31 
household. The group was measured on a quarterly hour basis and faced no 
interaction with LINEAR or other projects.  Analysis shows that also within this 
control group, consumption drops with 6%. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
external factors outside control of LINEAR influence total consumption. Whether 
LINEAR triggered additional energy conservation remains subject to further research.  
This drop in consumption is also shown in Fig. 4.19 visualizing average LINEAR-
household consumption patterns during both reference and field test periods for 
week and weekend days. During week days consumption drops mainly occur during 
peak periods such as between 7h and 13h and between 20h and 24h. During 
shoulder periods consumption drops are less apparent. During weekends 
consumption again mainly drops during the late evening and in the morning from 
10h to 13h.  
Although energy conservation is quite apparent, distinction should be made between 
conservation on the one hand and consumption shifts or DR as discussed in this 
dissertation on the other. To obtain more insights in the latter, Fig. 4.20 visualizes 
the average daily consumption pattern relative to total daily consumption. In other 
words, each pattern sums up to one, making consumption shifts more clearly visible 
better illustrating the DR incentive. Nevertheless, note that this is an approximation. 
During the field test relative consumption decreases during the late evening period 
both during week and weekend days. It has two main reasons. The average price 
block from 20h to 24h is the highest over the day, incentivizing consumers to shift 
consumption away. Around 81% of consumers had a day-night tariff scheme during 
the reference period, implying a lower price starting from 21h or 22h. Therefore, 
reference consumption during this period is higher. From the reference to the field 
test, this consumption is shifted backwards to the early evening resulting in a 
consumption increase in the period 17h to 20h. Another rise in consumption 
following from the field test is found in the off-peak period from 13h to 17h. For both 
week and weekend days the increase is most profound at the start of the off-peak 
period. This suggests that households wait for their appliances to start until this 
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period begins. Finally, during the night period, no demand increase is observed. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that on average consumers do not shift consumption 
past midnight. 
 
 
Fig. 4.19. Impact of manual demand response based on renewable pricing on the average 
power pattern of households during week (top) and weekend days (bottom) expressed in kW, 
distinguishing between reference (dashed lines) and field test (dotted lines) consumption. 
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Fig. 4.20. Impact of manual demand response based on renewable pricing on the average 
power pattern of households during week (top) and weekend days (bottom) expressed as 
percentage of average daily consumption, distinguishing between reference (dashed lines) and 
field test (dotted lines) consumption. 
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To further distinguish between energy conservation and demand response, Fig. 4.21 
visualizes the difference-in-differences for relative average power within each time 
block. Therefore, the difference between relative average power during reference 
and field test periods for the control group is subtracted from the difference of 
relative average power for the LINEAR group. This partly ranges out the 
climatological factors in play for both the control and LINEAR group. Therefore, the 
impact of LINEAR is more properly visualized. Values close to zero imply that there is 
no substantial difference. The impact of LINEAR within these periods is limited. The 
further away from zero, the higher the LINEAR impact. During night and noon 
periods in week days the impact is limited compared to the morning and evening 
periods (Fig. 4.21). This implies that the shift of consumption from the late evening 
towards the early evening can be attributed to LINEAR as previously discussed. 
Moreover, LINEAR induces a larger average reduction in consumption during the 
morning. During weekends, the same pattern occurs although the impact during 
noon from 10h to 13h and during the night is bigger compared to weeks. 
 
 
Fig. 4.21. Difference in change of relative average power within each time block towards the 
field test period between the LINEAR and control group for week (top) and weekend (bottom) 
days. 
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Although previous figures help visualizing whether consumers react to electricity 
prices in general, less insight is provided in the amount of energy shifted, following 
from the averaging of patterns over all considered week or weekend days. In this 
perspective, Fig. 4.22 visualizes the average power pattern over all considered 
households during one random Thursday in March. Consistent with previous results, 
in general consumption during the field test drops. Moreover, the drop is clearest in 
the late evening from 20h till 24h. Hereby, power goes down by up to 750 W. 
Nevertheless, no clear patterns of demand shifting can be noticed during the rest of 
the day. This implies that control and predictability of demand shifts are limited 
under manual demand response as implemented within LINEAR.  
 
Fig. 4.22. Impact of manual demand response based on renewable pricing on the average 
power pattern of households during a random Thursday in March, distinguishing between 
reference (dashed lines) and field test (dotted lines) consumption. 
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Automated DR results 
Total consumption during the reference and field test period amounts to 42619 and 
42337 kWh respectively, implying an energy conservation of 0.7%. This consumption 
covers 48 households over the two-month period. Compared to manual DR the 
conservation effect is limited. This can be explained by the fact that less feedback is 
provided. Also the interaction with households is different compared to manual DR. 
The main action of households under automated DR is setting the shifting potential 
of their shiftable appliances, without considering prices or comparing current with 
reference consumption. Moreover, climatological circumstances between both 
reference and field test periods were not considerably different. Therefore, the 
impact on total consumption differences between reference and field test period is 
limited. 
Fig. 4.23 visualizes the impact of renewable pricing on the average consumption 
patterns for week and weekend days expressed in kW. For reasons of consistency 
with manual DR, the same patterns are repeated in Fig. 4.24 yet expressed as a 
percentage of the average daily consumption. Due to data availability, a control 
group could not be added for automated DR. 
At the starts of lower price periods small consumption peaks occur during the field 
test, as seen after midnight and after 13h during week days and after 13h and 20h 
during weekend days. Figures show practical evidence that in general consumption 
during lower price periods increases while consumption during high price periods 
decreases. Examples are a decrease in consumption during the morning period from 
7h till 13h and the evening from 17h till 24h. Increases in consumption are found 
during the night and afternoon. This is in contrast to results of manual DR where 
almost no shift towards the night was observed. Therefore it illustrates that 
automation helps shifting consumption deeper in the night. These results are 
consistent with results from simulated demand response discussed in Section 4.2. 
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Fig. 4.23. Impact of automated demand response based on renewable pricing on the average 
power pattern of households during week (top) and weekend days (bottom) expressed in kW, 
distinguishing between reference (dashed lines) and field test (dotted lines) consumption. 
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Fig. 4.24. Impact of automated demand response based on renewable pricing on the average 
power pattern of households during week (top) and weekend days (bottom), expressed as 
percentage of average daily consumption and distinguishing between reference (dashed lines) 
and field test (dotted lines) consumption. 
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Consistent with manual DR, visualizing demand shifts for one random day helps 
gaining insights in the amount of shifting. Therefore, Fig. 4.24 depicts the power 
profiles during a random Thursday in October for reference and field test period. 
Clear demand shifts over different price periods are noticed. This implies that 
automation adds more controllability and predictability of demand shifts compared to 
manual demand response. Next, average increases and decreases of 250 W can be 
noticed. This amount is in line with simulated DR with white appliances as described 
in Section 4.2. As previously mentioned, also the moment towards which demand is 
shifted aligns: the night and the late afternoon. In other words, practical results from 
the LINEAR field test partly confirm results from theoretical simulations.  
 
Fig. 4.24. Impact of automated demand response based on renewable pricing on the average 
power pattern of households during a random Thursday in October distinguishing between 
reference (dashed lines) and field test (dotted lines) consumption. 
4.3.3 Household savings 
Monetary savings obtained from residential DR within LINEAR are outlined. Again 
distinction is made between manual and automated DR. First, average annual 
household savings under manual and automated DR are discussed. Apart from the 
averages, the distribution of savings over all households is discussed.  
Table 4.3 depicts average household savings under manual and automated DR within 
LINEAR. Consequently, total household consumption is included covering both 
flexible and non-flexible consumption. Savings are calculated based on the difference 
between costs during the reference and the field test period. As only 4 and 2 months 
were considered in the reference and field test period of manual and automated DR 
respectively, savings were extrapolated to obtain annual savings.  
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Table 4.3 shows that annual household savings for manual DR amount to €135. This 
is a multitude of results from simulated demand response. Although these average 
savings are substantial, this result should be interpreted with care. These savings 
mainly result from energy conservation rather than from a demand shift. Only 16 
households were considered for manual DR. Apart from manual DR, the average 
result of automated DR closely approximates results from simulation. For the average 
household, savings amount to €14. 
 
Table 4.3. Impact of manual and automated demand response based on renewable pricing on 
average annual electricity savings within the LINEAR project. 
 Average annual household savings [€] 
Manual demand response 135 
Automated demand response 14 
 
Apart from average savings, individual household savings provide deeper insight into 
usefulness of DR. Therefore, Fig. 4.25 depicts a boxplot with the spread of cost 
savings resulting from manual and automated DR, each box representing 40% of 
housholds.  
This figure illustrates a large spread of cost savings for both manual and automated 
DR. For some households, even negative savings are observed. This implies a higher 
bill during the field test compared to the reference period. Although not visualized in 
the figure, this mainly results from an increase in consumption. Nevertheless, most 
households have positive savings even extending to around 700 and €400 for manual 
and automated DR respectively. At the median, households save 100 and €26 for 
manual and automated DR respectively. 
 
Fig. 4.25. Spread of cost savings due to manual and automated demand response based on 
renewable pricing with the upper and lower boxes representing 40% of the observations and 
the wickers representing the minimum and maximum savings. 
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4.4 Summary & Conclusions 
Residential demand response as a reaction to dynamic pricing is discussed. To attain 
a thorough understanding, both theoretical and practical set-ups are highlighted. 
Within the theoretical set-up residential demand response is simulated. The benefit 
of these simulations is that DR under different dynamic pricing schemes can be 
analyzed and that the impact of different load types such as WAs and BEVs can be 
assessed. Within the practical set-up, impact of DR is described based on the LINEAR 
field test. Hereby, two consumer interaction models are tested, automated and 
manual DR. While under manual DR households modify their consumption based on 
a REN tariff received in day-ahead, LINEAR steers consumption of shiftable and 
storable loads itself under automated DR. Note that the impact of DR on the 
underlying cost and price is not accounted for. This is subject for further research. 
Simulations of WAs show that RTP shifts consumption away from noon and late 
evening periods towards the afternoon and night respectively. On appliance 
consumption level, this leads to the rise of new peaks during the day. Nevertheless, 
considering total household consumption no new peaks are created as shifted 
consumption fills the valleys. Hereby, it should be noted that the impact on peaks in 
total household consumption is limited as the initial number of WAs in operation 
during peak periods is limited. 
While consumption of WAs is limited, consumption of BEVs is considerable. Adding 
them to the reference household consumption profile creates new peaks even if DR 
is not in use. This new peak arises just before midnight as most vehicles have 
returned home and started charging during this period. Applying DR based on RTP, 
this new peak is shifted towards the night. On average, this new peak is almost 
double of the reference consumption peak. Whether this peak increase leads to grid 
stability problems partly depends on the number of BEVs scheduled towards prices, 
on the underlying pricing scheme, and on the approach to optimize these BEVs. 
Assessing the impact of DR under different tariff schemes, simulations show that DR 
based on ToU pricing mainly affects evening peaks during weeks while noon peaks 
remain almost unaffected. Moreover, during weekends power profiles during 
weekends align between ToU and Flat pricing. Adding more dynamics to pricing 
schemes, also leads to more variation in consumption profiles, illustrated under REN 
and RTP simulations. REN peaks start earlier as prices are averaged over a longer 
period. The drawback is that consumption is not always shifted to the most 
advantageous period leading to new peaks during initial shoulder periods. 
Apart from the impact of different dynamic tariffs with different appliances on 
consumption patterns, also the amount of household savings is affected. More 
dynamics in a tariff scheme leads to higher savings. For instance, savings under RTP 
are 6 to 7 times higher than under ToU. Significant differences in the amount of 
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savings occur between WAs and BEVs. Hereby, savings with BEVs are a multitude of 
those with WAs. This mainly results from the amount of energy both consume. 
Although average annual savings for WAs amount to less than €20, the spread over 
different households shows that for some households savings are almost double. 
Practical results from the LINEAR field test partly confirm results from theoretical 
simulations. This is mainly true for automated DR. Also in this case a consumption 
shift from noon and evening to the afternoon and night is observed. Moreover, the 
amount of load shifted approximates the simulation results.  
While results for automated DR align with results from simulation, results from 
manual DR differ. Apart from DR also energy conservation is observed. While this 
conservation mainly follows from climatological circumstances, the impact of LINEAR 
could not be completely ruled out and is subject to further research. Provision of 
dynamic tariff schemes to households also leads to shifts in demand. Nevertheless, 
these shifts are less profound than with automated or simulated DR. The amount of 
shifting is more limited under manual DR and no shifting towards the night occurs. 
Automation overcomes these hurdles. 
  
 5. Demand response quantification: price 
elasticities based on renewable pricing 
5.1 Introduction 
Several parameters exist to quantify the level of demand response following dynamic 
pricing schemes. DR can be measured as a peak demand reduction. Generally, this 
parameter gives the percentage drop in demand during peak periods. Although this 
gives an indication of the peak reduction potential, no information is given on the 
aggregated load modification and its sensitivity to electricity price levels. The second 
way of expressing DR is by means of the price elasticity of demand. Price elasticity 
represents the responsiveness of user demand to electricity price changes [89]. This 
measure provides a more exact quantification of DR, allowing to predict the demand 
level after implementing a dynamic pricing scheme.  
Section 5.2 describes the concept of price elasticities based on consumer demand 
theory. Moreover, different categories of price elasticities are listed and empirical 
evidence of price elasticities is discussed in a literature review. Section 5.3 describes 
the statistical model used to estimate price elasticities. Section 5.4 applies this model 
to simulated DR and practical evidence from the LINEAR-project as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Based on the obtained price elasticities, Section 5.5 predicts 
demand patterns following from dynamic prices and Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2 Literature review 
5.2.1 Consumer demand theory 
Before an indication of DR following from dynamic electricity prices can be derived, 
an economic model of consumer demand is needed. Such a model allows studying 
consumer behavior and preferences and eventually leads to their mathematical 
quantification. In this perspective, a functional form is needed which relates several 
variables determining consumer behavior. This functional form should fulfill two 
conditions. The functional form should be consistent with restrictions on demand 
functions implied in economic theory. Moreover, it should allow sufficient flexibility in 
order not to restrict the estimated parameters.  
Economic theory assumes that an individual consumes goods in order to maximize 
utility subject to budget constraints [91]. Typically, the utility of an individual is a 
function of the consumed goods, also referred to as a direct utility function. 
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Optimization of the utility function while accounting for the budget constraint results 
in a demand function, expressing the quantity of demand of a good as a function of 
its price, prices of other goods, income, and additional factors of importance. Hereby, 
distinction is made between a Marshallian and Hicksian demand function referred to 
as an uncompensated and compensated demand function respectively [91]. In a 
Marshallian demand function income or budget is assumed to be constant across the 
demand curve, while in a Hicksian one utility is assumed constant. Translating this 
towards electricity demand as discussed in this thesis, Hicksian demand mainly 
assumes shifting of electricity demand from one period to another. Hereby, utility 
remains constant and comfort is unaffected. Apart from the substitution effect, 
Marshallian demand additionally assumes an income effect. This implies that next to 
shifting electricity also the total amount of electricity consumption changes due to a 
change in the total budget for electricity.   
Apart from using a direct utility function, demand functions can be derived from 
indirect utility and expenditure functions. Often, these functions are preferred in 
empirical work. While an indirect utility function expresses utility in function of prices 
and income, an expenditure function expresses expenditures in function of prices and 
income. 
5.2.2 Categories of price elasticities 
Based on the functional form and the demand function, consumer behavior is derived 
by estimating price elasticities. As previously discussed, this consumer behavior is 
also referred to as DR in case of dynamic electricity pricing. 
Several categories of price elasticities are distinguished in order to quantify DR. The 
three main categories are own, cross, and substitution price elasticities. The 
mathematical expressions are: 
own elasticity: 𝜀𝑖   =  [
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑞𝑖
] [
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑖
]⁄  , (5.1) 
cross elasticity: 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 =  [
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑞𝑖
] [
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑝𝑗
]⁄           𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, (5.2) 
substitution elasticity: 𝜎𝑖,𝑗 =  
𝜕(𝑞𝑗 𝑞𝑖⁄ )/(𝑞𝑗 𝑞𝑖⁄ )
𝜕(𝑝𝑖 𝑝𝑗⁄ )/(𝑝𝑖 𝑝𝑗⁄ )
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, (5.3) 
with: 
𝑞𝑖:  electricity demand in period i, 
𝑞𝑗:  electricity demand in period j, 
𝑝𝑖:  electricity price in period i, 
𝑝𝑗:  electricity price in period j.   
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Own price elasticity refers to the relative change in demand in response to a change 
in the electricity price in the same period. These elasticities are typically negative as 
a price increase incentivizes a decrease in demand. While own price elasticity 
captures the relative change in demand within the same period, cross price elasticity 
refers to the relative change in demand due to a change of the electricity price in 
another period. Hereby, electricity demand in different periods are considered as 
different products. Positive cross-elasticities reflect a demand increase when the 
price in another period goes up. Therefore, demand in these periods are substitutes. 
Negative elasticities also occur, implying that a price increase in one period will lead 
to a demand decrease in another. Therefore, demand in these periods are 
complements. Finally, substitution elasticity defines the change in relative demand of 
electricity between two periods in response to a change in the relative electricity 
price between them. Typically, substitution elasticities are negative implying a 
relative demand decrease over two periods when the price ratio over those two 
periods increases.  
5.2.3 Functional forms 
To determine price elasticities of electricity demand with dynamic pricing, several 
functional forms are used in the literature. In what follows different functional forms 
are listed and their main advantages and disadvantages are discussed in line with 
Table 5.1. Although most common functional forms are included, this list is not 
exclusive. To enhance readability, the mathematical specifications are not discussed 
in detail. Nevertheless, references are provided in which the specifications can be 
found. The specification for the functional form used in this dissertation is discussed 
in Section 5.3. 
 
Table 5.1. Overview of different functional forms used for determining the price elasticity of 
electricity demand. 
Functional form Consistency with 
demand theory? 
Flexible form? Price elasticities Sources 
Double logarithmic No No Own & Cross [92], [93] 
Constant elasticity of 
substitution  
Yes No Substitution [94], [95], [96], 
[97], [98], [99], 
[100], [101] 
Almost ideal demand 
system 
Yes Yes Own & Cross [102], [103], 
[104], [105], 
[106] 
Generalized Leontief Yes Yes Substitution [95], [107] 
Generalized McFadden Yes Yes Own & Cross [108], [109] 
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Double logarithmic 
The double logarithmic functional form expresses the logarithm of electricity demand 
as a linear combination of the logarithm of prices. Usually, household and time 
dummies are added in order to increase predictive power of the functional form.  
Its advantage is the ease of interpretation and estimation. Price elasticities can 
simply be derived from the coefficients of the price variables yielding own and cross 
price elasticities. Estimation can be performed by ordinary least squares. The main 
disadvantage of this functional form is that it leads to ad hoc estimates. This implies 
that own and cross price elasticities are assumed constant across several price levels. 
In other words, the resulting elasticities do not depend on the price levels itself and 
therefore usability during periods with different prices is limited. The double 
logarithmic functional form is not strictly consistent with economic theory as it cannot 
be derived from the process of utility maximization. Often estimation of this 
functional form leads to inconsistent and biased estimates due to problems of serial 
correlation. 
While Angevine and D. Hrytzak-Lieffers [92] apply the double logarithmic functional 
form for estimating price elasticities, the use of this functional form is often 
discouraged due to its disadvantages. Variants of the double logarithmic functional 
form are the single logarithmic and quadratic functional form. The former expresses 
the logarithm of demand as a function of prices and is applied in Horowitz [93]. The 
quadratic form expresses demand as a function of prices and the square of prices 
[98]. 
 
Constant elasticity of substitution 
The constant elasticity of substitution or CES functional form expresses the ratio 
between peak and off-peak electricity demand as a function of an intercept, the ratio 
between peak and off-peak prices and some additional variables. Typically, 
substitution elasticities are derived from this functional form as the variables refer to 
the ratios of demand and price. Hereby, a two-stage budgeting process of residential 
consumers is assumed to align with economic theory [110]. The budget is assigned 
between electricity and other products. Hereby, homothetic separability of utility 
functions is assumed. This implies that the input demand and elasticities can be 
derived from subfunctions alone, without knowledge related to other products [111]. 
The electricity budget is assigned over the different periods of the day. Demand 
during these periods is considered as different products.  
The first advantage is that it is consistent with economic theory as it is derived from 
the maximization of a utility function. The model and the resulting price elasticities 
can easily be estimated as the model is highly structured. The main disadvantage is 
that the functional form is not flexible. This implies that the substitution elasticity is 
Demand response quantification: price elasticities based on renewable pricing 99 
 
independent of the price levels itself. The functional form does not allow estimating 
cross elasticities which can capture the price effect in a given hour on quantity in 
another. Therefore, it cannot be determined whether demand in a given hour is a 
substitute or a complement. 
The CES functional form is frequently applied in the literature [94], [95], [96], [97], 
[98]. Often it is used when the applicable dynamic pricing scheme only distinguishes 
between peak and off-peak periods. An exception is [97], in which the functional 
form is applied to a real-time pricing pilot. Also variants of CES functional forms are 
often applied, the most common variant being the nested CES functional form [99], 
[100], [101]. In this functional form shifting demand between days is also considered 
next to shifting within days. 
 
Almost ideal demand system 
The almost ideal demand system (AIDS) expresses budget shares of electricity 
demand as a function of the logarithms of prices and the logarithm of real total daily 
expenditures [103], [112]. Typically, own and cross elasticities can be derived from 
this form. Similar to the CES functional form, AIDS assumes a two-stage budgeting 
process in which the total budget is first divided between electricity and other 
products and afterwards between the different electricity demand periods during the 
day. Moreover, homothetic separability is also assumed. 
The main advantage of the AIDS model is that it’s relatively simple to estimate while 
estimated price elasticities depend on the price level itself. The model provides a 
first-order flexible functional form in which the complementarity or substitutability of 
different demand periods can be addressed. Moreover, distinction can be made 
between Marshallian and Hicksian price elasticities. Finally, the flexible functional 
form is derived from economic demand theory of utility maximization while 
restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry are easily imposed. Nevertheless, other 
functional forms exists which are theoretically superior. 
For deriving the price elasticity of electricity demand, AIDS is applied in Filippini 
[102] and Matsukawa [104]. Moreover, several variants of AIDS exist: Linear 
Approximate AIDS (LA-AIDS) model, Generalized AIDS (GAI) model and Quadratic 
AIDS (QUAIDS) model. While the GAI model was applied to derive the price elasticity 
of electricity demand in Navigant [105] and Bigerna and Bollino [106], no examples 
were found for the LA-AIDS and QUAIDS model. 
 
Generalized Leontief 
The generalized Leontief (GL) functional form expresses utility as a function of the 
squared roots of demand. In turn, the derived demand function expresses the 
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logarithms of demand ratios as a function of the ratios of the square root of prices. 
Typically, from this demand function substitution elasticities are derived. Consistent 
with previous functional forms, a two-stage budgeting process and homothetic 
separability are assumed. 
The main advantage of this functional form is its consistency with economic demand 
theory. The form is also flexible as the elasticity of substitution can vary between 
different pairs of inputs as well as with different input prices. Finally, it is also suited 
for estimating small price elasticities. Its main disadvantage is that demand in all 
periods is assumed substitutable, neglecting complementarity. Moreover, estimation 
is complex. 
The generalized Leontief functional form is applied to demand under dynamic 
electricity pricing within Braithwait [95] and Boisvert et al. [107]. Within Braithwait 
[95], estimated results from the GL and CES functional form are compared. 
 
Generalized McFadden 
The generalized McFadden (GM) functional form uses a variable cost function to 
derive demand functions from which own and cross elasticities can be found [113]. 
The flexible functional form satisfies consumer demand theory. Consistent with 
previously discussed flexible forms, it assumes a two stage budgeting process. 
Its main advantage is that it is theoretically superior to other functional forms. The 
flexible functional form is second-order flexible while being able to capture small 
positive and negative elasticities. Its main disadvantage is that it is complex to 
estimate.  
For deriving the price elasticity of electricity demand, the GM functional form is 
applied for industrial demand in Taylor et al. [108] and Patrick and Wolak [109].  
5.2.4 Evidence of residential price elasticities 
Based on various residential pilot projects, several own, cross, and substitution 
elasticities are found in the literature (Table 5.2). The main part of these studies 
entail ToU or CPP tariff structures. RTP was only tested in the US, although a hybrid 
form of RTP and ToU was studied in the EdF Tempo tariff in France [114]. It can be 
seen that substitution elasticities range between -0.05 and -0.41, while own 
elasticities range between 0.00 and -2.42. Cross elasticities range from -0.12 to 1.42. 
Apart from residential elasticities, elasticities from larger consumers are also found in 
the literature. They typically include medium-to-large commercial, industrial, and 
governmental demand [92], [99], [108], [109]. For these consumers, own price 
elasticities following from RTP range between 0.00 and -0.27.  
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Table 5.2. Overview of substitution, own and cross price elasticities based on various residential 
pilot projects with distinct tariff schemes. Results based on the literature. 
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Subst. Own Cross 
Energy Australia  [115] AU 2006  ToU Not 
available 
 -0.30 to 
-0.38 
-0.04 to 
-0.12 
Swiss utilities [102] CH 1987-
1990 
 ToU AIDS  -1.29 to 
-2.42 
0.48 to 
1.42 
Midwest Power 
Systems of Iowa 
[116] 
 
US 1991- 
1992 
 ToU CES -0.12 to 
-0.17 
  
PG&E [117] US 1983-
1984 
 ToU CES -0.37   
Carolina Power 
and light 
[110] US 1970-
1980 
 ToU CES -0.05 to 
-0.25 
  
Connecticut 
Light & Power 
[118] US 2009 x ToU/
CPP 
CES -0.05 to 
-0.08  
  
GPU pilot [96] US 1997 x ToU/
CPP 
CES -0.06 to 
-0.41 
  
California 
Statewide 
Pricing Pilot 
[98] 
[119] 
[120] 
[121] 
[121] 
US 2003-
2004 
 ToU/
CPP 
CES -0.09 to 
-0.15 
 
  
BGE experiment [94] US 2008-
2009 
x CPP CES -0.10 to 
-0.23 
  
EdF Tempo 
Tariff 
[114]  1989-
1991 
 RTP/
ToU 
Variant 
on GL 
 -0.18 to 
-0.79 
 
ComEd RTP 
pilot 
[122] 
[123] 
US 2003-
2006 
 RTP Double 
Log 
 -0.04 to 
-0.08 
 
ComEd RTP 
pilot 
[93] US 2005  RTP Double 
Log 
 No sign. 
results 
  
 
Variation in elasticity estimates over different residential pilot projects, results from 
several factors. Underlying tariff structures differ. Although the general tariff design 
itself can be similar, the price levels and price blocks differ leading to different 
estimates. Residential demand differs as a result of different geographic conditions or 
climate zones. This leads to different degrees of air conditioning or heat pump 
ownership affecting demand and therefore demand response. Some pilot projects 
offer enabling technology. Examples are in-home displays, energy orbs, air 
conditioning switches or smart thermostats. Typically, they lead to a higher demand 
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response incentive and therefore a higher elasticity. Finally, elasticity estimates 
resulting from the application of different functional forms can lead to different 
results. This follows from the fact that all functional forms are approximations of an 
underlying, but unknown functional form.  
Several aspects are still missing in the estimation of elasticities resulting from pilot 
studies. Evidence from residential pilots with RTP is still missing. Hourly day-ahead 
RTP was only tested in the ComEd pilot, while the EdF pilot included some hybrid 
form of RTP and ToU. Moreover, the role of automation is untested in most pilots. 
The focus is on demand response with no automation or on switching of air 
conditioning, while automation of wet appliances or new loads such as electric 
vehicles is not investigated yet.  
5.3 Almost ideal demand system 
A more in-depth discussion of the selected functional form in this thesis is provided, 
being the almost ideal demand system (AIDS). This functional form is selected 
because of its advantages such as flexibility, relative easiness of estimation, and 
alignment with consumer demand theory. In what follows, the AIDS model is 
expressed mathematically together with its applicable restrictions. The mathematical 
description of price elasticities derived from AIDS is provided. Finally, the estimation 
method used for solving the AIDS model and deriving its price elasticities is given. 
As previously discussed, the almost ideal demand system expresses daily budget 
shares of electricity demand as a function of the logarithms of prices and real total 
expenditures [112]. The mathematical expression is: 
𝑤𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗 log 𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖 log
𝑥
𝑃
 
𝑗
 (5.1) 
with: 
𝑤𝑖: budget share from electricity demand in period i [%], 
𝑝𝑗: electricity price in period j [€/MWh], 
𝑥:  total daily expenditure [€], 
P:  price index, 
𝛼𝑖, 𝛾𝑖𝑗 and 𝛽𝑖:  parameters to be estimated. 
This demand system can be estimated for every period within the day. 
The budget share 𝑤𝑖 is obtained by multiplying prices and demand in each period i 
and dividing it by the total daily budget. The price index P is defined by: 
log 𝑃 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘 log 𝑝𝑘  𝑘 + 
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑗 log 𝑝𝑘 log 𝑝𝑗𝑘𝑗  (5.2) 
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To align with consumer demand theory, several restrictions on the parameters are 
imposed, namely adding up, homogeneity of degree zero in prices and daily 
expenditures, and Slutsky symmetry [112]. Adding up implies that total expenditure 
shares should sum to one. Homogeneity of degree zero in prices and daily 
expenditures implies that a proportional change in these variables does not affect 
budget shares. Slutsky symmetry implies that the substitution effect of an increase in 
electricity price in period j on the budget share in period i is equal to the substitution 
effect of an increase in electricity price in period i on the budget share in period j. 
The restrictions are imposed as follows: 
Adding up:       ∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1  ,  ∑ 𝛽𝑖 = 0
𝑛
𝑖=1  , and ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 0
𝑛
𝑖=1  ∀ 𝑗 (5.3) 
Homogeneity:   ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 0  ∀ 𝑖  (5.4) 
Symmetry:       𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗𝑖 (5.5) 
A full derivation of the AIDS model is provided in Deaton and Muellbauer [111].  
Once the parameters of the AIDS model are estimated, Marshallian and Hicksian 
price elasticities are determined according to: 
Marshallian:  𝜂𝑖𝑗 = −𝛿𝑖𝑗 +  
𝛾𝑖𝑗
𝑤𝑖
 −  
𝛽𝑖𝛼𝑗
𝑤𝑖
 −
𝛽𝑖
𝑤𝑖
∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑗 log 𝑃𝑘𝑘   (5.6) 
Hicksian:      𝜂𝑖𝑗
∗ =  𝜂𝑖𝑗 + 𝑤𝑗(1 +  
𝛽𝑖
𝑤𝑖
) (5.7) 
with: 
𝜂𝑖𝑗:  Marshallian price elasticity of electricity demand, 
𝜂𝑖𝑗
∗ : Hicksian price elasticity of electricity demand, 
𝛿𝑖𝑗: Kronecker delta (𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 1 for 𝑖 = 𝑗, 𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 1 for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗). 
Elasticities depend on the budget shares  𝑤  illustrating that the applied functional 
form is flexible.  
To estimate the proposed demand system, a statistical software package called 
STATA 12 is used in what follows [124]. This package provides commands such as 
QUAIDS to estimate the almost ideal demand system. Additional information is given 
in [125] and [126].  
 
 
 
104 Chapter 5  
5.4 Price elasticities for simulated demand response 
and within LINEAR 
This section builds further on the descriptive analysis of demand response discussed 
in Chapter 4 and quantifies demand response by means of price elasticities. Again 
distinction is made between simulated demand response with WAs and BEVs on the 
one hand and practical evidence from LINEAR with manual and automated DR on the 
other.  
The notion behind price elasticity differs between the simulated and LINEAR cases. 
This follows from the underlying assumptions of demand behavior (Table 5.3). For 
the simulated cases, optimal elasticities based on renewable pricing (REN) are 
obtained. This naming is chosen as these elasticities follow from optimized demand 
profiles. Hereby demand is always shifted to the lowest price period independent of 
price differences between periods. Therefore, these elasticities align with a best case 
scenario as households are extremely price sensitive within the boundaries of their 
comfort zone. Note that as a consequence, price elasticities also depend on the 
pricing scheme itself as the same demand shifting applies whether relative price 
differences are small or large. Therefore, ‘based on renewable pricing’ is explicitly 
added to the naming of the optimal elasticities. While elasticities following from 
simulation serve as benchmarks, price elasticities under the LINEAR cases are based 
on real behavior of households. In the manual DR case, households receive 
renewable pricing schemes and can react accordingly. This reaction can take the 
form of shifting demand, but also of a conservation or growth in demand. 
Remuneration is based on the pricing scheme itself. Elasticities derived from manual 
DR align with price elasticities as defined within economic theory as they represent 
the genuine response of households towards price changes. In the automated DR 
case, households set a shifting potential for their appliances based on which they 
receive a bonus. During this shifting potential, the appliance is automatically cycled 
by LINEAR. While these households do not see the renewable pricing scheme, their 
consumption is shifted based on it. Therefore, elasticities in this case are useful to 
estimate the relationship between prices and demand, yet do not align with 
elasticities as defined in economic theory. Consequently, these elasticities are 
referred to as automated elasticities based on renewable pricing. Although the 
reasoning behind elasticities from this case aligns with optimal elasticities from the 
simulated cases, automated elasticities follow from practice. Therefore, also other 
demand behavior apart from shifting can occur. 
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Table 5.3. Underlying characteristics of simulated and practical demand response cases and its 
resulting elasticities and interpretation. 
Cases 
Customer 
involvement 
Demand behavior Remuneration Elasticities 
Simulation WAs None, optimization 
starting from 
historic profiles 
Shifting Based on DP Optimal price 
elasticities based 
on REN 
BEVs None, optimization 
starting from 
historic profiles 
Shifting Based on DP Optimal price 
elasticities based 
on REN 
LINEAR Manual DR Reaction to DP Shifting, 
conservation, 
growth, etc. 
Based on DP Price elasticities as 
defined within 
economic theory 
Automated DR Set shifting 
potential 
Mainly shifting, yet 
also other types of 
behavior possible 
Based on 
shifting 
potential 
Automated price 
elasticities based 
on REN 
 
Based on the almost ideal demand system, elasticities are estimated for the four 
cases. As the focus is on demand shifting within the comfort settings of the 
household rather than other demand behavior, demand is assumed to be Hicksian. 
This shifting behavior is especially valid in the simulated cases and in the automated 
DR case. Based on LINEAR inquiries, the main DR behavior for manual DR is also 
shifting. So Hicksian elasticities are derived approximating this substitution effect.  
This model is run twice for every case, once for week days and once for weekend 
days. In each model run, all available week or weekend days are included. This 
distinction between week and weekend is made because of differences between 
demand patterns. Therefore, price elasticities are also expected to be different. 
Nevertheless, no substitution between week and weekend days is considered. This 
forms a limitation of the current model. Next, a day within the model is considered to 
cover the period from hour 8 until hour 7 the next calendar day instead of the usual 
calendar day from hour 1 until hour 24. The reasoning behind this is that demand 
shifts towards the night period are mainly based on comparison of night prices with 
previous prices rather than with following prices. Moreover, flexibility of appliances 
available during the evening spans two calendar days as it often runs into the night. 
Therefore, the night block is linked to price blocks of the previous calendar day 
rather than the following ones.  
The datasets used for calculating price elasticities cover both a non-treatment and 
treatment period. Distinction between both periods allows accounting for the effect 
on the demand pattern from going from traditional towards renewable pricing. The 
non-treatment period aligns with the unscheduled and reference period for the 
simulated and LINEAR cases respectively. The treatment period aligns with the 
scheduled and field test period for the simulated and LINEAR cases respectively.  
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Elasticity matrices following from the different cases are discussed. Before assessing 
the resulting elasticity matrices for each case, an example is provided in Fig. 5.1 in 
order to understand their structure. The matrix depicts the influence of all price 
blocks within the renewable pricing scheme, on demand in all periods during the day. 
Hereby, rows represent demand blocks, columns price blocks. The first period 
considered within the matrix is the block from hour 8 until hour 10 as this is the first 
period within the AIDS model. Every cell of the matrix contains an elasticity which 
describes the effect of price in a certain period on demand in another or the same 
period for cross and own price elasticities respectively. Own price elasticities lay on 
the diagonal, while cross elasticities are found alongside the diagonal.  
 
    Price 
  Period Hour 8-10 Hour 11-13 Hour 14-17 Hour 18-20 Hour 21-24 Hour 1-7 
D
e
m
a
n
d
 
Hour 8-10 
            
Hour 11-13             
Hour 14-17             
Hour 18-20             
Hour 21-24             
Hour 1-7             
Fig. 5.1. Example of price elasticity matrix, distinguishing between different time periods 
resulting in own and cross price elasticities. 
5.4.1 Wet appliances 
In line with Chapter 4, optimal price elasticities following from demand shifting with 
wet appliances are based on simulated shifting of WAs within 30 households covering 
a period from January till March. Hereby, simulation starts from realistic demand 
measurements.  
As price elasticities determined by the almost ideal demand system are flexible, price 
elasticities vary from day to day. Fig. 5.2.A provides optimal elasticities for one 
random Thursday in February. Based on the estimated parameters from the model 
run for all weekdays and the characteristics of the random Thursday, price elasticties 
are obtained. This day partly aligns with the day visualized in Section 4.2.1, yet also 
covers the hours of the first price block of the next calendar day. Also note that 
these elasticities do not align with economic theory as previously discussed. These 
elasticities merely serve as a benchmark of what optimally could be attained under 
REN pricing. To illustrate this point, optimal elasticities based on other pricing 
schemes are provided in Appendix A.   
Cross price elasticities 
 
Cross price elasticities 
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A. WAs Price 
  Period Hour 8-10 Hour 11-13 Hour 14-17 Hour 18-20 Hour 21-24 Hour 1-7 
D
e
m
a
n
d
 
Hour 8-10 -0.195** -0.037 0.182** 0.132* -0.179** 0.098** 
Hour 11-13 -0.041 -0.311* 0.493*** -0.137 0.122 -0.125** 
Hour 14-17 0.167** 0.410*** -0.606*** -0.020 0.308*** -0.258*** 
Hour 18-20 0.106* -0.100 -0.018 -0.270*** 0.109 0.173*** 
Hour 21-24 -0.121** 0.075 0.227*** 0.092 -0.423*** 0.151*** 
Hour 1-7 0.089** -0.102** -0.254*** 0.193*** 0.202*** -0.128** 
        B. BEVs Price 
  Period Hour 8-10 Hour 11-13 Hour 14-17 Hour 18-20 Hour 21-24 Hour 1-7 
D
e
m
a
n
d
 
Hour 8-10 -0.662*** 0.148*** -0.096*** 0.095*** 0.502*** 0.013 
Hour 11-13 0.242*** -0.652*** -0.037 0.143*** 0.382*** -0.078*** 
Hour 14-17 -0.234*** -0.056 -0.459*** -0.304*** 1.362*** -0.309*** 
Hour 18-20 0.120*** 0.112*** -0.158*** 0.045 -0.737*** 0.617*** 
Hour 21-24 0.387*** 0.180*** 0.430*** -0.446*** -1.763*** 1.212*** 
Hour 1-7 0.020 -0.070*** -0.184*** 0.708*** 2.294*** -2.768*** 
        C. Manual DR Price 
  Period Hour 8-10 Hour 11-13 Hour 14-17 Hour 18-20 Hour 21-24 Hour 1-7 
D
e
m
a
n
d
 
Hour 8-10 -0.133** 0.067 -0.094* -0.005 0.077 0.087** 
Hour 11-13 0.075 -0.556*** -0.021 -0.086 0.475*** 0.112** 
Hour 14-17 -0.092* -0.018 0.184** 0.057 -0.071 -0.060 
Hour 18-20 -0.003 -0.057 0.043 -0.023 -0.027 0.068** 
Hour 21-24 0.040 0.219*** -0.037 -0.019 -0.177*** -0.027 
Hour 1-7 0.071** 0.082** -0.049 0.074** -0.042 -0.135*** 
        D. Automated DR Price 
  Period Hour 8-10 Hour 11-13 Hour 14-17 Hour 18-20 Hour 21-24 Hour 1-7 
D
e
m
a
n
d
 
Hour 8-10 0.190** -0.175*** -0.183*** -0.251*** 0.301*** 0.119** 
Hour 11-13 -0.196*** -0.154 0.081 -0.035 0.135 0.169*** 
Hour 14-17 -0.180*** 0.071 -0.123 0.074 0.222*** -0.064 
Hour 18-20 -0.187*** -0.023 0.056 0.471*** -0.408*** 0.091** 
Hour 21-24 0.156*** 0.062 0.117*** -0.283*** -0.087* 0.035 
Hour 1-7 0.097** 0.123*** -0.053 0.100** 0.055 -0.323*** 
        
   
Legend:   Significant negative price elasticity 
   
    Significant positive price elasticity 
   
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1   
 
Fig. 5.2. Optimal price elasticities, automated price elasticities, and price elasticities as defined 
within economic theory based on REN pricing for one random Thursday based on simulation 
with WAs (A) and BEVs (B) and on practical experience from manual (C) and automated (D) DR 
within LINEAR, stating the significance level of each price elasticity.  
108 Chapter 5  
The elasticity matrix shows that the own optimal price elasticities based on 
renewable pricing along the diagonal are all significant: the price during a price block 
has a significant impact on demand during the same period. Moreover, all own price 
elasticities are negative. This implies a demand decrease when prices go up. 
Nevertheless, own price elasticities vary over the time of the day. Also note that the 
significance level of elasticities is shown by the number of asterisks. One asterisk 
aligns with a p-value of less than 0.1 implying that results are significantly different 
from zero. More asterisks increase significance. Cross elasticities are visualized 
alongside the diagonal. Although the main part of cross elasticities is significant, 
demand during some periods is not affected by prices in others. Most significant 
cross elasticities are positive. This implies that demand within one period rises when 
price in another period goes up. Demands during those periods are considered as 
substitutes. Also some negative cross elasticities are found. This is the case for 
demand in the period from hour 1 till hour 7 which is complementary with hours 11 
to 13 and 14 to 17. The sign of significant values are symmetric within the matrix 
although values differ. Therefore complementarity and substitutability between 
specific periods matches, yet the impact of prices differs in quantity. 
The lowest negative own price elasticities are found in hours 14 to 17 and hours 21 
to 24 with a value of -0.606 and -0.423 respectively. This implies that when prices 
rise by 10% in one of these periods, demand decrease with 6.1% and 4.2% 
respectively. The highest cross price elasticity is found between the price in hours 14 
to 17 and demand in hours 11 to 13 with a value of 0.493. Therefore, if the price in 
hours 14 to 17 rises by 10%, demand in the previous period goes up with 4.9%. 
These effects align with results from the descriptive analysis of Chapter 4, yet price 
elasticities allow proper quantification.  
 
5.4.2 BEVs 
In line with Chapter 4, optimal price elasticities based on renewable pricing following 
from demand shifting with BEVs are based on simulated shifting of the vehicles of 
100 households covering a full year. Hereby, simulation starts from realistic driving 
patterns while distinguishing between different types of vehicles. 
Fig. 5.2.B visualizes an example of the optimal price elasticity matrix based on REN 
pricing for one particular Thursday in October in line with Section 4.2.2. The elasticity 
matrix shows that 5 out of 6 own elasticities along the diagonal are significant. Only 
for hours 18 till 20, the price does not have a significant effect on demand within the 
same period. Significant own price elasticities are negative illustrating a demand 
decrease when prices go up. Most cross elasticities alongside the diagonal are 
significant, implying that a price change in one period also influences demand in 
other blocks. In most cases, these cross elasticities are positive implying 
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substitutability between products. In line with the elasticity matrix following from 
shifting WAs, signs of significant elasticities within the elasticity are symmetric yet 
values differ. Also note that these elasticities do not align with economic theory, as 
previously discussed. These elasticities merely serve as a benchmark of what 
optimally could be attained under REN pricing. A more accurate quantification of 
demand response is subject to further research. 
The highest absolute own and cross price elasticities is present in hours 21 to 24 and 
1 to 7. Hereby, own price elasticities amount -1.763 and -2.768 respectively, while 
cross price elasticity between price in hours 21 to 24 and demand in hours 1 to 7 
amounts to 2.294. This illustrates that demand in the night period is highly sensitive 
to prices in the late evening. The level of those elasticities can be explained by the 
high level of electricity demand of BEVs compared to WAs. Moreover, optimal 
elasticities are listed representing a best case scenario. 
5.4.3 Manual DR 
Apart from optimal price elasticity matrices based on renewable pricing following 
from simulated DR with WAs and BEVs, practical evidence from the LINEAR project 
allows deriving genuine price elasticities based on consumer interaction. The first 
interaction model tested within LINEAR is manual DR. To derive the price elasticity 
matrix, the same data are used as in Section 4.3 covering 16 households measured 
during both a reference and field test period from March till the end of June. As 
noted in the previous chapter, total household demand decreased significantly 
towards the field test.  Therefore, also a control group covering 31 households is 
added to establish a true cause-and-effect relationship between prices and demand 
by controlling for parameters which changed from the non-treatment towards the 
treatment period. As previously discussed, climatological circumstances played a 
substantial role in case of manual DR.  
Fig. 5.2.C visualizes an example of an elasticity matrix for a random Thursday in 
March. This day is in line with the day chosen in Section 4.3.2. The number of 
significant values within the matrix is considerably less than with previous optimal 
results from simulation. This illustrates that manual DR cannot reach the level of 
response compared to benchmark results and therefore the impact of price on 
demand is more limited. Along the diagonal five significant own price elasticities are 
present. Four of them are negative while the elasticity in hours 14 to 17 is positive. 
This implies an increase in demand when prices increase.  
The highest negative own price elasticity is -0.556 and occurs in hours 11 to 13. The 
highest cross price elasticity is found in the hours 21 to 24. Hereby, a price increase 
in these hours, increases demand in the hours 11 to 13, reflecting substitutability. 
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5.4.4 Automated DR 
Finally, also automated DR is tested within the LINEAR project leading the automated 
price elasticity matrix based on renewable pricing. To this end, the same data are 
used as in Section 4.3 covering 47 households measured during both a reference and 
field test period from mid-September till mid-November. 
Fig. 5.2.D visualizes an example of an elasticity matrix for a random Thursday in 
October. More elasticities are significant compared to manual DR. Therefore, 
automation leads to additional DR. Nevertheless, the number of significant values is 
still smaller than in the simulated cases. This follows from the fact that in the 
simulated cases flexibility is given for each household and every time an appliance is 
set. Response from households within LINEAR varies to a larger extent between 
households and appliance types, as measurement results and inquiries filled in by 
participants pointed out. Nevertheless, commercial implementation of automated DR 
can approximate optimal results more closely as the focus of LINEAR was on a 
technical breakthrough of DR. Four own price elasticities are significant along the 
diagonal of which two are negative. These negative price elasticities occur during 
hours 21 to 24 and 1 to 7. As described in the previous chapter, demand typically 
goes up when prices are low in these periods. The negative own price elasticities 
confirm this. Several positive and negative cross price elasticities occur alongside the 
diagonal. Therefore, both substitutability and complementarity are present. Also note 
that these are automated elasticities under REN pricing and therefore do not align 
with economic theory, as previously discussed. A more accurate quantification of 
demand response is subject to further research. 
The lowest negative own price elasticity occurs in hours 1 to 7 with a value of -
0.323. The highest positive cross price elasticity is found for prices in hours 21 to 24 
and demand in hours 8 to 10, with a value of 0.301. Hereby, a price rise of 10% in 
hours 21 to 24 increases demand with over 3% in hours 8 to 10.  
5.5 Prediction of demand patterns based on 
renewable pricing 
Although quantification of demand response by means of optimal and automated 
price elasticities and price elasticity consistent with economic theory helps gaining 
insight in general DR behavior, these price elasticities also help predicting aggregate 
demand patterns in case dynamic pricing schemes are sent to households. This is 
useful for system operators, generators and retailers in order to know the impact of 
dynamic price profiles.  
Predictions on the daily demand patterns are made based on the above obtained 
elasticities. A predicted demand pattern results from the difference between 
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reference and field test prices, the reference demand, and price elasticities. Similarly 
to previous sections, the same days for each of these cases are analyzed. 
Fig. 5.3 shows how closely predicted average demand approximates average demand 
under renewable pricing. Again distinction is made between simulated DR with WAs 
and BEVs on the one hand and manual and automated DR within LINEAR on the 
other. For simulated DR, distinction is made between unscheduled, scheduled, and 
predicted demand. For DR within LINEAR, distinction is made between demand 
during the reference and field test period and predicted demand. The day 
represented in the figure does not align with a calendar day, but rather with the day 
used within the AIDS model. Therefore, the graphs start at 7h00. 
Predicted demand approximates demand after WA scheduling quite closely (Fig. 
5.3.A). Nevertheless, a perfect approximation is not obtained as not all parameters 
are accounted for within the AIDS model. For example, no distinction is made 
between elasticities during different days of the week or during different months.  
Fig. 5.3.B visualizes demand predictions based on optimal elasticities following from 
simulations with BEVs. As expected due to the high number of significant optimal 
elasticities, predicted demand again approximates scheduled demand quite closely. 
For closer approximations, again finer granularity has to be added to the model. 
Fig. 5.3.C visualizes predictions for manual DR within LINEAR. Predicted demand 
does not approximate field test demand. This could be expected as prediction builds 
further on the reference measurements. Therefore, differences between pre- and 
post-treatment outside the control of LINEAR are not accounted for: prediction by 
means of elasticities should start from a classical prediction model which includes 
parameters such as time, season, weather, etc. Hereby, price elasticities can be 
included in the prediction model. This mainly results from the limited number of 
significant price elasticities, implying a limited effect of prices. Nevertheless, this is 
out of scope in this dissertation.  
Fig. 5.3.D visualizes predictions for automated DR within LINEAR. Although better 
compared to the manual DR case, predictions still fail to approximate the field test 
demand pattern closely. This follows from the same main reason as for the manual 
case.  
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A. 
B.  
C.  
D.       
   
Fig. 5.3. Predicted demand based on elasticities following from simulation with WAs (A) and 
BEVs (B) and from manual (C) and automated (D) DR results within LINEAR, distinguishing 
between reference demand (dotted), field test demand (dashed) and predicted demand (solid). 
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5.6 Summary & Conclusions 
This chapter provides a quantification of demand response by means of price 
elasticities. Price elasticities capture the responsiveness of user demand to electricity 
price changes. Several categories of price elasticities exist covering own, cross, and 
substitution price elasticities.  
To derive elasticity estimates several functional forms can be used to approximate 
the true underlying preferences of households. These functional forms relate several 
variables determining consumer behavior. Often these functional forms are derived 
from consumer demand theory and align with restrictions on demand functions. This 
is the case for the constant elasticity of substitution model, the almost ideal demand 
system, the generalized Leontief model, and the generalized McFadden model. Some 
functional forms also provide flexibility in order not to restrict the estimated 
parameters. Examples of the latter are the almost ideal demand system, the 
generalized Leontief and the generalized McFadden model.  
In a literature review, practical evidence of price elasticities in various residential pilot 
projects is highlighted. Nevertheless, no consistency is found in the elasticity 
estimates. This is due to differences in geographic conditions, implementation 
designs, but also to the choice of the functional form. Moreover, the literature review 
shows that price elasticities following from more dynamic pricing schemes such as 
RTP and REN are still lacking. Additionally, the impact of automation and the 
introduction of new loads such as BEVs is not investigated thoroughly. 
To overcome the above literature gaps, this chapter estimates price elasticities for 
four different cases. Two cases cover simulated demand response based on WA and 
BEV scheduling under REN pricing. The other two cases cover practical evidence 
from manual and automated DR within LINEAR again under REN pricing. For each 
case, elasticity matrices are derived by means of the almost ideal demand system. 
This system is chosen as it provides a relatively simple estimation while preserving 
flexibility of the elasticities and consistency with economic theory.  
Results show that most elasticities within the elasticity matrix are significant in the 
simulation cases. These elasticities are optimal based on renewable pricing and 
represent a best case scenario. Therefore, these do not align with economic theory, 
yet they provide a quantification of demand response. Note however, that more 
accurate ways to quantify demand response are subject to further research. The high 
number of significant values follows from the fact that households are assumed to be 
extremely price sensitive within the boundaries of their comfort zone. Especially in 
the BEV simulation optimal elasticities are significant due to the high level of 
electricity demand by BEVs. The high sensitivity of BEV demand towards pricing can 
also be seen in the level of optimal elasticity coefficients as these are a multitude of 
optimal elasticities with WA scheduling. Compared to the simulated cases, practical 
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evidence from LINEAR leads to less clear results, although significant elasticities are 
also found. This follows from the fact that not all households actively participated in 
LINEAR. Nevertheless, it is clearly shown that automation leads to more significant 
levels of demand response. 
Apart from using price elasticities to gain insights in DR behavior, this chapter also 
uses price elasticity matrices to predict aggregated demand profiles. This is useful for 
system operators, generators, and retailers in order to know the impact of dynamic 
pricing. Predicted demand approximates scheduled demand quite closely for the 
simulated cases. Therefore, it can be concluded that the AIDS model provides a 
thorough demand response quantification. Demand predictions based on elasticities 
following from LINEAR didn’t approximate field test demand closely. Nevertheless, 
this is logical as the prediction starts from demand during the reference period. 
Therefore, other circumstances not related to price and changing towards the field 
test are not accounted for within the LINEAR cases. Therefore, the true value of 
prediction based on price elasticities can only be assessed when it is included in a 
classical prediction model which also accounts for additional variables. Yet this is 
outside the scope of this dissertation.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART IV 
Power system benefits of 
residential demand response 
  
 
  
6. Impact of residential demand response on 
power system operation 
6.1 Introduction 
Power system operation around the world is facing challenges due to the integration 
of renewable energy resources (RES) and the electrification of energy services. To 
safeguard the demand-supply balance and to cover increased peak demand, demand 
response (DR) can be addressed.  
The use of DR in systems with a high integration of renewables is investigated in 
literature. In Dietrich et al. [127], power system operation with high wind 
penetration is modeled by means of unit commitment modeling. This allows including 
the effect of wind variability. Results show that DR can level out variations in wind 
power, leading to cost and emission reductions. These reductions are accomplished 
by load shifting and peak reduction [16]. In De Jonghe et al. [128], it is shown by 
means of unit commitment modeling that DR brings a reduction in wind power 
curtailment. Also in Sioshansi and Short [129], the impact of DR programs in a high 
wind penetration scenario is tested. A day-ahead unit commitment model is 
combined with a real-time dispatch model. Next to the variability, this allows to 
account for the wind prediction error. Results show that less wind power is curtailed 
due to DR. In Moura and Almeida [130], the role of residential, commercial, and 
industrial demand side management for integrating wind power in the system is 
assessed. Results show that peak reduction mitigates operational problems caused 
by the variability of wind power generation.  
The impact of the electrification by means of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) is 
investigated in the literature. In Wang et al. [131], the impact of plug-in hybrid 
electric vehicles on power system operation is investigated using a detailed unit 
commitment model. It is shown that total operating costs can be reduced up to 13%. 
In Bañez et al. [132], different possible charging strategies are tested in a unit 
commitment and daily economic dispatch model. The latter allows accounting for the 
prediction errors associated with power generation from RES. Finally, in Madzharov 
et al. [133], a detailed unit commitment model is used to determine the effect of 
different electric vehicle penetration levels on the total operating costs. Results show 
that for every 10% of additional electric vehicle penetration, total generation costs 
increase by approximately 1%. 
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A further refinement of the inclusion of DR in system operation modeling is needed. 
At the generation side, technical characteristics of generation plants such as ramping 
rates, minimum output, and minimum up and down time are neglected in Wang et 
al. [131]. In Dietrich et al. [127] and De Jonghe et al. [128], a day-ahead unit-
commitment model is performed, ignoring real-time operation. Therefore, prediction 
errors associated with power generation from RES are not considered. At the 
demand side, shiftable demand is often determined as a percentage of peak demand 
without accounting for the underlying consumption patterns of specific appliances 
[128], [131]. A more detailed approach is needed to reach a realistic quantification of 
operational benefits. The same applies for BEVs as realistic driving patterns and BEV 
characteristics contribute to a more realistic outcome. Next to including realistic 
demand and supply characteristics, the analysis needs to be performed on a broad 
period of data. Otherwise, the implications of single events are overestimated. 
This chapter assesses the impact of an introduction of DR on system operation, 
focusing on plant operation, system reliability, emissions, and costs. A detailed 
modeling approach of both supply and demand side is taken, allowing to obtain a 
realistic quantification of DR benefits and to assess the potential of introducing 
demand response. The approach is applied on a full year of data. The focus is on 
residential DR, including scheduling of wet appliances (WAs) and BEVs. Wet 
appliances include washing machines, dishwashers and dryers. BEVs only include 
residential light-duty vehicles. Electric heating is not considered as this requires the 
integration of weather conditions [134]. Note that the program to address the 
demand side is not discussed in this chapter as this is a potential study. Therefore, 
the demand response programs can be both price-based and incentive-based in line 
with Chapter 1. 
Section 6.2 clarifies the operational model used to optimize system operation with 
DR. Section 6.3 elaborates on the data and assumptions for demand, DR, and 
generation. Results are highlighted in Section 6.4 and Section 6.5 concludes. 
6.2 Model 
The impact of DR with WAs and BEVs on system operation is evaluated with the 
reliability and operation model for renewable energy sources (ROM-model). This 
model approximates real-life power system operation by combining two sequential 
stages: an optimization stage in day-ahead and an hourly simulation stage updating 
the economic dispatch in real-time. Each stage is documented below (Fig. 6.1). The 
model is solved in GAMS 24.0.1 using CPLEX 12.2 as a mixed integer problem solver.  
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Day-ahead optimization stage
Hourly simulation stage in real-time
Input data:
- Demand profile & reserve requirements
- Technical constraints of power plants
- Predicted power generation profile from RES
- Power generation profile from biomass plants, and CHPs
- WG demand profiles
- BEV usage profiles, connection profiles, technical characteristics
Optimal output of thermal and hydro plants
Optimal demand pattern of WGs or BEVs
Deterministic unit commitment and economic dispatch model (cost minimization)
Events:
- Forecast errors of power generation from RES based on day-ahead prediction error
- Forced outages on thermal units based on forced outage rates
Corrective actions to meet demand-supply balance:
1. Operation reserves
2. Quick start thermal units
3. Generation surplus or energy not served
Revised output of thermal and hydro plants
Fig. 6.1. Flowchart of the ROM-model, covering a day-ahead simulation stage and hourly 
simulation stage in real-time. 
6.2.1 Day-ahead optimization stage 
 
Basic model description 
In the optimization stage, a deterministic unit commitment and economic dispatch 
model are used to determine optimal output of thermal and hydro plants for the next 
day. This model contrasts with stochastic unit commitment models in which 
uncertainty is considered [135], [136]. The specific mathematical formulation of the 
model used is extensively described in Dietrich et al. [127]. The model minimizes 
daily operational costs while meeting demand-supply balance and reserve 
requirements. Technical constraints for thermal units are considered. They include 
minimum and maximum output, maintenance, and ramping rates. Technical 
constraints for pumped storage units include bounds on the hydro reservoir and 
minimum and maximum output. The demand profile and predicted power generation 
profile from RES are considered as an input. Also power generation from biomass 
plants and combined heat and power plants (CHPs) are modeled as an input, as 
generation from these plants is considered as uncontrollable or not-dispatchable from 
system operator point of view.  
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Inclusion of residential demand response 
Within the day-ahead optimization stage, DR with WAs and BEVs is introduced. 
Contrary to the use of price elasticities [137], [138], [139], this is done by optimizing 
the consumption patterns of the appliances themselves. Hereby, scheduling of 
appliances is modeled as a centralized decision making process.  
For WAs, the model allows to integrate DR with different types of appliances, such as 
washing machines or dryers. The hourly load pattern of each appliance type can be 
shifted in time according to its shifting potential. The load pattern shift for each type 
must be balanced within one day. A detailed model description of the inclusion of 
WAs is provided in Dietrich et al. [127]. The main mathematical formulation is 
provided in Appendix B. 
For BEVs, the model allows to integrate different types of cars with different types of 
usage and connection profiles. Several technical characteristics of BEVs and their 
batteries are considered: specific energy consumption when driving, battery 
capacities, grid-to-battery and battery-to-wheel efficiencies, maximum state of 
charge, and maximum charging power. When BEVs are scheduled, the energy 
requirements related to the mobility patterns must be satisfied. The inclusion of DR 
with BEVs is extensively described in Bañez et al. [132] and Ramos et al. [140]. The 
main mathematical formulation is added in Appendix B. 
6.2.2 Hourly simulation in real-time 
In the hourly simulation stage, two events are introduced which require corrective 
actions in order to meet the demand-supply balance. First, forecast errors of power 
generation from RES are integrated based on the difference between day-ahead 
predicted and real-time power generation. Second, forced outages on thermal units 
are simulated based on forced outage rates of power plants. Three main actions can 
be performed to restore the demand-supply balance. First, operation reserves kept 
available from the optimization stage are assigned. Secondly, quick start thermal 
units are deployed. As a last resort, generation surplus or energy not served is 
triggered. This leads to a revised output of thermal and hydro plants. 
6.3 Data & assumptions 
The impact of DR with WAs and BEVs on system operation is assessed within two 
alternative power generation portfolios for a one year period. The first portfolio 
contains the Belgian power generation portfolio of 2012, while the second portfolio 
consists of the projected Belgian portfolio in 2025. In what follows, data and 
assumptions on both the demand and supply side are discussed.  
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6.3.1 Demand 
Demand in Belgium is based on hourly load data from 2012, provided by the 
European network of transmission system operators for electricity (ENTSO-E) [141]. 
Yearly demand sums to 84.59 TWh. Average, maximum, and minimum hourly 
demand amounts 9.63 GWh/h, 14.19 GWh/h, and 6.24 GWh/h respectively. Demand 
in 2012 and 2025 are assumed identical.  
 
Wet appliances 
Residential demand partly arises from consumption with WAs, split up in washing 
machines (WMs), dryers (DYs), and dishwashers (DWs). Average load patterns for all 
Belgian wet appliances are depicted in Fig. 6.2. These patterns are deducted from 
total demand and modeled separately. In order to derive Belgian load patterns for 
each appliance, the following parameters are used: number of times appliances are 
cycled, starting times of cycles, and consumption profiles of cycles. Based on [142] 
and statistics from the federal public service [143], over 9 million WAs are present in 
Belgium and the number of cycles a day amounts to 2.51, 1.30, and 1.85 million 
WMs, DRs, and DWs respectively. Starting times of appliances are derived from 
[144]. Consumption cycles are obtained from measured profiles from a pilot project 
named LINEAR [71]. This leads to a total yearly consumption of 1.93 TWh of which 
0.53, 0.60, and 0.80 is attributable to WMs, DYs and DWs respectively. This exceeds 
2% of total yearly electricity demand. It is assumed that all WA cycles can be used 
for load shifting purposes. While this is an overestimation, it allows results to be 
comparable with BEV scheduling. A shifting potential of 4 hours both forward and 
backward is assumed [145]. 
Fig. 6.2. Average daily load patterns of unscheduled Belgian wet appliances: washing machine, 
dryer and dishwasher. 
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Battery electric vehicles 
As the current Belgian demand does not include a significant number of BEVs, their 
power consumption has to be added to demand representing the electrification of 
transportation. In both the 2012 and 2025 scenario, the number of Belgian light-duty 
vehicles is assumed to be 5.41 million based on federal public service statistics [146], 
of which 8% or over 430 000 vehicles are BEVs [147]. In line with Section 4.2.2 
(Table 4.1), three types of vehicles with their own technical battery characteristics 
are considered: subcompact, midsize, and large vehicles. 200 representative BEVs 
and their accompanying driving patterns are considered. Total Belgian yearly power 
consumption of BEVs sums to 1.78 TWh. This exceeds 2% of total yearly electricity 
demand. The average load pattern in the unscheduled BEV charging scenario is 
depicted in Fig. 6.3. Hereby, it is assumed that BEVs are plugged in at each location 
when they are not driving. As soon as a BEV is plugged in, it starts charging until the 
battery reaches maximum state of charge or until the BEV departs again. With 
scheduled charging the timing and quantity of charging is optimized over the period 
when the BEV is not driving. 
 
Fig. 6.3. Average daily load pattern of unscheduled charging of BEVs. 
6.3.2 Power generation portfolio 
 
Installed capacity 
Current and future installed capacity in Belgium is based on data from ENTSO-E 
[148] and the Belgian TSO [149]. These capacity data are adjusted in several ways. 
Current and future installed wind, solar power capacity is revised according to 
estimations from Belgian regulators [150], [151] and the Belgian TSO [152]. A full 
nuclear phase out is assumed by 2025 [152]. Coal capacity is also phased out while 
additional gas capacity is integrated by 2025 [152]. Apart from covering demand, 
both current and future power generation portfolios need to provide reserves. An 
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approximation of reserve requirements is based on ENTSO-E and amounts to 870 
MW and 970 MW for 2012 and 2025 respectively [148]. Interconnection capacity and 
cross-border flows are not included in the analysis. The transmission grid is 
considered to be a copper plate with no internal congestions.  
Total installed capacity in 2012 and 2025 amounts to 20.30 GW and 22.25 GW 
respectively. As depicted in Fig. 6.4, the 2012 portfolio is characterized by plants 
operating on a mix of primary energy sources. Gas and nuclear capacity make up the 
main part. This is complemented with solar, wind, hydro, biomass, coal, and oil 
capacity. Biomass capacity also includes waste and wood pellets. Oil is typically used 
in smaller turbojets. Towards 2025, nuclear, coal, and oil are phased out. Installed 
capacity of gas power plants rises due to an increase in combined cycle gas turbines 
and combined heat and power plants (CHPs). Moreover, renewable integration 
becomes even more significant as more wind, solar, and biomass capacity is 
installed. Renewables make up almost 50% of total installed capacity.  
 
Fig. 6.4. Installed capacity in Belgium in 2012 and 2025. 
 
Technical characteristics 
Over 50 different thermal plants using different fuel types are present in Belgium. 
Capacities and fuel types of these plants are provided by the Belgian TSO [153]. 
Based on the capacities, the technical characteristics of plants are derived (Table 
6.1). Five different technologies are considered: pressurized water reactors (PWRs), 
steam power plants (SPPs), combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs), gas turbines 
(GTs), and internal combustion engines (ICEs). Except for start-up costs, probability 
of maintenance and forced outage rate, all technical characteristics of the first four 
technologies are based on [154] and consistent with [155]. For PWRs, efficiency is 
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set to 100% as their fuel costs is expressed in €/MWhelectric, as later on discussed. 
Start-up costs are based on [156], except for PWRs for which this characteristic is 
retrieved from [154]. The probability of maintenance and the forced outage rate are 
based on [157] for PWRs and on historic data from the Belgian TSO [158] for the 
other technologies. Technical characteristics of ICEs are retrieved from [156]. 
 
Table 6.1. Technical characteristics of power plants. 
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PWR 40 100 100 100 40 15 13 1 
SPP 30 100 33 40 40 34 2 6 
CCGT 45 100 53 60 100 73 7 2 
GT 20 100 25 32 100 10 9 5 
ICE 60 100 40 42 100 10 9 5 
 
Power generation from run-of-river plants is assumed to be stable at 50% of 
capacity. Pumped storage units are assumed to produce at an efficiency of 80% 
[159]. The reservoir level allows power generation at full capacity for 5 to 6 hours.  
Power generation data for solar, wind, biomass, and CHP plants are based on data 
from the Belgian TSO [149]. For wind power, both day-ahead predictions and real-
time power generation data are included to account for the prediction error. Power 
generation from biomass is included based on historical output data, while CHPs are 
considered as must-run plants with an unavailability rate of 14% in consistency with 
GTs. Towards 2025, all uncontrollable power generation data is scaled towards its 
respective installed capacity. 
 
Fuel cost and carbon content 
Fuel costs and the carbon content of fuels are listed in Table 6.2. Fuel costs are 
expressed in €/MWhthermal, except for uranium which is given in €/MWhelectric. 
Emission costs are set at 15 €/tCO2 [155]. 
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Table 6.2. Fuel prices and carbon content. 
Fuel Fuel costs  
[€/MWh] 
Carbon Content 
[tCO2/MWh] 
References 
Crude oil 48 0.63 [156], [160]  
Coal 10 0.85 [156], [161] 
Natural Gas 23 0.34 [154], [156] 
UO2 7 0.00 [162] 
6.4 Results 
This section describes results obtained from the Belgian case study for a whole year. 
As DR is the driver of operational benefits, scheduling of WAs and BEVs is addressed 
first. Afterwards, the impact of scheduling on power system operation is evaluated.  
6.4.1 Residential demand response 
 
Scheduled WA consumption patterns 
To be able to assess the impact of residential DR on yearly power system operation, 
firstly the unscheduled and scheduled consumption patterns of WAs for 2012 are 
discussed. While on average 15% of the total WA consumption volume is reduced 
during peak moments, daily shifting patterns widely vary over the year. Fig. 6.5 
compares the unscheduled WA consumption pattern and the spread of scheduled WA 
consumption. To obtain the spread of scheduled consumption, all daily consumption 
patterns are bundled. Afterwards, a distribution is made for each specific hour over 
all days. Hourly median values of scheduled consumption are represented by the 
white line. The intervals around the median capture a percentage of the total amount 
of observations and visualize the spread of the hourly wet appliance consumption. 
For example, the 0-10% interval shows the spread of the 10% lowest consumption 
values for each specific hour. It can be seen that WA consumption shows a large 
day-to-day variation, as demand and uncontrollable generation patterns differ 
between days. Therefore, cost minimization leads to different WA consumption 
patterns. In general, appliances are often shifted from the morning and the evening 
towards the late afternoon and the night. This leads to demand reductions of up to 
150 MWh/h. Although shifting often leads to new peaks in total wet appliance 
consumption, shifted demand typically fills valleys when total demand is considered. 
Although not visualized, average shifting patterns in 2025 are similar to those in 
2012. Nevertheless, variability of shifting patterns is higher in 2025 due to wind and 
solar power variability. 
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Fig. 6.5. Distribution of daily wet appliance consumption in 2012. The hourly median values of 
scheduled consumption are represented by the white line. The intervals capture a percentage of 
the total amount of observations in each hour. 
 
Fig. 6.6. Distribution of BEV charging patterns in 2012. The hourly median values of scheduled 
consumption are represented by the white line. The intervals capture a percentage of the total 
amount of observations in each hour. 
 
Scheduled BEV consumption patterns 
On average, 50% of the total BEV consumption volume in 2012 is reduced during 
peak moments. While unscheduled charging mainly takes place during daytime, 
scheduled charging shifts cycles towards the night (Fig. 6.6). Therefore, scheduled 
charging mainly occurs at home. Charging is mainly reduced during peak moments at 
noon and in the evening. Then total BEV consumption is often reduced to 0. This can 
amount to a 300 MWh/h reduction. Similarly to WA scheduling, scheduled charging 
creates new peaks on the level of BEV consumption. As these new peaks occur 
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mainly during nighttime, shifted consumption fills valleys when total demand is 
considered. Compared to scheduled charging in 2012, shifts in the average BEV 
consumption pattern are less profound in 2025. Moreover, the variability of shifting 
patterns is higher. This results from more variability due to wind and solar capacity. 
6.4.2 Impact of residential demand response on power system 
operation 
 
Power plant operation 
Demand response influences power plant operation within the current and future 
Belgian portfolio. To assess the influence, first power plant operation within two 
reference scenarios is evaluated. These reference scenarios consist of the 2012 and 
2025 power generation portfolio in which no DR is present. Afterwards, the impact of 
DR is discussed. Distinction is made between WA and BEV scheduling as the impact 
is assessed in separate simulations. 
The share of yearly power generation from different primary energy sources within 
the two reference scenarios is visualized in Fig. 6.7. For clarity reasons, power 
generation from oil and run-of-river hydro plants is omitted. These account for less 
than 1% of power generation. In 2012, 52% of demand is covered by power 
generation from nuclear plants, while 28% is produced from gas plants. Wind mills, 
solar panels, and biomass plants contribute 14% of power generation. The remaining 
part results from coal and hydro. In 2025, significant changes in power generation 
shares occur. Nuclear and coal plants are phased out, while power generation from 
gas plants increases substantially due to an increase in CCGTs and CHP plants. Also 
power generation from wind mills, solar panels, and biomass more than doubles. As 
power generation from wind mills and solar capacity increases, hourly ramping also 
increases. Comparing both power generation portfolios, the increase in 
uncontrollable power generation is noteworthy. While in 2012 uncontrollable power 
generation amounts 24%, this increases to 54% in 2025.  
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Fig. 6.7. Share of yearly power generation from different primary energy sources in Belgium in 
2012 and 2025. 
When looking at power plant operation of different technologies, PWRs and SPPs are 
typically used as base load units, CCGTs as mid-peak plants, while GTs, ICEs, and 
pumped storage units are used during peaks.  
Residential DR affects annual power generation of different power plants. In what 
follows, the focus is on CCGTs, GTs, and pumped storage units, as DR influences 
these mid-peak and peak units most (Fig. 6.8). Hereby, annual generation of 
technologies within each scenario is compared with its reference scenario. Three 
main observations can be derived. WA scheduling decreases annual generation from 
mid-peak and peak units. BEV introduction increases the loading of those units. An 
exception is the decrease of GT loading in 2012, although largely outset by an 
increased CCGT loading. Finally, the increased loading due to BEV introduction is 
reduced by scheduling BEVs. In other words, the scheduling of BEVs decreases the 
impact of a BEV introduction. 
Similar effects occur during the peak moments of the year. In Fig. 6.9, load duration 
curves of CCGTs and GTs are visualized. They depict the highest 300 hours of 
loading for each technology, covering different power plants. Due to decreased 
controllable generation capacity, mid-peak and peak plants run longer at full load in 
2025 compared to 2012. Demand response, both with WAs and BEVs, decreases the 
hours mid-peak and peak technologies operate at full capacity. Moreover, in 2012 
maximum GT loading is never attained under the scheduled BEV scenario. 
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Fig. 6.8. Annual generation difference of CCGTs (left), GTs (middle), and pumped storage 
plants (right) compared to the 2012 and 2025 reference scenarios. 
 
Fig. 6.9. Load duration curve of CCGTs (left) and GTs (right) for the top 300 hours of the year 
in different scenarios for 2012 (dashed lines) and 2025 (solid lines). 
DR also influences the frequency of starting up mid-peak and peak plants within a 
year (Fig. 6.10). In both 2012 and 2025, the number of start-ups of CCGTs and GTs 
decreases when WAs are scheduled. This decrease can go up to 180 start-ups of 
CCGTs in 2012, corresponding to 15% of the reference start-ups. When unscheduled 
BEV charging is introduced, the number of start-ups goes up. This increase is 
reduced when BEVs are scheduled. For example, in 2012 the number of start-ups 
with CCGTs decreases with 437 or 33% compared to the unscheduled BEV scenario. 
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Except for base load technologies, similar reductions in start-ups are found for other 
technologies. This illustrates that although the amount of flexible residential demand 
is limited compared to total demand, residential DR influences the number of start-
ups to a large extent.  
 
Fig. 6.10. Number of start-ups of CCGTs and GTs in different scenarios. 
 
Reliability 
As plant operation is modified by DR, power system reliability is also affected. This 
impact is visualized in the first two rows of Table 6.3. Reliability is expressed by 
energy not served (ENS) and loss of load expectation (LOLE). While ENS describes 
the total amount of electricity demand which could not be delivered, LOLE defines 
the number of hours in which it is expected that demand cannot be met. As 
interconnection capacity is not considered, ENS and LOLE should be interpreted with 
care. While these parameters provide insights in system reliability, actual reliability 
will be higher as interconnection capacity is available.  
Results show that ENS and LOLE are a lot higher in 2025 compared to 2012. This 
results from the underlying generation portfolio and reserve requirements in both 
years. In 2012, controllable capacity and reserve requirements are high enough to 
cover variations in RES, CHPs, and demand. ENS only occurs during forced outages 
of multiple large power plants. In 2025, demand cannot be met during 200 hours. 
Although this number is distorted due to the exclusion of cross-border flows, it 
illustrates that the increase in wind, solar, biomass, CHP, and CCGT capacity and the 
limited increase in reserve requirements are not sufficient to fully cover the phase 
out of nuclear and coal capacity. Moreover, it indicates the need for sufficient 
interconnection capacity as controllable capacity within the capacity constrained 
portfolio is not always able to cover demand peaks. Together with limited 
predictability of wind power, this is the main reason of ENS.  
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Table 6.3. Reliability, emissions, and costs in different portfolios. 
 2012 power generation portfolio 2025 power generation portfolio 
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ENS [GWh] 6.49 7.07 7.99 8.02 144.90 143.50 199.29 186.04 
LOLE [h/year] 25 30 37 37 200 202 266 245 
Renewable Surplus 
[GWh] 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 774.15 700.33 630.04 374.55 
Emissions [MtCO2] 8.94 8.92 9.62 9.62 10.37 10.33 11.00 10.86 
Total Costs [M€] 1207 1200 1290 1278 1697 1686 1887 1842 
Thermal Costs [M€] 1206 1199 1279 1271 1389 1381 1463 1445 
 
ENS not necessarily decreases when DR is introduced. This is a consequence of two 
counteracting effects. On the one hand DR contributes to peak shaving, reducing 
ENS when total capacity is constrained, such as in 2025. In this case, DR with wet 
appliance decreases ENS with 1% compared to the reference case. Scheduling of 
BEVs also reduces ENS by 7% or 13.25 GWh compared to unscheduled charging. On 
the other hand, DR results in a decreased number of committed power plants in the 
day-ahead optimization stage. This can result in a decrease of flexibility from 
committed plants on top of the reserve requirements as plants are running closer to 
their capacity limits, yielding more ENS in the real-time simulation stage. Although 
the impact is small, this effect leads to an ENS increase within the 2012 power 
generation portfolio. 
 
Environment 
Scheduling of WAs and BEVs impacts the environment due to a change in power 
plant operation. In what follows, this impact is expressed by the amount of 
renewable surplus or spillage and CO2-emissions as depicted in the third and fourth 
row of Table 6.3. 
Results show that renewable surplus is zero in 2012 when no DR is used. Towards 
2025 renewable surplus increases to 774 GWh due to limited controllability and the 
variability of wind and solar power generation. This equals almost 1% of annual 
demand. By scheduling WAs, surplus is reduced by 10%. By scheduling BEVs, the 
decrease is even higher and amounts to 41% or 255.49 GWh compared to the 
unscheduled scenario. 
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Also CO2-emissions are affected by the underlying generation portfolio and the 
presence of DR. In 2012, CO2-emissions amount to 8.94 million ton CO2 in the 
reference scenario. Towards 2025, CO2-emissions increase with 16% due to the 
nuclear phase out and its replacement by gas. By scheduling WAs, CO2-emissions 
decrease to a minor extent. Although WA scheduling decreases the loading of 
polluting ICE in 2012, this effect is counteracted by an increased loading of coal 
plants. In 2025, only the loading and the number of start-ups of gas plants are 
reduced. This has a limited effect on emissions. The introduction of BEVs increases 
CO2-emissions from the power system significantly due to increased power 
generation. Emissions increase with 8% in 2012 and 6% in 2025. Although the effect 
is limited, the scheduling of BEVs reduces CO2-emissions compared to the scheduled 
case. It should be noted that the decrease in emissions due to the electrification of 
transport is not accounted for.  
 
Cost 
Demand response influences annual operational costs. This impact is visualized in the 
last two rows of Table 6.3. Hereby, only the controllable part of the generation 
portfolio is considered. Operational costs and subsidies of RES and CHPs are not 
included. Cost results are split into costs and thermal costs. While thermal costs only 
account for operational costs, total costs also include costs for not being able to meet 
demand or reserve requirements.  
Results show that costs are higher in 2025. In 2025, total and thermal costs increase 
with 41% and 15% respectively. The increase in thermal costs is mainly due to the 
nuclear phase out, which increases the run-time of more expensive thermal plants. 
Moreover, thermal costs and total costs are of the same order in 2012, while in 2025 
total costs are significantly higher. This results from increased violations of demand 
and reserve requirements, as discussed previously. By introducing DR with WAs, a 
yearly total cost reduction of 7 and 12 M€ is accomplished for 2012 and 2025 
respectively. The cost reduction for 2025 is larger as more ENS is avoided. The 
thermal cost reduction mainly follows from a reduced use of other sources of 
flexibility, such as GTs and pumped storage hydro units. When BEVs are introduced, 
total costs rise substantially. The cost increase is higher in 2025, as future power 
generation capacity does not allow for a further increase in demand. If BEVs are 
introduced with scheduled charging, both total and thermal costs decrease with 10-
25% compared with unscheduled charging. This ranges from 12 to 45 M€ of total 
yearly cost reduction and 8 to 18 M€ of thermal yearly cost reduction. This cost 
decrease is higher in 2025 as more ENS is reduced and less renewable surplus 
occurs. 
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6.5 Summary & Conclusions 
This chapter studies the impact of demand response on power system operation by 
scheduling wet appliance and battery electric vehicles. A two-stage modeling 
approach is used on an hourly data set covering a full year. This allows taking into 
account both the variability and limited predictability of power generation from RES. 
Moreover, it provides a detailed representation of flexibility at the demand side. This 
benefits a realistic outcome allowing to assess a potential introduction of DR.  
Results show that in general DR decreases the loading of mid-peak and peak plants 
over the year and during peak moments. This is also reflected in the reduced number 
of start-ups of those plants. Renewed plant operation impacts reliability, environment 
and costs of power system operation. While reliability is affected to a limited extent, 
DR provides an efficient means to integrate RES and avoid surplus. By shifting only 
2% of total consumption towards moments with an excess of generation from RES, 
up to 41% of renewable surplus can be avoided. Finally, DR decreases thermal costs 
as less peaking plants need to be operated. This chapter shows that the impact of 
DR depends on the underlying power generation portfolio. The highest benefits of 
DR are accrued in a portfolio with a high amount of uncontrollable and renewable 
capacity.  
Looking at the demand side, shifting WA cycles and BEV charging in time contributes 
to peak shaving. Up to 150 MWh/h and 300 MWh/h of the peak is reduced by WA 
and BEV scheduling respectively. BEV consumption is mainly shifted towards 
nighttime, while WA cycles are mainly shifted towards the night and the afternoon. 
Aside from these general observations, this chapter shows that a large variety in 
shifting patterns exists. While only 8% of light-duty vehicles or 432 000 BEVs are 
assumed to contribute to DR, compared to 100% or over 9 million of WAs, system 
benefits are higher in case of BEVs. This justifies an increased attention for DR with 
BEVs. While an introduction of unscheduled BEV charging impedes system operation, 
scheduling facilitates the integration extensively. 
While this chapter provides insights into the impact of DR, some limitations are 
present in the modeling of the power system and DR. In the modeling of the power 
system interconnection capacity, transmission capacity, market behavior, demand 
uncertainty, and uncertainty in power generation from solar plants is neglected. 
Moreover, no stochasticity is included in the day-ahead optimization stage. In the 
modeling of DR, the willingness of households to provide flexibility and the cost it 
brings is not included. Furthermore, individual WA characteristics per household are 
not considered. Integrating this would further benefit a realistic outcome. Other 
paths for future research are the inclusion of a sensitivity analysis on reserve 
requirements, residential controllable generation technologies, the provision of 
reserves by means of DR and vehicle-to-grid charging. 
  
 7. Impact of residential demand response on 
generation investment decisions 
7.1 Introduction 
In the event of more power generation from renewables and the electrification of 
energy services, power system operation is challenged as shown in the previous 
chapter. Traditionally, these operational challenges in turn increase investments in 
additional generation capacity. As short-term demand response (DR) also helps 
overcoming these operational challenges, it can also affect generation investment 
needs. 
In the literature, the calculation of the impact of demand response on generation 
investments is often simplified [163], [164]. Hereby, DR investment benefits are 
assessed based on a load duration curve (LDC). This curve ranks hourly demand 
from high to low for a full year of data. Afterwards, the calculation method of 
investment benefits states that a peak demand reduction during a limited percentage 
of hours, decreases generation capacity investments with the according level of peak 
load reduction. To illustrate the reasoning, an example is provided based on the load 
duration curve for Belgium for 2012 (Fig. 7.1) [141]. The reasoning implies a 
decrease in generation capacity with 15% when demand can be reduced during 5% 
of the hours of the year. By multiplying the capacity decrease with the cost of peak 
generation, the investment benefits of demand response are obtained. 
 
Fig. 7.1. Belgian load duration curve in 2012. 
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Although determination of the impact of DR on generation investments based on LDC 
is straightforward, several flaws arise due to neglecting chronology in power 
generation and demand. First of all, the LDC method does not account for temporal 
and intertemporal aspects of the operation of dispatchable power plants. Examples 
are outages or ramping constraints. Next, the impact of variability, limited 
predictability and limited controllability of generation from RES is not accounted for. 
Finally, the availability of demand response in time and quantity is not considered. 
For these reasons, a quantification of investment benefits based on the LDC method 
leads to unrealistic results and should be avoided. Therefore, detailed short-term 
power operation should be included when assessing the impact of demand response 
on generation investment decisions.  
Apart from the influence of short-term power system operation, generation 
investment decisions are also influenced by long-term uncertainty. Although evidence 
of electrification is rising due to the integration of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and 
heat pumps, the long-term evolution is covered by uncertainty influencing generation 
investment decisions. Also future use of DR with BEVs or wet appliances (WAs) 
remains uncertain.  
To quantify the impact of short-term DR on generation investment decisions, the 
short-term operational characteristics of both RES and DR should be accounted for 
together with the long-term uncertainty in demand and demand response. Therefore, 
these aspects should be integrated in generation expansion planning (GEP) models 
[165]. These models allow determining the optimal generation investment decision. 
In general, GEP models consist of a long-term investment model and a short-term 
operational model. A higher level of detail and sophistication in both models allows a 
more realistic quantification of the impact of DR. 
Within long-term investment models, a distinction is made between static and 
dynamic investment models on the one hand, and deterministic and stochastic 
models on the other. In static models an optimal generation portfolio is determined 
for one specific year, while in dynamic ones multiple decision stages are considered 
over the planning horizon [166]. In deterministic investment models no uncertainty 
in variables is considered, while in stochastic ones uncertainty is accounted for. An 
example is the uncertainty of demand over the planning horizon. To allow for 
multiple decision stages in which the gradual release of information due to 
uncertainty is reflected, a stochastic dynamic investment model is needed. Stochastic 
dynamic programming (SDP) determines the mathematical background of real 
options (RO) theory, often employed to evaluate financial options [167]. RO was 
introduced into investment projects in the power system to deal with long-term 
uncertainties by Dixit and Pindyck [168]. In contrast to the discounted cash flow 
approach which momentarily decides whether to invest in a project, the real options 
theory also evaluates whether a postponement of the investment is beneficial. 
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Hereby the reduction of uncertainty when waiting is accounted for [169]. 
Consequently the real options theory is mostly referred to as the ”wait and see” 
approach, while the discounted cash flow resembles the ”now or never” approach 
[170]. 
Next to the long-term investment model, the short-term power system operation 
model of GEP can include different degrees of detail. A widespread approach to 
capture some operational elements is the screening curve method in which 
technologies are assigned based on the LDC [171]. As mentioned before, this 
method neglects the chronology of power system operation. A more sophisticated 
approach is linear programming, first presented by Massé and Gibrat [172]. This 
approach optimizes the generation portfolio under a cost minimization objective, 
taking into account technical constraints of different power generation technologies. 
Recently these models are updated to determine the optimal generation portfolio 
under a large share of RES [173], [174].  
Although a wide range of GEP models exist in the literature, DR is only considered 
rarely in these models. In De Jonghe et al. [175], a static single-year optimization 
approach is used to evaluate DR. Although a detailed operational model is used to 
reflect RES characteristics, appropriate DR characteristics are neglected. Moreover, 
the investment model does not account for uncertainty and investment decisions 
over the different years as the model is static. In Botterud et al. [176], the impact of 
DR on investments is assessed using a stochastic dynamic programming approach 
which accounts for uncertainty and for several investment decision stages. Although 
this leads to a detailed investment model, the representation of operational 
characteristics of DR and the power generation portfolio can be improved. In Choi 
and Thomas [177], the impact of DR is assessed in a case study using a deterministic 
dynamic approach. While a detailed operational model is used, several power plant 
and demand characteristics are neglected. Finally, Samadi et al. [178] assesses the 
effect of demand response with a simplified operational model without taking into 
account uncertainty. 
This chapter assesses the impact of short-term DR with WAs and BEVs on generation 
investment decisions by combining real options theory with a detailed short-term 
operational model. It allows accounting for short-term operational characteristics and 
long-term uncertainty in demand or DR growth. Moreover, it allows policy makers to 
assess the feasibility of DR to help realizing policy targets such as the integration of 
renewables or a phase out of conventional generation capacity. The focus is on 
residential DR with WAs and BEVs. This approach contributes to the state-of-the-art 
in two domains: 
 existing GEP models are complemented by an accurate representation of DR 
and an accurate short-term operational model, and 
 this approach is applied to the Belgian case to draw relevant conclusions. 
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Note that the program to address the demand side is not discussed in this chapter as 
this is a potential study. Therefore, the demand response programs can be both 
price-based and incentive-based in line with Chapter 1. 
Section 7.2 describes the GEP model used to optimize generation investment 
decisions. Section 7.3 elaborates on the data and assumptions for demand, DR, and 
generation. Results are highlighted in Section 7.4 and Section 7.5 concludes. 
7.2 Model 
The subsequent levels of the GEP model are depicted in Fig. 7.2. A discrete state 
space is created to represent the various compositions of the future power system. 
This state space covers all potential investment decisions and demand fluctuations 
over the planning horizon. A detailed two-step operational model is applied to 
calculate operational costs for each state in the state space. RO-theory is used by 
means of a stochastic dynamic programming model, leading to an investment 
decision in the first stage based on the calculated operational costs. Finally, an 
investment simulator assesses the optimal investment paths throughout the long-
term planning horizon. Each level is described in detail. 
Determine state space
            State space
Two-step operational model
            Operational costs
Stochastic dynamic programming 
            Investment decision stage 1
Investment simulator
            Investment paths
 
Fig. 7.2. Subsequent levels in generation expansion model. 
7.2.1 Determination of state space 
The discrete state space contains a finite number of possible states where the power 
system can end up in during the planning horizon. Typically, a state of the power 
system is defined by the power generation portfolio and the demand. The power 
generation portfolio within each state depends on the current power generation 
portfolio, planned investment and phase out decisions, and on new investment 
decisions. The latter leads to a decision tree over the considered planning horizon. A 
visualization of the different states over the different stages is depicted in Fig. 7.3. 
An increase in the number of possible investment decisions within one state enlarges 
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the decision tree and therefore the state space. Demand and DR growth within each 
year depends on external factors such as the electrification of energy services and 
the willingness of users to offer DR resources. The variation in demand and DR 
growth is covered by uncertainty, leading to an uncertainty tree over the considered 
planning horizon. In this tree each path between two states is characterized by a 
probability of occurrence. An example of an uncertainty tree with two possible 
demand growth scenarios each characterized by a probability of occurrence (Pup and 
Pdown) is visualized in Fig. 7.4. A similar uncertainty tree can be constructed for DR 
growth. A combination of the decision and uncertainty tree results in the total state 
space. After the planning horizon, a non-flexible period is added in which the states 
are equal to the respective state in the last stage. This period allows investments 
made in the last investment stages to be earned back.  
 
Fig. 7.3. Decision tree characterized by different states in different stages. 
 
Fig. 7.4. Uncertainty tree characterized by different states in different stages. 
7.2.2 Two-step operational model 
A detailed two-step operational model is applied on each state of the state space. 
This model aligns with the operational model as described in Section 6.2. This model 
accounts for demand response and approximates real-life power system operation by 
combining two sequential steps: an optimization in day-ahead by means of a 
deterministic unit commitment and economic dispatch model, and an hourly 
simulation updating the economic dispatch in real-time. Based on this model, the 
operational costs for each state of the state space are obtained. 
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7.2.3 Stochastic dynamic investment model 
Once all annual generation costs for each state are calculated, the investment model 
determines the expected total cost for the entire planning horizon based on RO-
theory. The mathematical description of this model is:  
𝐽1(𝒙𝟏, 𝑑1)   =   min
𝒖1,…,𝒖𝑇−1
E
𝜔
{∑ [
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝑘−1
∙  𝑐𝑘(𝒙𝒌, 𝑑𝑘 , 𝒖𝒌)] +  
1
(1 + r)T
 
T−1
𝑘=1
∙  𝑓𝑇(𝒙𝑻, 𝑑𝑇)} 
(7.1) 
𝒙𝒌+𝟏 =  𝒙𝒌 + 𝒖𝒌  (7.2) 
𝑑𝑘+1 =  𝑑𝑘 + 𝜔𝑘 (7.3) 
𝑐𝑘(𝒙𝒌, 𝑑𝑘 , 𝒖𝒌) =  𝑜𝑐(𝒙𝒌, 𝑑𝑘) + 𝒖𝒌  ∙  ic  (7.4) 
𝑓𝑇(𝒙𝑇 , 𝑑𝑇) =  𝑐𝑇(𝒙𝑇 , 𝑑𝑇|𝒖𝑇 = 0) ∙  
1 − (1 + 𝑟)−TNF
𝑟
 
(7.5) 
 𝒙𝒌 ∈  Ω𝒙,𝑘 ,  𝑑k ∈  Ω𝑑,𝑘 ,  𝒖𝒌 ∈  Ω𝒖,𝑘 ,   𝜔𝑘 ∈  Ω𝜔,k  (7.6) 
 
where, 
𝑐𝑘(𝒙𝒌, 𝑑𝑘 , 𝒖𝒌)  = cost in period k to fulfill demand 𝑑𝑘 with a given generation portfolio 
[€], 
𝑓𝑇(𝒙𝑻, 𝑑𝑇)  = operational cost of non-flexible periods 𝑇𝑁𝐹  actualized to period 𝑇 
[€], 
𝐽1(𝒙𝟏, 𝑑1)    = minimum total expected costs [€], 
𝑑𝑘  = electricity demand in period k [MW], 
𝑜𝑐(𝒙𝒌, 𝑑𝑘)  = minimum operational costs obtained from operational model [€], 
𝒖𝒌  = investment decision in period k [MW], 
𝒙𝒌  = total installed capacity in period k [MW], 
𝜔 = long-term uncertainty of demand growth for electricity, 
ic = investment cost for thermal plants [€], 
r = discount factor [%], 
T  = planning horizon [periods], 
TNF  = number of non-flexible periods after the planning horizon in which 
the variables stay constant [periods], 
Ω𝑥,𝑑,𝒖,𝜔   = state space. 
This description only accounts for demand growth, but the description for demand 
response growth is similar. 
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The RO-model is solved by SDP and is based on previous work of Botterud et al. 
[176] and Mo et al. [166]. Equation (7.1) shows that the total expected actualized 
cost is minimized taking into account the uncertainty in demand growth 𝜔 . The 
current investment decision 𝒖𝒌  determines the total installed capacity in the next 
stage 𝒙𝒌+𝟏 according to (7.2). This equation shows an investment decision is only 
effective in the next stage. Equation (7.3) shows that uncertainty in demand growth 
𝜔𝑘  defines the demand level in stage k+1 given a probability distribution. As 
indicated in (7.4), total costs 𝑐𝑘 consist of the operational and the investment costs. 
Apart from the planning horizon, a non-flexible period TNF is added after the planning 
horizon. The costs of this period are actualized to the last stage of the planning 
horizon by (7.5). Finally, equation (7.6) defines the state space of the variables. 
To obtain the expected total actualized cost for the entire planning horizon, the 
model starts its procedure in the last stage of the planning horizon T and iterates 
back until the first stage. The backward iteration is based on:  
𝐽𝑘(𝑥𝑘, 𝑑𝑘)   =   min𝒖𝒌∈ Ω𝒖,𝒌 {𝑐𝑘(𝒙𝒌, 𝑑𝑘 , 𝒖𝒌) +  
1
(1+𝑟)
  ∙  E
𝜔
[ 𝐽𝑘+1(𝒙𝒌, 𝑑𝑘 , 𝒖𝒌)]}. 7.7 
Once the expected costs in the states of stage k+1 are known, the optimal paths to 
the states in stage k are determined, leading to an investment decision uk  with 
minimum total expected costs for each state. This procedure is repeated until the 
first stage is reached leading to the optimal investment decision in this period. 
7.2.4 Investment simulator 
Although the RO-model derives the optimal investment decision for the first stage, it 
does not provide insight in investment decisions over the entire planning horizon. 
Therefore, a simulator is created to determine the optimal investment paths while 
accounting for the gradual release of information over the years. The simulator starts 
from the optimal investment decision in the first stage based on the RO-model. 
Afterwards, the simulator randomly draws a demand growth based on given 
probabilities in the state space, as elaborated on in subsection 7.2.1. In the second 
stage, the RO-model is rerun subject to the investment decision and realized demand 
growth from the previous stage. This results in a new investment decision for stage 
2. This process is repeated until the complete investment horizon is covered and the 
investment paths over the different stages are known. The simulation is repeated 
multiple times to cover various demand evolutions in order to determine the 
probability of each investment path. 
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7.3 Data & assumptions 
The impact of DR on generation investment decisions is assessed within a Belgian 
case study (Fig. 7.5). Two alternative cases are considered. In the first one, the 
impact of DR with wet appliances (WAs) is evaluated; in the second the impact of DR 
with battery electric vehicles (BEVs) is assessed. These cases are referred to as the 
WA and BEV cases respectively. In both cases the impact of demand response is 
assessed by comparing a scenario without and with demand response, referred to as 
the unscheduled and scheduled scenario respectively. Both scenarios of each case 
are solved separately with a GEP model. Within each case and scenario, uncertainty 
is integrated in different ways. For the WA case, no uncertainty is assumed in the 
unscheduled scenario while uncertainty in demand response growth is included in the 
scheduled scenario. For the BEV case, uncertainty in the integration of BEVs is 
assumed in the unscheduled scenario. In the scheduled scenario this uncertainty 
comes along with the uncertainty in demand response growth. In what follows, data 
and assumptions for both cases and scenarios are further discussed for each of the 
subsequent levels of the generation expansion model. 
  
Fig. 7.5. Overview of cases and scenarios tested with the GEP model. 
7.3.1 State space 
The planning horizon of the complete state space covers 14 years, from 2013 until 
2026. The horizon is split in 7 stages of two years each. Each state is defined by the 
power generation portfolio and its accompanying decision tree, and the demand and 
its accompanying uncertainty tree.  
The initial installed Belgian power generation portfolio is in line with the one from 
Section 6.3.2. Nevertheless, internal combustion engines (ICEs) are neglected to limit 
calculation time. Moreover, the state space accounts for the  gradual evolution of 
installed capacity, considering different primary energy sources such as nuclear, coal, 
gas, wind, solar, biomass, and hydro capacity (Fig. 7.6).  
WA case BEV case 
Unscheduled 
scenario 
Scheduled 
scenario 
Unscheduled 
scenario 
Scheduled 
scenario 
- - No DR 
- - No uncertainty 
- - DR with WAs 
- - Uncertainty in 
DR growth 
- - No DR 
- - Uncertainty in 
demand growth 
- - DR with BEVs 
- - Uncertainty in 
demand growth 
= DR growth 
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Fig. 7.6. Installed capacity of different primary energy sources over the planning horizon in 
Belgium. 
On top of the planned capacity evolution, new capacity can be added based on an 
investment decision tree. Except for the final stage, in every stage an investment 
decision is taken. This decision entails the construction of two combined cycle gas 
turbines (CCGTs) with a capacity of 300 MW each. Plants are online after 2 years.  
Next to the power generation portfolio, the state space is determined by demand. 
Demand in Belgium is obtained from hourly load data of the first 6 months of 2012, 
as provided by ENTSO-E [179]. This 6 months period is long enough to enable 
representativeness while limiting calculation time. Total demand in this period adds 
up to 43.77 TWh. The average, maximum, and minimum hourly demand amounts to 
9.97, 14.2, and 6.50 GWh respectively. In view of comparability, the historic demand 
pattern is assumed to be equal in the different stages of the considered planning 
horizon. Based on the uncertainty trees of the WA and BEV cases, the demand 
pattern is adapted. Note that no industrial DR participation is assumed. 
In the WA case, uncertainty in DR growth is assumed while the number of wet 
appliances remains constant. From one stage to the next demand response with WAs 
stays equal or increases. This stepwise increase between stages amounts to 20% of 
all Belgian wet appliances. The chance of this stepwise increase is assumed to be 
equal to the chance that the amount of DR remains the same, namely 50%. In the 
final stage, this leads to a maximum and minimum level of DR with WAs of 100% 
and 0% respectively. Consequently, the expected share of DR with WAs at the end 
of the planning horizon equals 60% of all WAs.  
In the BEV case, uncertainty in DR is assumed due to the integration of BEVs. From 
one stage to the next either demand stays equal or increases due to power 
consumption from BEVs. The stepwise increase in BEV share between two stages 
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amounts to 10% of all Belgian light-duty vehicles [180]. The chance that the amount 
of BEVs increases between two stages is assumed to be equal to the chance that no 
increase occurs, being 50%. In the final stage, this leads to a maximum and 
minimum BEV penetration level of 60% and 0% respectively. Consequently, the 
expected share of BEVs at the end of the planning horizon equals 30% of all Belgian 
light-duty vehicles.  
A combination of the decision tree on the power generation side with the uncertainty 
tree on the demand side leads to 1 or 1*1 state in the first stage and 49 or 7*7 
states in the final stage. In total, 140 distinctive states determine the state space. 
Besides the stages within the planning horizon, the non-flexible period TNF 
considered after the planning horizon counts 25 years. 
7.3.2 Operational problem 
For each state of the state space, the daily operational model is executed for 6 
months of hourly data. In this model, technical characteristics of power generation 
plants, WAs, and BEVs are integrated according to Section 6.3.  
Within the WA case, the expected amount of consumption available for DR purposes 
at the end of the planning horizon amounts to 0.58 TWh or 1.32% of total demand. 
Within the BEV case, the expected number of BEVs at the end of the planning 
horizon corresponds to an additional power consumption level of 3.85 TWh, or 8% of 
the total envisioned historic demand.  
As mentioned before, two scenarios are considered for both the WA and BEV case. 
These scenarios are included in the operational model as follows. Within the 
unscheduled scenario of the WA case, no DR is assumed. Therefore, power 
consumption of WAs aligns with historic power consumption. For the scheduled 
scenario of the WA case, power consumption from WAs is optimized according to 
Section 6.3.1. For the unscheduled scenario of the BEV case, the charging of BEVs 
cannot be scheduled in time and is modeled as an input. This assumes that BEVs 
start charging as soon as the vehicle is not driving until the maximum state of charge 
of the battery is reached or the vehicle departs again. For the scheduled scenario of 
the BEV case, the timing and quantity of power consumption from charging of BEVs 
is optimized. Comparison between the unscheduled and scheduled scenario within 
both the WA and BEV case allows assessing the impact of demand response.  
7.3.3 Investment problem 
Once the operational costs for every state are determined, the investment costs are 
defined and integrated in the real options model. Based on reference [181], the 
investment cost of CCGT capacity amounts to 727 €/kWe. As the real option model 
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determines the investment decision in the first stage, operational and investment 
costs need to be discounted. The discount rate is set to 10% [181].  
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Operational costs 
The annual operational costs of all feasible paths in the scheduled scenarios of the 
WA and BEV case are visualized in Fig. 7.7. Although each path is not clearly 
distinguishable, the figure illustrates the cost spread resulting from DR growth, 
demand growth and investment decisions over the planning horizon. For clarity 
reasons, annual costs higher than 2500 M€ are not visualized. The cost spread is 
larger in the BEV case. This illustrates that demand growth with BEVs increases costs 
substantially. The cost spread increases towards the end of the planning horizon 
which reveals a close link with the underlying generation portfolio. After 2013 costs 
tend to increase as nuclear capacity is phased out. The following years, the 
integration of RES leads to a cost decrease while in 2023 and 2025 cost rise again 
due to the completion of the nuclear phase out. In these years, the integration of 
BEVs and the installed capacity of CCGTs largely impact operational costs illustrated 
by the large cost spread. Although not visualized in the figure, annual costs in the 
BEV case can go up to 6759 M€. This aligns with the situation in which no 
investments are made while the number of BEVs constantly increases. Moreover, the 
unscheduled scenario for the BEV case has an even higher spread as the annual 
costs reach 7376 M€. 
  
Fig. 7.7. Feasible operational cost paths over the planning horizon in the scheduled scenario of 
the WA case (left) and the BEV case (right). 
7.4.2 Investment decision stage 1 
The cost results for investment decisions in stage 1 are depicted in Table 7.1 for both 
the unscheduled and scheduled scenarios in the WA and BEV case. Distinction is 
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made between operational and investment costs in stage 1, and actualized future 
operational and investment costs. Operational costs in stage 1 are based on 
extrapolation from 6 months to a year and covers both operational costs in this year 
and actualized operational costs of next year. These costs are equal in the different 
scenarios as no DR with WAs or BEVs is integrated yet and the investment decision 
only results in functioning power plants from stage 2 onwards. For actualized future 
costs, they depend on the case, the scenario and the investment decision.  
 
Table 7.1. Cost results for investment decisions in stage 1 for the unscheduled and scheduled 
scenario of the WA and BEV cases. 
Case  Scenario Investment 
Decision  
Operational 
costs [M€] 
Investment 
costs [M€] 
Actualized future 
costs [M€] 
Total costs 
[M€] 
WAs 
Unscheduled 
Do not invest 2.533 0 11.555 14.086 
Invest 2.533 436 11.269 14.237 
Scheduled  
Do not invest 2.533 0 11.529 14.060 
Invest 2.533 436 11.243 14.211 
BEV 
Unscheduled  
Do not invest 2.533 0 14.039 16.572 
Invest 2.533 436 13.609 16.578 
Scheduled  
Do not invest 2.533 0 13.816 16.349 
Invest 2.533 436 13.405 16.373 
 
In the WA case, investment in CCGTs decreases future costs in both scenarios. This 
cost decrease is lower than the investment costs itself. Therefore, it is optimal in 
both scenarios to postpone investment in CCGTs. Comparing both scenarios, costs 
are lower when DR is used. Scheduling of WAs leads to an actualized cost reduction 
of 26 M€.  
In the BEV case, the actualized future cost decrease due to investment is again lower 
than the investment cost itself. Therefore, not investing in the first stage is optimal. 
Moreover, scheduling BEVs brings an actualized cost reduction of 223 M€ compared 
to the unscheduled scenario, i.e. 1.3% of total costs.  
Comparing both cases, actualized total costs increase significantly when BEVs are 
integrated. For the unscheduled scenarios, integration of BEVs leads to a cost 
increase of 2486 M€ or 18% of total costs in the WA case. Moreover, this cost 
increase is significantly lower in the scheduled scenario. Comparing the impact of DR 
with WAs and BEVs, the impact of WA scheduling on total costs is minor due to two 
main reasons. First, the generation portfolio operates closer to its limits in the BEV 
case due to demand growth. This increases the influence of DR. Second, the amount 
of energy usable for DR is higher in the BEV case. The 10% increase in BEVs 
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between two stages aligns with 0.64 TWh, while 20% of WAs only aligns with 0.20 
TWh. 
7.4.3 Investment paths 
The different optimal investment paths over the different simulations for the WA and 
BEV case are depicted in Fig. 7.8. Hereby, distinction is made between the scheduled 
and unscheduled scenarios. Each optimal investment path is represented by a line 
which increases when investments are made and remains horizontal otherwise. The 
optimal investment paths largely differ between the WA and BEV case. Both the 
unscheduled and scheduled scenario of the WA case only count two investment 
increases while the BEV case counts three or four. This illustrates the demand 
growth due to integration of BEVs influences generation investment decisions. The 
WA case only depicts one optimal investment path while the BEV case has several. 
This illustrates that DR with wet appliances has no influence on generation 
investment decisions, while demand growth and DR with BEVs influences investment 
decisions in several ways due to its uncertainty.  
  
  
Fig. 7.8. Optimal investment paths over the planning horizon for the unscheduled (top) and 
scheduled (bottom) scenario in the WA case (left) and BEV case (right). 
Focusing on the WA case, it can be noticed that investments are only needed 
towards the end of the planning horizon. Driven by the nuclear phase out, additional 
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capacity is installed towards 2023 and 2025. This is independent of the inclusion of 
DR with WAs. Therefore, DR with WAs does not affect generation investments. 
Focusing on the BEV case, three optimal investment paths exist for both unscheduled 
and unscheduled scenario. Within each scenario, the optimal paths differ due to 
distinctive demand growth resulting from the uncertainty tree. For each path, its 
occurrence in percentage is listed. In the beginning of the planning horizon, no 
capacity is installed in both scenarios. Based on an investment decision in 2017, 
installed capacity goes up towards 2019 in 75% of the cases for both scenarios. 
When no BEVs are integrated towards 2017, the investment decision is postponed. 
Otherwise, an investment is made. Starting from 2021, a difference occurs between 
the investment paths in both scenarios. While installed capacity always increases in 
the unscheduled, capacity remains equal in 25% of the cases in the scheduled 
scenario. This aligns with the case in which the BEV share amounts to 10% and an 
investment in CCGTs was already made in the past. This illustrates that DR can defer 
investment decisions depending on the number of BEVs integrated. The impact of DR 
is also observed towards the end of the planning horizon. While in the unscheduled 
scenario total installed capacity is 2400 MW in 69% of cases, this amounts to 50% in 
the scheduled scenario.  
7.4.4 Power system operation paths 
The optimal investment paths, resulting from minimizing the expected total costs, 
affect power system operation over the planning horizon. In this subsection, power 
system operation is assessed based on three parameters: operational costs, energy 
not served (ENS), and renewable surplus. This allows evaluating to which extent DR 
helps reaching current Belgian policy targets.  
The evolution of power system operation is visualized in Fig. 7.9. Each of the three 
parameters is extrapolated to cover a full year. Distinction is made between the WA 
and BEV case. Different optimal paths over the planning horizon exist for both cases 
depending on previous investment decisions, DR and demand growth. In each 
subfigure, distinction is made between an area covering the unscheduled and one 
covering the scheduled scenario. The borders of the areas represent the minimum 
and maximum optimal paths. Due to limited impact of DR with WAs on power system 
operation, these areas almost coincide for operational costs and ENS. On the 
contrary, Fig. 7.9 shows clearly distinguishable areas in the BEV case. Next to the 
areas, median paths are represented in white. They result from the probability 
distribution of DR with WAs or BEVs. For clarity reasons the different optimal paths 
within the BEV case are only visualized for the scenario covering the smallest area. 
In case of operational costs and ENS, this area entails the scheduled scenario, while 
for renewable surplus it entails the unscheduled.  
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Fig. 7.9. Operational cost paths (top), energy non served paths (middle) and renewable surplus 
paths (bottom) in the WA (left) and BEV (right) cases corresponding to the optimal investment 
decisions. The median unscheduled pattern are represented in dashed white lines while the 
median scheduled patterns are represented in dotted white lines. 
 
While the top figures of Fig. 7.7 depict the operational costs of all feasible investment 
paths, Fig. 7.9 only accounts for operational costs associated with the optimal. In the 
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latter costs also go up towards the end of the planning horizon. Compared to Fig. 
7.7, this cost increase is limited as investments are made in several stages. While in 
Fig. 7.7 operational cost go up to over 2000 and 6500 M€ for the WA and BEV case 
respectively, costs are now limited to 1600 and 2700 M€ for both cases. While in the 
BEV case the minimum and maximum optimal paths are clearly distinct, the minimum 
and maximum cost paths almost align in the WA case, due to the limited impact of 
DR with WAs on operational costs. In the final stage the difference between 
operational costs is limited to a maximum of 9 M€. In the BEV case, the minimum 
cost path is the same in both scenarios and aligns with the case when no BEVs are 
integrated. Comparing the median of the optimal cost paths between scenarios, 
illustrates that operational costs do not necessarily go down when DR is used. 
Although the effect is minor, this is related to the deferral of investments. The 
reduction in investment cost by using DR outperforms the higher operational costs. 
The middle figures of Fig. 7.9 show the energy not served over the planning horizon. 
This parameter covers the amount of electricity which could not be delivered to the 
consumers. Although ENS is always present, ENS goes up towards 2025 in the WA 
case. It results from the full nuclear phase out. Hereby, the impact of DR with WAs 
remains negligible as no significant difference in the ENS paths is found. 
Nevertheless, larger spread is observed for the BEV case. Hereby, ENS increases 
towards 2015. This follows from a combination of the decommissioning of a nuclear 
plant and the integration of BEVs. This illustrates that current installed controllable 
generation capacity is limited. Towards 2025, the amount of ENS increases with 
more than 100% in several optimal paths of the BEV case. This follows from the full 
nuclear phase out and BEV integration. Comparing both scenarios, the minimum 
optimal path is the same while the maximum path is higher if no DR is used. 
Therefore, BEV scheduling limits the increase of ENS when thermal capacity is 
phased out. As interconnection capacity is not considered, ENS should be interpreted 
with care. While this parameter provides insights in system reliability, actual reliability 
is also influenced by interconnection and transmission capacity. 
Finally, the bottom figures of Fig. 7.9 show the renewable surplus over the planning 
horizon. This covers the part of power generation from wind farms which is curtailed. 
For both the WA and BEV case, no power generation from RES is curtailed in the first 
stages, while in later stages surplus cannot be avoided due to the RES increase. 
While the spread in the final stages is again larger for the BEV case, DR with WAs 
also has a considerable impact on renewable surplus. Hereby, scheduling WAs 
decreases renewable surplus. Nevertheless, impact is larger for BEVs. Comparing 
between the unscheduled and scheduled scenario, the maximum optimal path align 
for both, while the minimum and median paths differ. DR largely reduces the 
renewable surplus. In more than 50% of cases, surplus remains below 20 GWh if DR 
is used. Therefore, DR with BEVs contributes to renewables integration. 
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7.5 Summary & Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the impact of demand response on generation investments 
by means of a GEP model which accounts for detailed power system operation and 
uncertainty in demand or demand response growth over the planning horizon. This 
approach allows evaluating investment decisions over multiple stages within the 
planning horizon and to quantify the cost reduction demand response brings. It can 
be used by policy makers to assess the feasibility of promoting demand response and 
to understand how demand response helps accomplishing policy targets such as the 
integration of RES or the phase out of nuclear power plants. 
This model is applied to the Belgian power system in which nuclear capacity is 
phased out and more RES are integrated towards 2026, while demand response and 
the integration of BEVs is subject to uncertainty. As shown in this chapter, alignment 
with the Belgian renewable and nuclear phase out targets leads to a considerable 
increase in operational costs if only the planned power generation investments are 
completed. To maintain cost-effective system operation an additional capacity of 1.2 
GW is required. In case BEVs are integrated, the required capacity even reaches 
between 1.8 and 2.4 GW. Nevertheless, demand response can limit this investment 
need in quantity and time.  
Scheduling BEVs leads to a reduction of invested capacity of 600 MW in 19% of the 
cases. Moreover, during the planning horizon investments can be postponed in time 
decreasing actualized costs. Overall, an actualized cost reduction of 223 M€ or 1.3% 
of total costs is reached by BEV scheduling. Given that no BEVs are integrated yet 
and that future power consumption of BEVs is limited compared to total demand, this 
cost decrease is substantial and calls for the inclusion of demand response within 
power system operation. Therefore, a potential breakthrough of BEVs should support 
scheduled charging in order to decrease the impact on power system costs. The 
opposite is true for WAs scheduling. Opposed to BEV scheduling, WA scheduling does 
not influence investment decisions. This follows from the limited amount of energy 
resulting from the use of WAs. Nevertheless, a modest actualized cost decrease of 26 
M€ is obtained by scheduling WAs following from operational benefits. 
Given the investment decisions in the unscheduled and scheduled scenarios in the 
WA and BEV cases, power system operation is influenced in three different ways: 
operational costs, energy not served and renewable surplus. For both operational 
costs and energy not served the impact of WA scheduling is minor. Only renewable 
surplus is influenced to a larger extent. Nevertheless, scheduling of BEVs largely 
influences all three parameters. Although demand response decreases operational 
costs within a specific year, it is shown that they can increase over the planning 
horizon when demand response is implemented. The increase is caused by a deferral 
of investments. However, the cost benefit of the investment deferral surpasses the 
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increase in operational costs. This chapter also illustrates that the energy not served 
in the power system as a consequence of the nuclear phase out can be limited by 
using demand response with BEVs. Finally, this chapter shows that demand response 
with BEVs provides an efficient means to integrate more RES by decreasing 
renewable surplus. Therefore, the scheduling of BEVs helps reaching Belgian policy 
targets. 
While this chapter contributes to the state-of-the-art research concerning the impact 
of demand response on power system operation and investments, several 
improvements can still be made. A first improvement is the inclusion of 
interconnection capacity and the transmission grid in the operational model. Next, 
other technologies with various capacities can be integrated in the decision tree. 
Although this contributes to a more realistic outcome, the state space will increase 
magnifying the calculation time. Finally, a deeper assessment of the uncertainty tree 
can lead to a more realistic outcome. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART IV 
Conclusions and 
recommendations 
 
 
 8. Summary, conclusions and recommendations  
8.1 Summary & Conclusions 
Against the background of a push towards renewables, electrification of energy 
services and an ageing infrastructure, the need for flexibility within power system 
operation is growing. While flexibility can be obtained from several resources, this 
thesis explores the use and usefulness of flexibility at the residential demand side 
triggered by dynamic electricity prices, referred to as residential demand response 
(DR) based on dynamic electricity prices (DP).  
Although residential DR based on dynamic electricity tariffs is a known topic in the 
literature, its use and understanding is still limited. Current electricity tariff designs 
fall short on incentivizing DR. Moreover, no clear indication or quantification is 
available on how residential users react to more dynamic pricing schemes. Finally, 
benefits resulting from DR remain largely unknown. 
To address this limited understanding, this thesis enhances knowledge of residential 
DR and DP. It contributes by answering these research questions: 
- What are demand response and dynamic electricity pricing? 
- How should dynamic electricity prices be designed? 
- To which extent do residential users modify their power pattern as a 
reaction to DP? 
- How can this modification be quantified and predicted? 
- What benefits do these load modifications bring for residential users and for 
power system operation and investments? 
In what follows, first the answers to these research questions are provided by 
discussing conclusions and contributions of each chapter. Afterwards, general 
findings on the use and usefulness of DR are provided. 
8.1.1 Research findings 
Chapter 1 provides insights in the concept of DR. Different categories are discussed 
distinguishing between the purpose it is used for and the benefits it brings, the user 
classes it serves, and the load types targeted. It shows that momentum towards 
implementation of residential DR is gaining as all stakeholders are recognizing its 
value and even promoting it. This is reflected at the level of policy, regulation, 
standardization and the energy industry. Moreover, the rise of smart metering 
systems, advanced ICT and automation further pushes DR from research towards 
implementation. Although limited, current implementation of DR mainly covers the 
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commercial and industrial sector. Nevertheless, the potential of residential DR is 
substantial and its implementation is on the verge of a breakthrough.  
Chapter 2 elaborates on price-based DR programs. More specifically, focus is on 
locational dynamic pricing (LDP) in which prices depend on time and location. While 
traditional tariff schemes fail to reflect costs that specific households cause and fail to 
trigger DR, LDP aims at valuing residential consumption and generation against their 
contribution to the whole electricity system. Moreover, it aims at triggering DR. In 
this context, this chapter provides a theoretical framework to design and assess LDP. 
It starts from specific costs incurred at the generation, transmission, distribution and 
retail level. Locational and time dependency of each cost is assessed according to its 
cost drivers: energy usage, system’s peak, and cost independent of usage or peak. 
As usage and peak typically depend on the time of the day, most costs driven by 
these drivers can be made time dependent. This leaves substantial potential for 
adding dynamics to tariff schemes. Moreover, locational dependency of costs also 
relates to locational dependency of its cost drivers. If costs are driven by usage or 
system’s peak at local level, costs should be assigned to this local level. If costs are 
induced by usage or peak at global level, costs should be shared among its 
beneficiaries at the global level. When translating these costs into tariff schemes, 
general principles of tariff design need to be accounted for. Hereby, distinction is 
made between principles related to practical consideration and social acceptability on 
the one hand and cost related principles on the other. While traditional tariff 
schemes typically align with the former, cost related principles such as cost causality 
are harmed. In contrast, LDP largely meets cost related principles. Although 
practicalities to attain perfect cost causality still exist, technological and economic 
breakthroughs in ICT, metering and automation lead the way to the implementation 
of LDP. Apart from meeting cost causality, this also triggers DR. Hereby, the level of 
DR depends on tariff design. The latter is determined by concepts such as advance 
notice, length of price blocks and length of price pattern. These concepts in their 
turn affect the general tariff principles related to social acceptability and cost, often 
in a contradictory way. Therefore, a balance should be found between tariff 
principles related to costs and social acceptability on the one hand and its resulting 
DR incentive on the other. 
Chapter 3 develops different dynamic pricing schemes. They differ in advance notice, 
length of price blocks and length of price patterns. Hereby, averaging over multiple 
price periods reduces the peak and increases the off-peak tariff. Therefore, variability 
decreases and the DR incentive gets smaller as price differences lower. Five tariff 
designs are discussed: flat, time-of-use (ToU), critical peak (CPP), real-time (RTP) 
and renewable pricing (REN). These tariff schemes are categorized in three types 
based on their objectives: meet cost causality, decrease demand during critical 
events, and align demand with power generation from RES. The first type covers flat, 
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ToU, and RTP tariff schemes. While flat schemes allow meeting cost causality over 
the year, they do not meet cost causality over a shorter time horizon. ToU tariff 
schemes go one step further by allowing cost causality over peak and off-peak 
periods within the year. Moreover, it stimulates short-term DR due to the difference 
between peak and off-peak prices. RTP tariff schemes meet cost causality reflecting 
hourly underlying costs, therefore incentivizing DR on an hourly basis. The second 
type of tariff schemes covers CPP. This is typically used within a capacity constrained 
power system that is not able to meet demand during a limited number of hours a 
year. Hereby, focus is on reducing demand during infrequent critical events. 
Nevertheless, intermittency in a power generation portfolio based on RES cannot be 
addressed. The final type of tariff schemes covers REN pricing. This tariff aims at 
more efficient integration of intermittent RES by aligning demand with available 
power generation from RES.  
Following theory and development of dynamic pricing, Chapter 4 describes the DR 
effects. To provide comprehensive insights in DR under its various forms, both DR 
based on theory and practice is covered. While theoretical simulations serve as a 
benchmark, practical evidence provides a reality check. Simulations with wet 
appliances (WAs) based on RTP show shifts of consumption away from noon and late 
evening periods towards the afternoon and night. This leads to new peaks on 
appliance consumption level. Nevertheless, these peaks fill valleys when considering 
household consumption levels. The impact on household consumption peaks is 
limited as initial WA consumption during those peaks is relatively small. On the 
contrary, consumption of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) is substantial and just 
adding these vehicles to the household consumption profile creates new peaks even 
if DR is not used. This new peak arises just before midnight as most vehicles have 
returned home. Applying DR based on RTP, this new peak is shifted towards the 
night. On average, it is almost double of the reference household consumption peak. 
Considering other dynamic pricing schemes than RTP, simulations show that 
consumption patterns are largely affected by the choice of the schemes. Compared 
to flat pricing, adding dynamics to the tariff scheme leads to more variation in 
household consumption profiles. This is shown with RTP and REN pricing bringing the 
biggest changes in consumption patterns. Hereby, new peaks under REN pricing start 
earlier than under RTP as REN prices are averaged over longer periods. The 
drawback is that consumption is not always shifted towards the most advantageous 
periods leading to new peaks during initial shoulder periods. Apart from the impact of 
dynamics of tariff schemes on consumption patterns, also the amount of household 
savings is affected. In general, more dynamics in tariff schemes leads to higher 
savings. For instance, savings under RTP are 6 to 7 times higher than under ToU. 
Savings largely depend on the load type. Hereby, savings under load shifting with 
BEVs are a multitude compared to those with WAs. Nevertheless, for both load types 
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a relative high spread of savings is found over the different households. Apart from 
theoretical results, evidence from the LINEAR project also shows that REN pricing 
impacts demand. Under the manual interaction model, consumers manually reduce 
consumption in the morning and late evening periods. Nevertheless, no clear impact 
during the night period is observed. In this perspective, automating WAs helps 
shifting consumption deeper in the night. Moreover, it adds to controllability and 
predictability of DR. This is shown by the clear demand increase during low price 
periods and vice versa.  
Building on the descriptive analysis of theoretical and practical DR, Chapter 5 
provides a deeper quantification of the responsiveness of demand to electricity price 
changes by means of price elasticities. While the literature on DR is not conclusive on 
the level of residential price elasticities in general, also evidence on elasticities 
following from dynamic pricing schemes such as RTP and REN is missing. Moreover, 
the impact of new type of loads or of automation is another topic not well addressed. 
Therefore, this thesis derives optimal price elasticities for simulated DR with WAs and 
BEVs and elasticities for manual and automated DR within LINEAR, all under REN 
pricing. Simulated DR serves as a benchmark for DR under automation and also 
shows the impact of new load types such as BEVs. Note however that the use of 
price elasticities for simulated and automated cases do not align with economic 
theory and therefore results have to interpreted with care. Results show that most 
optimal elasticities within the elasticity matrix are significant. Especially with BEV 
simulation, optimal elasticities are significant due to the high level of electricity 
demand resulting from BEV charging. High sensitivity of BEV demand towards pricing 
can also be seen in the level of elasticity coefficients. They are a multitude of 
elasticities following from WA scheduling. Compared to the simulated cases, practical 
evidence from LINEAR is less straightforward. While significant elasticities are found, 
impact compared to the simulated cases is lower. This follows from the fact that not 
all households actively participated in LINEAR. Moreover, commercial implementation 
is expected to lead to higher response levels. Nevertheless, it is clearly shown that 
automation leads to more significant levels of DR.  
While previous chapters focus on the household level, Chapter 6 describes the 
impact of residential DR on power system operation. Therefore, this chapter provides 
an operational model quantifying power system operation benefits of residential DR 
with WAs and BEVs tested within a Belgian case study. Contrary to the available 
literature, this model provides a detailed representation of demand, DR and 
generation covering a full year. Results show that based on optimal power system 
operation, demand valleys are filled with consumption from WAs and BEVs. Hereby, 
BEVs cycles are mainly shifted towards the night while WAs are shifted towards the 
afternoon and night. This aligns with results from previous chapters. Moreover, this 
chapter shows that in general DR decreases loading of mid-peak and peak plants 
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over the year and during peak moments. This is also reflected in the reduced number 
of start-ups of those plants. This renewed plant operation also impacts reliability, 
environment and costs of power system operation. While reliability is affected to a 
limited extent, DR provides an efficient means to integrate RES and avoid surplus. By 
shifting only 2% of total consumption towards moments with an excess of generation 
from RES, up to 41% of renewable surplus is avoided. Finally, DR decreases thermal 
costs as less peaking plants need to be operated. Hereby, it has to be noted that the 
impact of DR depends on the load type and the underlying power generation 
portfolio. Consistent with the previous chapter, benefits under BEV scheduling 
surpass WA benefits. Moreover, highest benefits of DR are accrued in a portfolio with 
a high amount of uncontrollable and renewable capacity.  
Following the operational impact of DR, Chapter 7 discusses the impact of DR on 
power generation investment decisions. To this end, a detailed generation expansion 
planning model is developed. Contrary to models from the available literature, this 
model combines detailed a short-term operational model with real options theory 
accounting for long-term uncertainty in DR and demand growth. This approach is 
tested within a Belgian case and allows policy makers to assess the feasibility of DR 
to help realizing policy targets such as the integration of renewables or a phase-out 
of conventional generation capacity. Results show that DR can limit investments in 
quantity and time. Nevertheless, 1.2 GW of additional capacity on top of planned 
investments is required towards 2026 to maintain cost-effective operation. If BEVs 
are integrated, the required capacity even reaches between 1.8 and 2.4 GW. In the 
latter case, scheduling BEVs leads to a reduction of invested capacity of 0.6 GW in 
19% of cases depending on the speed of BEV integration. Moreover, during the 
planning horizon investments can be postponed in time also decreasing actualized 
costs. Overall, an actualized cost reduction of 223 M€ or 1.3% of total costs is 
reached by BEV scheduling. Given that no BEVs are integrated yet and that future 
power consumption of BEVs is limited compared to total demand, this cost decrease 
is substantial and calls for the inclusion of DR within power system operation. 
Therefore, a potential breakthrough of BEVs should support scheduled charging in 
order to decrease the impact on power system costs. The contrary is true for the 
scheduling of WAs. Opposed to BEV scheduling, WA scheduling does not influence 
investment decisions. This follows from the limited amount of energy resulting from 
the use of WAs. Nevertheless, a modest actualized cost decrease of 26 M€ is 
obtained by scheduling WAs following from operational benefits. 
8.1.2 General findings on the use and usefulness of demand 
response 
The aim of this thesis is to enhance the knowledge of residential DR and DP. 
Additionally, it also wants to enable more informed decision making by policy 
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makers, industry and residential users. As different topics related to DR are 
addressed using different models, interpretation of results can be a challenging task. 
Therefore, this section aims at providing a general summary on the implications of 
results describing the use and usefulness of DR. As most results in this thesis follow 
from Belgian case studies, conclusions in this section also focus on Belgium. 
Throughout this thesis, it was pointed out that momentum is building towards 
implementation of residential DR. The driver of this momentum is the increased need 
for flexibility due to the rise of renewables, phase-out of conventional generation 
capacity, ageing assets, and electrification of energy services. This need is only 
expected to become more stringent as more renewables are integrated and 
conventional generation capacity is phased-out.  
The enabler of this momentum is the rise of technology as advanced metering, ICT 
and automation have taken a leap. These technologies are prerequisites for the 
successful implementation of DR and DP. Metering enables to measure and verify 
demand reactions to certain events. First experiences with DR have learned that this 
is essential for utilities in order to rely on the triggered flexibility and remunerate it 
accordingly. The same principle holds when DP is implemented. In this perspective, 
correct billing according to electricity consumption in every price block is essential. 
Progress in ICT adds to social acceptability and practicality of DR and DP. Hereby, 
technologies such as online monitoring, graphical user-interfaces and in-house 
displays can provide useful information to households. This results in higher 
customer involvement and enables them to make informed decisions concerning their 
electricity consumption. Finally, also automation adds to social acceptability and 
practicality as it entails to trigger DR without compromising comfort. Moreover, it 
allows households to keep their level of response over time as the effort needed to 
provide DR is limited. From the point of view of utilities, this also benefits reliability 
and controllability of DR facilitating easier integration in power system operation.  
Following from the rise of technology and the increased need for flexibility, energy 
industry and policy makers recognize the usefulness of DR. This is the case for 
generators, retailers, transmission system operators, and distribution system 
operators. Their interest sprouts either from regulatory, economic, or reliability 
incentives.  
Benefits for households and power system operation resulting from DR can be 
substantial. This is shown to be the case for WA and BEV shifting based on DP. 
Under RTP, nearly all BEV owners annually save between 100 and €200 by 
scheduling consumption. If these savings do not come at costs of comfort, 
participation of vehicle owners seems viable. For WAs, the picture looks different as 
the average household saves €18 by scheduling consumption. Nevertheless, some 
households save more than double. The latter might be interested in shifting 
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consumption to reap these savings. Apart from financial incentives, environmental 
incentives are not considered. Following from DR at household level, also significant 
cost savings can be reaped at the power system level. Hereby, integration of BEVs 
has considerable impact on power system operation and investment. Under the 
assumptions that no BEVs are integrated yet and that the expected share of BEVs 
amounts 30% of all light-duty vehicles in 2025, 223 M€ or 1.3% of total Belgian 
operating and investment costs can be saved. Moreover, DR with BEVs provides an 
efficient means to prevent curtailment of generation from RES. Therefore, scheduled 
charging of those vehicles seems appropriate upon massive integration as this helps 
reaching policy targets such as the integration of renewables while saving money. 
For WA scheduling, again this picture looks different as savings are more limited. 
Hereby, the amount of demand is not large enough to influence investment 
decisions, nor to influence operational costs to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, 
DR again proves to be an efficient means to prevent curtailment of generation from 
renewables. 
Demand response can be triggered using different dynamic pricing schemes. As 
stipulated, a balance needs to be found between tariff principles related to costs and 
social acceptability and practicality on the one hand and its resulting demand 
response incentive on the other. In order to reach substantial savings following from 
DR, sufficient dynamics in tariff schemes are key. Therefore, smaller price blocks 
implying larger price differences seem appropriate in order to incentivize DR. An 
example of such a tariff scheme is real-time pricing (RTP). To allow residential users 
to react to variability in prices while keeping their comfort level, inclusion of 
automation seems essential. It allows meeting principles of social acceptability and 
practicality, while prevailing cost related tariff principles and triggering DR.  
8.2 Recommendations for further research 
Recommendations for further research following from this thesis are twofold. First of 
all, expansions and improvements of the models discussed in this thesis are 
suggested. Second, other interesting research paths linked to this thesis are 
discussed. 
8.2.1 Model expansions and improvements 
This thesis covers several models: a model for development of dynamic pricing 
schemes, a WA and WG scheduler, a statistical model for calculating price elasticities, 
an operational model which includes DR in power system operation, and an 
investment model which includes short-term system operation and long-term 
demand uncertainty. Possible improvements for each of these models are possible. 
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Currently, the model for development of dynamic prices is based on wholesale prices 
and residential load profiles. Adding to cost causality, a more detailed inclusion of 
several cost categories seems appropriate. Nevertheless, detailed cost information 
from DSOs, TSOs, generators and retailers is not readily available. Moreover, the 
relationship between costs and residential generation or consumption is not 
straightforward. Note also that translating costs into prices based on a mixture of 
rate designs such as energy based pricing, capacity based pricing, and fixed pricing 
remains subject to further research. 
The WA scheduler assumes residential users to set a shifting potential of 8 hours 
during which the appliance cycle needs to be finished. Although this aligns with 
averages derived from the LINEAR-project, including a distribution of shifting 
potential over different households would further add to a realistic outcome of 
simulations.  
The scheduler assumes that BEVs can charge during stand-still at home, covering the 
period from arriving until departing. Specific charging settings of vehicle owners are 
neglected. Moreover, fast charging and vehicle-to-grid charging are neglected.  
The almost ideal demand system (AIDS) within this thesis estimates price elasticities 
based on REN-pricing. Expanding this model in order to estimate hourly elasticities 
would be interesting as this leads to more detailed results of demand changes over 
the course of the day. Another interesting research path would be to compare results 
from AIDS with other functional forms such as generalized Leontief and generalized 
McFadden. Moreover, including elasticity results in classical models for predicting 
demand would allow to further test the usefulness of estimated price elasticities. 
Finally, as shown in this thesis, a quantification of DR based on price elasticities does 
not fully align with economic theory in the simulated and automated cases. 
Therefore, developing new models that allow for a more accurate and finer 
representation of DR shows significant potential.  
In modeling power system operation, interconnection capacity, transmission 
capacity, market behavior, demand uncertainty, and uncertainty in power generation 
from solar plants are neglected. Moreover, no stochasticity is included in the day-
ahead optimization stage. In modeling DR, the willingness of households to provide 
flexibility and the cost it brings are not included. Furthermore, individual WA 
characteristics per household are not considered. Integrating this would further 
benefit a realistic outcome. Other paths for future research are the inclusion of a 
sensitivity analysis on reserve requirements, residential controllable generation 
technologies and vehicle-to-grid charging. Finally, including DR in the second stage 
of the operational model would allow it to contribute to corrective actions needed 
due to forced outages or forecast errors of power generation from RES. This real-
time DR could significantly impact results. 
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A first improvement of the investment model is to integrate other technologies with 
various capacities in the decision tree. Although this contributes to a more realistic 
outcome, the enlarged state space increases calculation time enormously. Second, a 
deeper assessment of the uncertainty tree can lead to a more realistic outcome.  
8.2.2 Other research paths 
Several research paths related to DR and DP remain open to be explored.  
The impact of remuneration schemes for residential generation facilities on 
residential bills but also on the DR incentive is largely untested. Different 
remuneration schemes exist, yet the impact on DR is often not considered during 
implementation. Nevertheless, it is considerable as partly shown in Chapter 2. 
Therefore, more elaborated research to describe this impact seems necessary. 
Within this thesis, simulations of residential DR focus on WAs and BEVs. Including 
other residential appliances such as heat pumps and cold appliances could expand 
current conclusions.  
Practical results in this thesis are based on the LINEAR project. This project enabled 
a first step towards implementation of DR and DP. Nevertheless, additional testing is 
needed to reach commercial implementation. Therefore, additional field tests 
involving more households, different user interfaces, and different dynamic pricing 
schemes may contribute to better knowledge of consumer behavior. 
Distribution and transmission constraints are not considered in this thesis. Including 
these technical constraints in economic optimizations provides insights in feasibility of 
results as described. 
While this thesis provides insights in savings for households and the power system as 
a whole, the distribution of these savings and the value flows amongst the different 
stakeholders are not discussed. Moreover, cost aspects of including DR within the 
system are not covered. Both distribution of savings and inclusion of costs remain 
subject to further research. 
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Appendix A  
Optimal price elasticities based on simulation with wet 
appliances under different tariff schemes 
Within this thesis dissertation, optimal elasticities under renewable pricing are 
derived for the cases in which wet appliances and battery electric vehicles are 
simulated. This naming is chosen as these elasticities follow from optimized flexible 
demand profiles. Hereby, flexible demand is always shifted to the lowest price period 
independent of relative price differences between periods. Therefore, these 
elasticities align with a best case scenario as households are extremely price 
sensitive within the boundaries of their comfort zone.  
To illustrate the dependency of the optimal elasticities on price, the own elasticities 
based on wet appliance shifting for three different pricing schemes are shown in Fig. 
A.1. The different pricing schemes are all obtained based on the renewable pricing 
scheme (REN) as described in this dissertation. The base pricing scheme equals REN, 
while in the other pricing schemes a flat component of 5 and 15 c€/kWh is added on 
top of REN. This ensures that absolute price differences between price periods 
remain the same, while relative price differences change.  
 
 
Fig. A.1.  Own price elasticities based on wet appliance shifting under three different pricing 
schemes: renewable pricing (REN), REN plus a flat component of 5 c€/kWh, and REN plus a flat 
component of 15 c€/kWh. 
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As shown in Fig. A.1., own optimal elasticities depend on the pricing scheme itself. 
Own optimal price elasticities become more negative when a flat component is added 
to the REN pricing scheme. This follows from a decrease of the relative pricing 
differences between peak and off-peak periods while the demand shift remains the 
same. In other words, the same demand response following from smaller relative 
price differences leads to more negative price elasticities. This illustrates the 
importance of the naming of the optimal price elasticities throughout this thesis. As a 
consequence, the optimal elasticities based on simulation within this thesis are only 
valid under similar tariff schemes.  
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Appendix B  
Inclusion of residential demand response in power 
system operation 
This appendix provides the specific mathematical formulation of the inclusion of 
demand response within the deterministic unit commitment and economic dispatch 
model used in this dissertation. Therefore, the main indices, parameters, variables, 
and equations are provided. A distinction is made between demand response with 
wet appliances (WAs) and demand response with battery electric vehicles (BEVs). A 
detailed description of the former can be found in Dietrich et al. [126], while the 
latter is thoroughly discussed in Ramos et al. [139] and Bañez et al. [131]. 
Constraints related to reserve requirements or technical characteristics of power 
plants are omitted for simplicity, but can be found in Dietrich et al. [126]. 
Indices 
General  
𝑝, 𝑝’   Time period. 
𝑔 Generators. 
𝑡  Thermal plants ({t g}). 
ℎ  Pumped storage hydro plants ({h g}). 
Inclusion WAs 
𝑎 Types of appliances. 
Inclusion BEVs 
𝑒 Types of BEVs. 
𝑠, 𝑠’ State of the BEV {sc (connected to the grid), sm 
(moving)}. 
Parameters 
General   
𝐷𝑝   Demand for period p [MW].  
𝑈𝑛𝑐𝐺𝑝 Power generation from uncontrollable capacity (wind 
capacity, solar, biomass, CHP, hydro run-of-river 
capacity) in period p [MW]. 
𝑈𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐶, 𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐶 Upward and downward reserve deficit cost [€/MWh]. 
𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶 Non-supplied energy cost [€/MWh]. 
𝐹𝐶𝑡 Fixed cost of thermal unit t [€/h]. 
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𝑉𝐶𝑡 Variable cost of thermal unit t [€/MWh]. 
𝑆𝐶𝑡 Start-up cost of thermal unit t [€]. 
Inclusion WAs 
𝐷𝑈𝑝𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑎  Maximum upward variation of demand for each 
appliance type a [p.u.]. 
𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑎  Maximum downward variation of demand for each 
appliance type a [p.u.]. 
Inclusion BEVs 
𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑝
𝑒 Maximum power charged by BEV e in period p [MW]. 
𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒 Maximum energy charged by BEV e [MWh]. 
𝐸𝑃𝑝
𝑒,𝑠 Percentage of BEV of type e and in the state s for each 
period p [p.u.]. 
𝐸𝑃𝑇𝑝
𝑒,𝑠,𝑠′ Percentage of BEV of type e and in the state s’ that 
move to the state s for each period p [p.u.]. 
𝐸𝑇𝑝
𝑒,𝑠  Battery energy used in transport of each type of BEV e  
in each state s for each period p [MWh]. 
𝐸𝐸𝑓𝐺𝑡𝐵𝑒   Grid-to-battery efficiency for each type of BEV e [p.u.]. 
𝐸𝐸𝑓𝐵𝑡𝑊𝑒  Battery-to-wheel efficiency for each type of BEV e [p.u.]. 
Variables 
General  
𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 Total operational cost [€]. 
𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑝 Non-supplied power in period p [MW]. 
𝑤𝑐𝑝 Wind curtailment in period p [MW]. 
𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑝 , 𝑑𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑝  Upward and downward reserve deficit in period p [MW]. 
𝑠𝑡𝑝
𝑡  Start-up thermal unit t in period p {0,1}. 
𝑢𝑐𝑝
𝑡  Commitment of thermal unit t in period p {0,1}. 
𝑔𝑝𝑝
𝑔
 Output of generator g in period p [MW]. 
𝑔𝑐𝑝
ℎ Consumption of pumped storage hydro plant h in period 
p [MW]. 
Inclusion WAs 
𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑝,𝑎  , 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑝,𝑎 Upward and downward demand variation for each type 
of appliance in period p [MW]. 
Inclusion BEVs 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑝
𝑒,𝑠 State of charge (SOC) of the battery of BEV e at the end 
of period p in each state s [MWh]. 
𝑒𝑐𝑝
𝑒,𝑠 Consumption of BEV e  in state s in period p [MW]. 
𝑐ℎ𝑝
𝑒 BEV e charging indicator in period p {0,1}. 
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Objective function 
Min. 𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =  ∑ [
∑(𝐹𝐶𝑡 ∙  𝑢𝑐𝑝
𝑡  +  𝑆𝐶𝑡 ∙  𝑠𝑡𝑝
𝑡 + 𝑉𝐶𝑡  ∙  𝑔𝑝𝑝
𝑡 )
𝑡
+ 
𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶 ∙ 𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑝 + 𝑈𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐶 ∙  𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑝 +  𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐶 ∙  𝑑𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑝
]
𝑝
 
(A.1) 
Constraints related to inclusion of WAs 
Modified demand-supply balance constraint 
𝐷𝑝 + 𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑝,𝑎 − 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑝,𝑎 − 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝐺𝑝 − 𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑝 + 𝑤𝑐𝑝 =  ∑ 𝑔𝑝𝑝
𝑔 − ∑  𝑔𝑐𝑝
ℎ
ℎ𝑔
 ∀ 𝑝 (A.2) 
Upward and downward daily demand variation balance per appliance type 
∑ 𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑝,𝑎
𝑝∈{1,24}
= ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑝,𝑎
𝑝∈{1,24}
 ∀ 𝑎 (A.3) 
Maximum demand shift per appliance type 
(
𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑎
𝐷𝑈𝑝𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑎
) ∙ 𝐷𝑝 ≥ (
𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑝,𝑎
𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑝,𝑎
) ≥ 0  
∀ 𝑝, 𝑎 (A.4) 
Constraints related to inclusion of BEVs 
Modified demand-supply balance constraint 
𝐷𝑝 + ∑ 𝑒𝑐𝑝
𝑒,𝑠
𝑒,𝑠
− 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝐺𝑝 − 𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑝 + 𝑤𝑐𝑝 =  ∑ 𝑔𝑝𝑝
𝑔
− ∑  𝑔𝑐𝑝
ℎ
ℎ𝑔
 ∀ 𝑝 (A.5) 
State of charge of battery 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑝
𝑒,𝑠 − 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑝−1
𝑒,𝑠 = 𝑒𝑐𝑝
𝑒,𝑠 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑓𝐺𝑡𝐵𝑒 −
𝐸𝑇𝑝
𝑒,𝑠
𝐸𝐸𝑓𝐵𝑡𝑊𝑒
+ ∑ 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑝−1
𝑒,𝑠′ ∙ 𝐸𝑃𝑇𝑝−1
𝑒,𝑠,𝑠′
𝑠′≠𝑠
 
∀ 𝑝, 𝑒, 𝑠 (A.6) 
Logical BEV constraints of BEV when moving and plugged-in 
𝑒𝑐𝑝
𝑒,𝑠 = 0  ∀ 𝑠 ∈ 𝑠𝑚 
∀ 𝑝, 𝑒, 𝑠 (A.7) 
𝐸𝑇𝑝
𝑒,𝑠 = 0  ∀ 𝑠 ∈ 𝑠𝑐 
Maximum charging power  
𝑒𝑐𝑝
𝑒,𝑠 ≤ (1 − 𝑐ℎ𝑝
𝑒 ) ∙ 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑝
𝑒 ∙ 𝐸𝑃𝑝
𝑒,𝑠 ∀ 𝑝, 𝑒, 𝑠 (A.8) 
Maximum energy that can be charged in one period 
𝑒𝑐𝑝
𝑒,𝑠
≤ 𝐸𝑃𝑝
𝑒,𝑠 ∙ (𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑒 − 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑝
𝑒,𝑠) ∀ 𝑝, 𝑒, 𝑠 (A.9) 
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